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ABSTRACT 
 
The Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) is home to the largest tuna 
fishery stock in the world. However, Pacific Island members of the Western 
and Central Pacific Tuna Commission (WCPTC) argue that their share of the 
economic rent from the tuna catches taken out of the Pacific region is very 
small, being on average only about 6% of the total net benefit, when 
compared to the share earned by Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFNs). 
Kiribati is one of the Pacific Island Countries (PICs), which relies heavily on 
its fishery for its economic development and sustainability. Kiribati earns 40% 
- 50 % of its government revenue from fisheries access fees paid by DWFNs 
for tuna caught in the the Kiribati EEZ. The Government of Kiribati (GoK) 
believes that Kiribati could get greater benefit if they develop their own 
domestic tuna fishery.  
 
This study uses Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) and SWOT Analysis to 
investigate whether domestication of the tuna fishery is the right move for 
Kiribati or not. The CBA reported in this thesis adapted a model developed by 
Campbell (2004) to investigate and evaluate fisheries policy in Papua New 
Guinea (PNG). However the model in this thesis is reflective of the situation 
and case of Kiribati. In analyzing the different options identified in this study, 
the CBA indicated negative (-) NPV(s) for the medium-sized vessel option 
and positive (+) NPV(s) for the large-sized vessel option. The SWOT analysis 
however, complemented the CBA by further investigating the tuna 
domestication options in the economic, social and business and business 
environment of Kiribati. The SWOT analysis indicated that the existing 
situation and business conditions in Kiribati appears to favor the small to 
medium sized vessel options which are less risky than the large purse seine 
vessel option.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Kiribati Location, Social and Economic Background. 
 
The Republic of Kiribati is a Micronesian island state in the Central Pacific 
situated where the international dateline crosses over the equator (Figure 1.1). At 
the 2005 census, the population was estimated to be just over 90,000. The 
Republic of Kiribati comprises of 33 mostly low-lying coral atolls, divided up 
into 3 distinct island groups namely, the Gilbert Group to the west, the Phoenix 
Islands in the middle and the Line Islands Group to the east. All 33 islands of 
Kiribati are scattered over a huge exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 3.5 million 
square kilometres Throsby (2001), making it one of the most important and 
attractive fishing areas in the Pacific region for major international fishing nations 
or Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFN). All together, the three Island groups 
are spread across 5,000 km of the Pacific Ocean straddling the equator, and 
stretching from about 165° E Longitude around east of Nauru to about 145° W 
Longitude around the south of Hawaii. Some of the islands are separated by 
stretches of international waters and the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of 
other countries. However, the total land area of Kiribati is only about 810.5 square 
kilometres and the ratio of land to water surface is 1: 4,377. Most of the islands in 
Kiribati are low lying, rising a mere 2 - 3 metres above sea level and, therefore, 
making them extremely vulnerable to climate change impacts, particularly to 
those associated with rising sea levels. Kiribati has a very narrow resource base 
with limited scope for agriculture, mineral or husbandry produce. Figure 1.1 
shows the map of Kiribati and where it lies across the Pacific Ocean.  
 
Kiribati is one of the Pacific Island countries (PICs) that rely on its fisheries for 
its economy and subsistence living for its people. The Government of Kiribati 
earned more than 60% of its revenue from the fisheries sector alone, particularly 
from the abundant tuna resources available in its waters. Nonetheless, there has 
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been increasing concern by the Kiribati government, as well as the governments 
of other PICs, that the share of the economic rent PICs are getting from their tuna 
resources is very small compared to other similar fishing arrangements in other 
parts of the world. 
Figure 1.1 Kiribati 
Map.
(Source : Youngumi Choi, Secretariat of the Pacific Community, Noumea, New Caledonia; 
extracted from (Petersen, 2006)). 
  
Approximately 20% of the total tuna catch from Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean (WCPO) was taken from Kiribati’s EEZ in 1999 Gillett and Lightfoot 
(2001).This equates to the third largest tuna catch recorded in the region behind 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the Federated States of Micronesians (FSM). It is 
important to note however, that almost all of the fish each year are caught by 
DFWNs.  
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1.2 WCPO Tuna Fishery. 
 
The extension of coastal jurisdiction from 12 to 200 nautical miles in the late 
1970s has been a substantial gain to PICs because it enabled them extend their 
territory and thereby gain control over a much wider rich tuna fishing grounds. 
The United Nations Convention of the Sea (UNCLOS) helped establish Pacific 
islands sovereignty over their 200 mile EEZ in the early 1980s (Petersen 2006). 
 
The western and central pacific is currently the most important tuna-fishing 
region in the world. It represents approximately 70 percent of the total estimated 
Pacific Ocean catch of 2.7 million tonnes in 2003 and close to 50 percent of the 
global tuna catch, approximately 4 million tonnes in 2003 Petersen (2006). The 
Western and Central Pacific supplies approximately 40 to 60 percent of all tuna 
for canning purposes and 30 per cent of the tuna for the high priced sashimi (raw 
fish) market Aqorau (2004). Historically 90 per cent of catch has been harvested 
by the four main distant water fishing nations of Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and the 
United States of America. Petersen (2006) compares the total tuna catches of the 
four DWFNs to six other countries, five of which are Pacific island countries. 
Table 1.1 below shows the difference in catches by DWFNs compared to other 
fishing nations of the Pacific. 
 
Table 1.1 Tuna Catches from the top ten countries fishing in the Western 
and Central Pacific (thousand metric tonnes). 
Notes: 
 a Unites states of America excluding American Samoa; b Federated States of Micronesia 
 Source: SPC (2000) and Petersen (2002a) extracted from Petersen (2006). 
    1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 
Japan  305 519 436 444 440 
Taiwan  19 23 140 205 277 
Korea  17 51 209 205 196 
USA a  0 11 164 168 134 
Solomon Is  0 24 30 54 13 
Philippines  0 0 24 28  
Vanuatu  0 0 0 8 36 
PNG  2 34 0 15 70 
FSM b  0 0 0 8 22 
Australia   0 1 2 7 7 
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Obviously the four major DWFNs dominate the fishing activity in the region. By 
comparison, the fishing activities of the smaller DWFNs including the Philippines 
and Australia are very minimal. It can also be noted from the table that, with the 
exception of Papua New Guinea (PNG), most Pacific countries entered the fishing 
industry after the 1980s. The Solomon Islands, for example, started fishing in the 
1980s while Vanuatu and FSM started later in the mid 1990s. In any event, 
however, the access fees paid by major DWFNs has in all cases been less than 10 
per cent of their gross revenue as illustrated in table 1.2 below. 
 
Table 1.2 Access fees paid by DWFNs 
         
Distant Water Fishing 
Nations   Access fee   
    (Per cent of gross revenue)   
    World Bank Van Santen and Muller 
    (1996)  (2000)   
United States   10  10   
Japan    5  1.1   
Taiwan    3.7  3.8   
Republic of 
Korea   2.2  3.4   
(Source: Petersen 2003; extracted from Petersen (2006)) 
 
Fisheries resources of the Pacific represent a major source of food and income for 
Pacific Island Countries (PICs) and for many Pacific people is the main prospect 
for sustainable economic development. The maximisation of return from these 
resources and their sustainable conservation and management is therefore 
fundamental to the long term socio-economic wellbeing and stability of the 
region, as is the protection of those resources.  
 
PICs including Kiribati, are well aware of the fact that other tuna fishing areas in 
the world such as the Indian ocean, Antarctic ocean, the African ocean and others 
have all been over - fished to the extent that they are on the verge of collapsing. 
PICs are also equally mindful of the fact that there is currently a general rush by 
DWFNs moving towards securing their fishing spots in the Pacific region. 
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1.3 Concern over PIC share of Tuna Economic Rent.  
 
Leaders of PICs share the same concern that; i) their share of economic rent from 
the tuna caught from the region is very small compared to that earned by other 
countries in other fishing areas of the world; ii) the tuna resources in the WCPO 
are exploited by DWFNs. The world’s fishing industry is constantly expanding 
and developing with the deployment of new technologies, skill and equipment 
such as global positioning devices, sonar, fish detectors, driftnets, spotter planes 
and helicopters, as well as new fishing approaches such as the transhipment of 
fresh tuna in search of greater productivity and profitability, however the new 
technologies are very destructive to fish stock worldwide in particular in PICs. 
 
The PICs concern over the share of the economic rent from their tuna resources 
continues until today. ADB (2001) reported that out of the US$3 billion generated 
in 1999, the region only received about US$60.3 million in access fees for fishing 
activities in that year. This represents only around 13% of gross revenue at 1996 
levels of effort or 6% of the total value of tuna catch from the WCPO, whereas 
Muller (1992) points out, approximately 95% of tuna revenues are earned by the 
distant water fishing nations (DWFNs). The record in 2005 as reported in, Parris 
(2005) states that other countries in other fishing areas of the world are earning 
quite substantially more, ranging between 30 - 40% of the total net benefit of the 
value of the tuna taken from their waters. Chand et al (2003) and Iheduru, (1995) 
also argued that the access fees paid by DWFNs are very small compared to other 
countries. For instance, Chand et al (2003) stated that the European Union is 
paying the African countries for access fees that range from 18% to 45% of the 
value of their catch. The average yearly tuna catch in the late 1990s from West 
Africa was only 385,000 MT, and in the Western and Central Pacific (WCP), it 
was 1,000,000 in that same period. One of the main reasons for this one-sided 
state of affairs is due to the fact that small PICs have limited capacity and 
bargaining power to properly negotiate with DWFNs for higher access fees.  
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Further, reports have been updated and the concern continues until today. Gillett 
and Lightfoot (2001) also reported that the distribution of access fees within the 
WCP is not only small but also uneven. For instance, Fiji is not a fishing nation, 
but they managed to take advantage of their good port facility to attract big 
DWFNs vessels to off-load their catches in the Fiji port. Further, the fisheries 
policy in Fiji concentrates on tuna processing, and while their catch is not to 
sufficient to support the domestic processing industry, the DWFN vessels also 
provided catch for the industry, thus enabling Fiji to export and compete in the 
world market. Fiji is not a fishing nation, but they earn more revenue than Kiribati 
earns from its tuna fishery. Apparently, regional management is critical as there is 
need consider how to manage the natural resource given that you don’t have the 
human or manmade capital.  
 
In response to these concerns, most PICs have considered domestication of the 
tuna fishing industry with a view to increase their participation in the tuna fishing 
activity within their EEZ. As (Barclay 2005) reports most prominent desire 
expressed by the PICs was to capture more of the wealth generated by regional 
tuna industries in their domestic economies in a manner that is sustainable and 
consistent with the principles of social equity. PICs believed that domestication 
can slowly assist in avoiding overfishing, whereby PICs increase their 
participation in the fishing activity of their own resources. PICs should consider 
getting involved in the harvesting of the tuna resources and developing their own 
fishing industries instead of letting the DWFNs dominate the whole fishing 
process.  
 
Concerns over equity and distributional issues have prompted numerous seminars, 
workshops and conferences focused on the potential for domestication of the tuna 
industries by PICs. Sawhney (1996) stated at a UNESCAP (United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific) seminar held in 1996, 
for instance, that tuna stocks have the greatest potential for the expansion of 
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exports from PICs. Petersen, (2006) also supported this conclusion and further 
commented that the dependence on tuna is already unmatched elsewhere in the 
world and is likely to increase, causing the ownership of tuna, and the right to 
harvest it, to become one of the most highly sensitive and important issues 
politically and economically amongst PICs.  
 
To address the related concern of sustainability the PICs, through FFA, SPC and 
the WCPTC, are also taking pro-active measures to ensure that sustainable 
management of the tuna stock in the Pacific region is enforced effectively to 
avoid over-fishing in the Pacific’s EEZ.  
 
1.4 History of domestication in the PICs - Kiribati.  
 
Although PICs believed they could easily duplicate what DWFNs do to earn as 
much profit and benefit as possible, the ensuing 20 to 30 years, shows little 
progress has been made in developing viable and sustainable tuna based 
enterprises in the region.  The history of domestication in PICs is characterised by 
repeated failures, especially for the small PICs. For instance in Kiribati, the 
development of domestic participation in tuna fishery has been struggled since 
Kiribati gained independence in 1979.   
 
After Independence Kiribati was donated several fishing vessels by Europe and 
Japan to develop a domestic pole and line fishing industry. These were operated 
by a government owned company Te Mautari Ltd (TML). In 1987 the fleet 
peaked at six vessels but due to maintenance problems two were decommissioned 
soon after that, and often only three of the remaining four vessels were active. 
Despite donor funded overhauls of facilities and vessels on a couple of occasions 
the company was never very productive. During the 1990s one of the vessels was 
converted for long lining and training conducted by a Japanese master fisherman, 
but poor maintenance prevented the long line vessel from functioning well. 
During the last few years of TML’s operation it had only two pole and line 
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vessels, both of which eventually sank in the early 2000s (Chapman 2003), pp.2-
3). 
 
Ribwanataake (2004), states that the major contributors to failure of previous 
domestication efforts were the lack of skilled man power to operate effective 
fishing vessels, the improper transfer of knowledge and technology by donor 
countries who are at the same time were DWFNs, undermining the Kiribati 
development to safe guard their own interest and also the geographical nature and 
isolation of the Kiribati Islands, which makes it very disadvantaged to develop 
their land based support facilities for the tuna industry.   
 
The effort to domesticate tuna fishing continued, with more focus on training. 
There were a few small agencies training Kiribati fishermen to work on distant 
water fleets. The first of these was developed by Japan Tuna (the major Japanese 
tuna industry organization) who established a Fisheries Training Centre in 1989 to 
train the crew, and the Kiribati Fisherman Service (KFS) to recruit them. 
Following the success of this the Kiribati government negotiated with other 
distant water fleets as part of their access agreements to employ small numbers of 
crew on each of their vessels licensed to fish in Kiribati’s EEZ. The Fisheries 
Division was then doing some training, and much of the recruitment to the non 
Japanese fleets was being done by the government owned company Central 
Pacific Producers (CPP), although apparently there were also private sector 
companies doing training and recruiting (Yeeting 2005).  
 
Another outcome of the government/Cabinet in relation to the government dream 
of domestication is the development of the Kiribati Tuna Development and 
Management Plan (TDMP) in 1999. This is the outcome of the Tuna Task Force 
appointed in October 1999 by Cabinet to address the development and 
management of the tuna industry for Kiribati. However the plan had not been 
taken forward by the government in 2005. One reason for this was that the TDMP 
needed further work and review, especially in light of the new fisheries legislation 
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that was needed. As a legal basis for their plan, Kiribati was using their old 
Fisheries Act, which had been amended from time to time, and which FFA was 
helping them revise in 2005. The TDMP called for the establishment of an 
Authority along the lines of PNG’s National Fisheries Authority or Australia’s 
Fisheries Management Authority, which would be funded by vessel registration 
fees. The existing legislation needed to be revised so that an Authority could be 
established Barclay (2005).  Because there was no follow up action to facilitate 
the legal requirements of the TDMP, the Authority has not been established and 
the Plan has not been implemented.     
 
Kiribati is not alone in their struggle to domesticate the tuna fishery, which 
similar stories emerging from several other studies of PICs such as Tonga, Samoa, 
and Fiji. Among the only exceptions is PNG where domestication is progressing 
relatively well. Chapman (2003), Barclay (2005), Langley A., Williams P., and 
Hampton J, (2006), Campbell (2006) and Hampton J, (2006).  
 
1.5 Continued Dream of Kiribati. 
 
While most of the previous efforts by PICs to domesticate the tuna industry have 
failed, the government of Kiribati and the Ministry concerned did not give up but 
continued to seek assistance from fisheries experts overseas and from within the 
region. The government still believed that there is an opportunity to develop the 
fisheries industry domestically by identifying project that might succeed despite 
the infrastructure, capital and isolation issues identified in previous studies. The 
Government’s optimism was based on the belief that they could duplicate other 
small countries of very similar characteristics, in particular the Marshall Islands 
and the Maldives experiences in medium fishing scale and small scale long line 
fishing respectively.     
 
For instance, President Anote Tong government’s main hope for development 
from tuna resources was to establish some form of processing factory, based on 
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the success of a private sector loining plant that had operated in Marshall Islands 
(but which by mid 2005 had closed) Barclay, (2005). 
 
Barclay (2005) also states that transhipping and service industries were also seen 
as a development opportunity in Kiribati, again following the example set by the 
Marshall Islands. Some transhipping was also conducted in Tarawa lagoon, 
although several constraints – including limited supplies of provisions, limited 
freight connections for exporting fish, lack of wharf facilities, and fluctuations in 
port usage due to the migratory nature of the resource – have limited development 
in this sector.  
 
1.6 Need to take a harder look at whether domestication is better than 
managing access fees 
 
The goal of the thesis, given the continued dream of the government to pursue the 
domestication of the tuna industry, to carefully consider whether domestication is 
better than managing access fees, or whether there is need to consider both 
policies to improve the economic rent of the tuna resources.    
 
It is important to note that there is an opportunity cost of domesticating the tuna 
fishery. It should be stressed to the government that developing a tuna fishing 
industry will have an effect on the access fees revenue. The Forum Fisheries 
Agency (FFA), the Secretariat of the Pacific Commission (SPC) and the Western 
and Central Pacific Tuna Commission (WCPTC) are working together to enforce 
sustainable tuna catch levels through a quota allocation system for member 
countries. Under this system member countries are allowed to fish and/or sell 
their quotas to DWFNs in exchange for access fees but only to the allocated 
amount set by FFA and the WCPTC. Countries like Kiribati, Tuvalu and other 
small islands nations (SINs) are selling their quotas in return of negotiated fees. 
Accordingly and as been reported in Table 1.2 above, Kiribati earned 61% of its 
total revenue from access fees. In this regard, the government of Kiribati is 
sensitive to any effect on access fees because it forms a major part of its revenue.  
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For these reasons, it is important to compare the economic and financial net 
benefits of developing the tuna fishery in Kiribati with the stream of access fees 
that are associated with the sale of fishing quotas. If a proposed development 
project is going to bring massive benefit to the economy of Kiribati both in terms 
of government revenue, and improved community wellbeing, then the 
government would be pleased to forgo some proportion of its revenue in return 
for more benefits from developing a tuna fishing industry. This is going to be the 
main focus of this present study.  
 
The analysis of fishery domestication options in Kiribati will be based on SWOT 
analysis and Cost Benefit Analysis. The SWOT analysis, presented in Chapter 
Three will provide a qualitative examination of the forces and factors that may 
either help or hinder the domestication efforts. The CBA will provide a more 
quantitative analysis of the net social benefits associated with a tightly defined 
range of projects. The cost benefit model will be based on previous work by 
Campbell (2004 & 2006), who considered domestication options for PNG. The 
purpose of the CBA is to provide the readers and decision makers with the Net 
Present Value (NPV) of developing the tuna fishing industry in Kiribati. The NPV 
information will indicate whether it is a good idea for Kiribati to invest in the 
industry or whether Kiribati would be better off selling its quota in return for 
access fees alone.     
 
1.7 Scope of the Study. 
 
The origin of the problem comes from the main two-fold concerns of PICs in 
relation to tuna resource management in particular; i) sustainability of tuna stock 
in the WCPO; and ii) maximisation of the economic rent or net benefits from tuna 
resource. The present study will be focusing on one of these two major concerns; 
i.e. maximisation of net benefit of the tuna resource. A recent study by Barclay 
(2006) assumed that there are two main ways in which Pacific island countries 
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could capture more wealth from tuna, and they are through; i) the development of 
domestic tuna industry and ii) maximising returns from distant water fleets. 
 
This analysis will contribute to the domestication debate by carefully considering 
a range of development options for tuna harvesting in Kiribati. After a qualitative 
consideration of the carious internal and external factors that may influence the 
success of the development options. The study will apply a modified form of 
Campbell’s cost-benefit analysis (CBA) model to calculate the value of the 
development options for Kiribati and related stakeholders.  
 
However given the limited data short time-framework, the study will examine a 
pre-determined set of five options identified during the study, in particular the 
small-medium scale and for large scale fishing industry. The present study will 
also be a development study from previous studies but to critically analyse the 
real situation of Kiribati and to confirm the findings of previous studies if 
domestication is really a good idea for Kiribati.  
 
1.8 Problem Statement. 
 
Kiribati provides 20% of the total tuna catch from the WCPO. However it is 
becoming a major concern of the government of Kiribati and as well as other PICs 
that a large proportion of economic return from their tuna goes to DWFNs while 
they can earn only a small proportion of that benefit. The Pacific Island countries 
have long sought to increase their share of economic rents from the South Pacific 
tuna fishery. The opportunity for the PICs to increase the net benefit may lie in 
their capacity and potential to develop a domestic tuna fishing industry. The 
governments of many PICs adopted a new strategy in the 1990s of trying to force 
domestication of the industry with a view that they could duplicate distant water-
fishing nation activities to yield greater benefits from their own fishery. However, 
most of the domestication activities proved failures and were not successful. The 
governments of Pacific Island Countries together with the assistance of foreign 
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aid invested millions of dollars into developing tuna industries in the Islands but 
there is little evidence of success. It was suggested Tamate (2002), Savins (2001), 
Beverly (2003), Barclay (2006) that infrastructure improvement and a review of 
government tuna policy and regulations were required to address the issues and 
obstacles to the successful implementation of the tuna industry in PICs. 
 
The government of Kiribati believes that domestication of tuna is the path for 
economic development. However the development of domestic industries is slow 
and typically not successful. The Kiribati Tuna Development and Management 
Plan 2003 - 2006 (KTDMP) identifies the development of long-lining in Kiribati 
as a development option that may capture greater benefits from the tuna fishery. 
Specific case studies have been conducted to analyse the economic benefits of 
domesticating the tuna fisheries in some other PICs like Samoa, Fiji, PNG and 
Tonga. There is a need for a specific study to address the issues for Kiribati and to 
identify appropriate strategies for successful development of the industry. 
 
1.9 Research Questions. 
 
The study will investigate the following questions:  
 
1) Will development of a domestic tuna fishery provide more benefits for the 
Kiribati economy than access fees from DWFNs? 
 
2) What are appropriate strategies and policies for the Kiribati government to 
implement for domestication of the tuna fisheries?  
 
1.10 Thesis Outline. 
 
Chapter Two will be an overview of the Western and Central Pacific Tuna 
Commission (WCPTC). Chapter Three is a literature review of methodologies 
that have been used in analysing the domestication of the tuna industries in 
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selected Pacific island countries. The main methods as well as their results are 
described in Chapters Four and Five. Finally Chapter Six summarises the findings 
of the study, and offers conclusions and recommendations for policy makers.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL PACIFIC TUNA 
COMMISSION (WCPTC) AND THE CASE OF KIRIBATI 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter will report on the importance of the WCPO’s tuna resource to the 
world’s tuna supply, and how important for the region to realise the worth of the 
tuna catch taken from their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). It will also provide 
an overview of the Pacific region’s collective effort in managing their tuna 
resources, to prevent overfishing and trying to maximise the tuna return to its 
economy.    
 
The Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) is home to the largest tuna 
fishery in the world. Barclay (2006) and Aqorau (2004) state that in 2004, the 
WCPO provided more than half of the world’s tuna supply of which more than 
60% is supplied for canned or processed fish while more than 30% is provided for 
the high priced sashimi market. Reid, (year not dated) state that in 2005 total 
catches were around 2.1 million metric tonnes and the estimated value of the 
catch in excess of US$3 billion.  
 
Of this value, the share captured by Pacific island vessels remains modest. Most 
of the tuna is caught by distant water fishing nations (DWFN), with Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, Taiwan (China), and the United States being the most 
important players. Catches by Pacific Island country fleets represented only about 
11% of the total landed value in 1998.  
 
The value of the catch from the WCPO has increased remarkably in the last few 
years, from about $375 million in 1982 to nearly 2 billion in 1998. In 1998, the 
landed value of tuna caught in the Western and Central Pacific was estimated at 
US$1.92 billion, of which some 68 percent (US$1.3 billion) was caught in Pacific 
island countries’ Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). The annual tuna catch in the 
Pacific Islands appears to have a current value of about 11% of the combined 
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GDP of all the countries in the region. It is half of the value of all exports from 
the region. License fees represent a sizable portion of total public revenue in 
Micronesian countries, accounting in 1998 for 61 percent of the total revenue in 
Kiribati and 29 percent of revenues in the Federated States of Micronesia (Kiribati 
and FSM government statistics (2000); Barclay (2006). In 1997/1998 these fees 
amounted to more than just US$54 million. Kiribati, the Federated States of 
Micronesia (FSM), Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Marshall Islands and the 
Solomon Islands were the top beneficiaries.  
 
Parris and Grafton (2005) also stated that marine resources are vital to the well 
being of the PICs, especially those with a large EEZ, a small population and a tiny 
land mass. In the case of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Tuvalu and 
Kiribati, the value of fish caught in their EEZs exceeds their gross national 
income while in the Marshall Islands, Samoa, and Solomon Islands it is almost 
half of their national income.  
 
2.2 The Western and Central Pacific Ocean.  
 
2.2.1 Where is the WCPO? 
 
The Pacific region is divided up into two geographical areas; the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) and the Eastern Pacific Ocean (EPO) which are 
delineated by 1500 W longitude (Figure 2.1).  Aqorau (2001) defines the 
Convention boundary as it broadly approximates the eastern boundary of the 
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) Convention Area 
(WCP-CA). The boundary of the convention area is defined along the eastern and 
southern ends at 1500 east longitude and 550 south latitude and avoids overlaps 
with the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) and the 
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Living Marine Resources 
(CCAMLR). Ram-Bidesi and Tsamenyi (2003) stated that the Pacific islands 
region consisted of 22 island states and territories covering an aggregate area of 
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over 31 million sq km of which only 555,400 km2 is land. Papua New Guinea 
(PNG) accounted for 83% of the region’s total land area. The EEZ of the PICs 
covers about 50% of the WCPO but provides some 65 to 75 percent of the total 
regional tuna catches.  
 
Figure 2.1: WCPO and EPO 
 
(Source: SPC (2008); page 1) 
 
2.2.2 Tuna in the WCPO. 
 
The four main tuna species that inhabit the western and central pacific fishery are 
skipjack (Katsuwonnus palamis), yellowfin (Thunnus albarcores), bigeye 
(Thunnus obesus) and albacore (Thunnus alalunga). Langley el at (2008), 
reported that skipjack and albacore are not yet overfished. However, it was 
recommended that urgent management actions may be required in the western 
equatorial zone to maintain sustainability of these stocks. The other two species, 
bigeye and yellowfin, were considered over-fished and scientific committee of the 
WCPFC (Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Committee) has strongly advised 
that a 50% reduction in fishing effort is required to maintain the stock at the level 
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that would produce the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) Parris and Grafton 
(2005).  
 
In terms of biological characteristics of the fishery, the status of the skipjack, 
yellowfin and albacore is considered to be healthy. However, while the biological 
limits may not pose any problems, there are concerns that the fishery may have 
reached a situation of economic overcapacity as a result of global oversupply of 
tuna. Bigeye is posing considerable management challenges because of the 
development of a new fishery based on fish aggregating devices (FADs) which is 
compounding the strains already felt in the bigeye fishery. Bigeye is generally 
more valuable but less robust with a slower growth rate. Thus it is more 
susceptible to overexploitation than the other tuna species.  
 
The Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), the Forum Fisheries Agency 
(FFA) and the newly established Western and Central Pacific Tuna Commission 
(WCPTC) aside from their specific and individual functions, share the common 
interest to; i) ensure maximization of economic return or benefit  from sustainable 
harvesting of the tuna resources; and ii) ensure sustainability of the tuna stock.  
 
The most productive area for tuna lies in the equatorial zone of the Pacific region 
stretching from 100 N to 100 S. The equatorial zone alone provides for 80% of the 
total WCPO tuna catch. In 2006, the total tuna catch was estimated at 2,160,314 
mt, accounting to 78% of the total Pacific Ocean catch of 2,771,070 mt, and 50% 
of the global world tuna supply, which is about 3.4 million mt Langley el at. 
(2008).  
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Figure 2.2: Catch distribution by species 
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In 1998, the total catch of tuna in the western and central pacific was 1,893,648 
tonnes, but dropped in 1999 to 1,716,806 tonnes but still provided the majority of 
the catch i.e 48% of the world’s tuna catch. For instance, if we look at the tuna 
catches in the other regions, in 1998 the eastern tropical Pacific tuna catch was 
509,967 tonnes and in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans they were 416,558 and 
702,119 respectively.   
 
In terms of tuna catch distribution by species, of the total tuna catch in 2006, 
Skipjack accounted for 71% of the total catch whilst yellowfin 19%, bigeye 5% 
and albacore 5%.  Langley el at. (2008). Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of tuna 
catch by species.  
 
2.2.3 Fishing methods used in the WCPO. 
 
The total tuna fishery operation in the WCPO is a diverse fishing effort ranging 
from small-scale artisanal operations in the coastal waters of Pacific states to large 
scale industrial and commercial purse-seine, pole-and-line and longline 
operations, both in the EEZ (economic exclusive zones) of Pacific States and in 
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the international waters (high seas) of the WCPO region. The main tuna fishing 
technologies operated in the WCPO are purse-seine, pole-and-line and long-
lining.  
 
The trends in the fishing patterns largely reflect the shifts in fishing technology 
and improvements in gear. While traditionally Pacific Islanders have been fishing 
for tuna since time immemorial, large-scale commercial exploitation of tuna in the 
region began with the Japanese long-range pole-and-line and longline fleets since 
the 1930s. The Japanese pole-and-line and longline fleets fished mainly around 
the Micronesian waters (formerly US Trust Territories). The 1990s is 
characterised by a steady decline in the annual catch rates for the Japanese pole-
and-line fleets. Langley el at (2008), reported that in 1998, 199,000 tonnes of tuna 
was caught by the longline fleets in the region. The report added that 
approximately two-third of the tuna consisted of bigeye and yellowfin, while the 
remaining one-third was made up of albacore. However in the late 1990s to mid 
2000, purse-seine vessels dominated the tuna fishery in the WCPO. In 1998, 
approximately 887,100 tonnes was taken by purse seine fleet. In 2006, purse seine 
catch accounted for 71% of the total catch in 2006. The majority of the purse-
seine vessels are owned by DWFNs. An increasing proportion of the total tuna 
catch has been composed of skipjack, which now constitutes over 80% of the total 
catch. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 below shows distribution of tuna catch by species and 
fishing methods. 
 
Figure 2.3: Annual total catch of skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye and albacore by 
fishing method in the WCP-CA. 
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Figure 2.4: Annual total catch, by species in the WCP-CA. 
 
(Source: SPC (2008). 
 
The less popular fishing methods are pole-and-line and long-line. Both 
technologies have accounted for 10 to 12 percent of the total tuna catch in the 
WCPO over the past 30 years.  The remaining 6 to 8 percent of tuna catch is taken 
by small-scale and artisanal fishing methods. It should be noted, however, that the 
economic factors and technological advances of the purse seine fishery have 
impacted upon a number of pole-and-line vessels. A reduction in the amount of 
pole-and-line fishing effort and catch occurred during the last 15 to 20 years both 
by Japan and some of the domestic Pacific Islands such as Kiribati, Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon, Fiji, Palau and others (see Figure 2.5). This is attributable to 
their inability to compete with the purse seines that employ more efficient fishing 
methods. However, Barclay and Cartwright (2006), pointed out that this is indeed 
an unfortunate turn of events as the pole-and-line is in fact the least ecologically 
damaging and most labour intensive of the three main tuna fishing methods used 
in the WCPO.  
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Figure 2.5: Pole-and-line vessels operating in the WCP-CA. 
 
(Source: SPC, 2008) 
 
2.3 Tuna Management in the WCPO. 
 
2.3.1 The South Pacific Commission. 
 
The SPC (it was then called the South Pacific Commission), was founded in 1947 
as an international organisation, with headquarters in Noumea, New Caledonia. It 
was founded by six developed countries with an interest in the region. The six 
developed countries include; Australia, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. The broad objectives of the SPC are: i) to 
provide a common forum within which the Island peoples and their governments 
can express themselves on issues, problems, needs and ideas common to the 
region, with a view to maintaining the opportunity for all Islands to be heard, 
viewed, considered and assisted on equal terms with one another; ii) to be a 
vehicle for the development and implementation of the concept of regionalism; 
iii) to assist in meeting the basic needs of the peoples of the region; iv) to foster 
and develop means to facilitate the flow of indigenous products, technical know-
how and people among the islands; v) to serve as a catalyst for development of 
regional resources that are beyond the capability of individual island governments 
to develop ; vi) to serve as an aid-organising machine for islands which are 
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otherwise appropriate activities as may be determined by the South Pacific 
Commission) (Aqorau, year not stated). 
 
Two founding members, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom withdraw from 
the commission in 1962 and sometime later in the 1990s respectively. At present 
the SPC’s role has expanded in service of its community and includes more than 
twenty PICs in the region. The name was then changed to the Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community. One of the primary activities of the SPC is the development 
of marine resources and research. In line with this focus, the SPC has established 
the Oceanic Fisheries Programme (OFP). The OFP was previously known as the 
Tuna and Billfish Assessment Programme. Under the supervision of a Fisheries 
Programme Manager, the OFP Scientists undertake stock assessments and carry 
out scientific research into tuna species in the region.  
 
Basically the role of the SPC is to support, promote, and enhance socio-economic 
and political development of Pacific island countries. Among the areas covered by 
SPC, oceanic fisheries including tuna is one of the most important and core areas. 
Statistics and monitoring are regarded as core activities of the Oceanic Fisheries 
Programme since 1981. The activities under the oceanic fisheries programme 
includes the compilation of estimates of annual catches of target tuna and billfish 
species, the estimation of annual catches of non-target species, the compilation of 
operational (logsheet) catch and effort data, data processing on behalf of member 
countries and territories, and the provision of technical support for port sampling 
programmes and observer programmes in member countries and territories. 
Training is another important activity of the SPC. They provide training and 
technical assistance to member countries on fisheries statistics and database 
management. They also publish books and useful information like the Tuna 
Bulletin and the Tuna Fishery Yearbook, statistical analyses, and the provision of 
statistical support to scientific committee of the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission (WCPTC). Clearly the role of the SPC is to provide 
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scientific and advisory information to member countries, FFA, the Forum, 
WCPTC and any other pacific regional organisation.  
 
2.3.2 The Forum Fisheries Agency. 
 
The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) was created in 1979 under the South Pacific 
Forum Fisheries Agency Convention (FFA Convention). The headquarters of the 
FFA is located in Honiara, Solomon Islands. The FFA comprises of the Forum 
Fisheries Committee (the policy making body composed of fisheries ministers or 
their representatives) and the Secretariat of the Agency Aqorau (year not stated).  
 
The role of the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), in so far as tuna management is 
concerned, is to assist member countries to make well informed sound 
management decisions. The function of the FFA is similar to the SPC, they 
collect, evaluate, analyse, and disseminate to members statistical and biological 
information concerning the region’s living marine resources particularly tuna. 
They collect and disseminate to members information about management 
procedures, legislation and agreements adopted by other countries, both within 
and beyond the region. They also collect and disseminate to members, 
information about fish prices and shipping, processing and marketing of fish and 
fish products. Specifically the work programme of the FFA is divided into five 
broad areas of: i) economics and marketing ii) legal services iii) information 
technology iv) monitoring control and surveillance and v) corporate services. It is 
clear that the FFA’s primary responsibility is to carry out certain functions 
necessary for the member countries to discharge their tuna management 
obligations.  
 
However, the FFA does not meet all the obligations of states under the LOS 
convention and the Fish Stocks Agreement in so far as international cooperation 
for the management of highly migratory species is concerned. Even though this 
fact is clearly indicated in the FFA convention stating that “effective cooperation 
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for the convention and optimum utilisation of highly migratory species of the 
region will require the establishment of additional international machinery to 
provide for co-operation between all coastal states in the region and all states 
involved in harvesting of such resources” Aqorau (2001) 
 
Aqorau (2001) further commented that the Multilateral High Level Conference 
(MHLC) process and the WCPT Convention occurred as part of the development 
of tuna management arrangements in the region, which began in the mid-1970s. 
In this respect, the WCPT Convention fulfils the obligations set forth in relation to 
the final chapter in the relations between coastal states in the region and distant-
water.  
 
In terms of domestication of the tuna fisheries, however, the FFA, SPC and 
WCPTC are regional bodies. As such the decision to domesticate tuna fisheries is 
up to each individual member country to make that decision. The regional 
organisations are not in a position to dictate to island member countries as to 
whether or not to domesticate their tuna fisheries. However they can provide 
technical advice on perhaps how to develop a fishing industry, what is required 
and what funding assistance member countries could tap to start the project, etc. 
They are also able to provide useful and analytical tools, data and information, 
which member countries can use to analyse and measure the future cost and 
benefit of the fishing industry project and so on. Individual member countries 
make their own decision on the matter using whatever information and data they 
are able to get out of these regional organisations. In addition, member countries 
can also ask for specific assistance to these regional organisations to help them 
achieve their aim to domesticate their tuna fisheries. Hence, domestication of tuna 
fisheries is therefore a national policy decision. 
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2.3.3 The Western and Central Pacific Tuna Commission. 
 
The Western and Central Pacific Tuna Commission (WCPTC) was established in 
September 2000 by the Convention of the Conservation and Management of 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPT 
Convention) FFA (2000). The WCPT Convention is seminal in international 
fisheries law because it is the first comprehensive international fisheries 
instrument negotiated since the conclusion of the 1995 United Nations Fish 
Stocks Agreement.  
 
From a geo-political perspective, the WCPT Convention is also interesting 
because it involves fishing states which are active in most regions of the world. Its 
conclusion and implementation, therefore, will be watched with keen interest by 
coastal states in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans which, as a result of the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement, are reviewing their own arrangements Aqorau (2001).  
 
From the point of view of fisheries management, the WCPT convention is both 
empowering because it establishes new opportunities for the Pacific island states 
to secure greater benefits from the tuna resource, and threatening because of the 
opportunities it might give to some fishing states to take away from the Pacific 
island states the control that the Pacific island states now have over the tuna 
resource Clark (2000).  
 
The Western and Central Pacific region is the only major tropical tuna fishery 
which is not subject to international management unlike the eastern tropical 
Pacific and the Atlantic Ocean tuna fishery which were regulated under the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) and the International Convention 
for the Conservation of the Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT) respectively Aqorau (2001; 
382) 
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The WCPT Convention takes a more holistic approach towards management by 
requiring members of the Commission to apply certain principles of conservation 
and management including the precautionary approach. The objective of the 
WCPTC is to ensure through effective management, the long-term conservation 
and sustainable use of highly migratory fish stocks in the western and central 
Pacific in accordance with the 1982 (Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention) and the 
1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement Aqorau (2001), 
(http://www.wcpfc.int/). The objective is taken from the principle that highly 
migratory fish stocks must be managed throughout their migratory range both in 
areas under national jurisdiction and areas of high seas. The Convention applies to 
all species of highly migratory fish stocks, except sauries. 
 
The functions of the commission as designated under Article 9 of the LOS, 
include inter alia, determining the allowable catch or the total level of fishing 
effort within the convention area for such highly migratory stocks as the 
commission may decide and adopt standards for the collection and timely 
exchange of data on fisheries in the convention area. Aqorau (2001) commented 
that the role of the convention is clear and well defined, however, it is directed to 
develop criteria for the allocation of the allowable catch or the total level of 
fishing effort.  
 
In developing the criteria for allocation of the allowable catch, the commission 
must take into account a number of factors. These include; i) the status of the 
stocks and the existing level of fishing effort in the fishery; ii) the respective 
interests, past and present fishing patterns and fishing practices of participants in 
the fishery and the extent of the catch being used for domestic consumption; iii) 
the historic catch in an area; iv) the needs of small island developing states, and 
territories and possessions, in the convention area whose economies, food 
supplies and livelihoods are overwhelmingly dependent on the exploitation of 
marine living resources; and v) the respective contributions of participants to 
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conservation and management of the stocks, including the provision by them of 
accurate data and their contribution to the conduct of scientific research. 
 
In defining and allocating the allowable catch, the WCPT Convention has also the 
potential to increase their powers to gain economic benefits from tuna resources. 
As it determines the allowable catch or allocation; it also conserves, limits and 
excludes, and defines rights. The convention imposes limits on the amount of fish 
that can be taken, and limits on who can have access to the tuna resource. Because 
of these limits, it may be argued that access to the resource will become scarce 
resulting in a substantial increase in the value of access to the resource.  
  
2.4 The Case of Kiribati. 
 
2.4.1 An Overview of the Kiribati economy. 
 
The Republic of Kiribati is a Micronesian island state in the Central Pacific. The 
2005 population census reported that at the time of the census, the total population 
of Kiribati was  92,533 MOF (Ministry of Finance) (2007). A 2005 estimate 
shows that GDP per capita is AUD$1,000 and GDP is AUD$80 million. (Dr 
Rouatu : Statistics Office (MFED). The structure of the Kiribati economy reflects 
the narrow resource base and its heavy reliance on government activity. 
Agriculture and fisheries contributed about 10 % of measured GDP, with copra, 
fishing and seaweed being the main source of cash income. Geographic dispersion 
of islands creates administrative challenges, particularly in providing health, 
education, transport and communications services to the small isolated 
communities. 
 
Recently however, the government is experiencing problems in subsidising the 
copra and seaweed operations. A drought experienced in the mid-2000 affected 
the level of copra production. On top of that, the nature and remoteness of the 
Outer Islands where the majority of the copra production came from, is adding 
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pressure to the government to transfer the copra from the islands to Tarawa where 
it can be exported. Seaweed shared some problem with the copra operations. Both 
continued to operate with losses supported by government subsidies. This leaves 
no choice for the government but to develop its abundant fisheries resource to 
make up for the loss of other resources, for provisions to balance its recurrent 
budget, which is the major concern of the government, and most importantly and 
which will be the focus of this study, to ensure that Kiribati maximises its 
economic benefits from its fisheries.  
 
One of the government’s concerns and main focuses is to support and develop the 
private sector. However, the private sector comprises a relatively small proportion 
of the economy, and industrial activity is negligible. There are two important 
distinct forms of activities in the private sector - informal and formal activities. 
The informal activities comprise those persons and families engaged in 
subsistence and semi-subsistence activities in the rural areas and those working in 
urban areas without formal employment arrangements. Formal activities usually 
involve regular wage and salary employment, but also activities run as a business 
that go beyond being just a by-product of subsistence living. Formal activities are 
normally undertaken by businesses that are incorporated or licensed to do 
business, are registered with the local authorities and pay government fees and 
taxes. The 2000 census reported that more than 30,000 adults or around 60% of 
the adult population are engaged in the village work or informal activity, and only 
4% of all adults are engaged in formal private sector activities ADB (Asian 
Development Bank) (2002).  
 
Accordingly people doing the village work are those performing a variety of tasks 
in growing or gathering, producing or fishing to feed their families and are 
described as subsistence farmers or fishermen. Fishing activity is a major 
component of this group of population. However, almost all of the fishing 
activities in Kiribati are informal-private and small artisanal fishing operations. 
More than half of the total population involved in the village work is engaged to 
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subsistence fishing where they fish for household consumption and/ or sell 
surplus catches in the local market MOF (Ministry of Finance) (2006). 
 
The majority of the population relies on household production as their primary 
source of food and shelter. The Kiribati economy is dominated by government 
activity and hence its economic performance is heavily influenced by government 
decisions and actions. Because of the small size of the cash economy in Kiribati, 
the proportion of government finance derived from taxation is low, at just over 
20% of revenue. The principle sources of non-tax revenues are royalties paid by 
countries fishing in the EEZ, and the interest and dividends on the Revenue 
Equalisation Reserve Fund (RERF).  
 
Essentially the fiscal policy of the government of Kiribati has involved using 
domestic taxes and revenues to cover recurrent expenditure, with drawdown from 
the RERF to cover shortfalls of government revenues in particular the access fees. 
Kiribati uses the Australian dollars as its currency. While this means that the 
government need not concern itself with monetary policy, it also means that the 
country’s international competitiveness is not reflected in the exchange rate for its 
currency, and also that its domestic inflation rate is linked to that in Australia.  
 
Commodity exports are small, but Kiribati has been very successful in exporting 
labour. There are approximately 1,100 I-Kiribati merchant seafarers and 300 
fishers working on foreign fishing vessels. The 2000 census estimated that 15% of 
all households receive remittances from men working on overseas vessels – 12% 
of households in the outer islands and 20% in south Tarawa. In 2000, offshore 
wages and salaries amounted to an estimated $10 million, equivalent to about 
15% of GDP or about $115 per capita, most of which was remitted home. 
Remittances in 2002 were expected to be around $14 million ADB (Asian 
Development Bank) (2002). 
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2.4.2 The population and unemployment in Kiribati. 
 
The 2000 census of about 84,500 persons indicated an annual growth rate of 1.7 - 
1.9% over the previous decade. The recent 2005 population census reported that 
at the time of census, the total population of Kiribati was 92,533, of whom more 
than 40% lived in South Tarawa, where the density was as high as 1,800 people 
per square kilometre. Of the adult population of about 48,000, 84% were 
economically active, but only 8,000 were employed in the cash economy. The age 
distribution reveals a very young age structure, with 41% of the population being 
less than 15 years of age in 1995. A population growth rate of 1.8 % per annum 
there would lead to a doubling of the population in 39 years. ADB (Asian 
Development Bank) (2002). 
 
The 2005 population census also reported that of the total population 34,715 are 
defined as employed. This number is comprised of 13,133 (37.8%) being in cash 
employment and the remaining 21,582 (62.2%) are village workers or non cash 
workers. Figure 2.6 below shows the distribution of population by employed – 
cash workers and village workers. 
 
Figure 2.6 Employed – cash workers and village workers. 
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Since independence, the population of South Tarawa has increased at an annual 
average rate of 3.3% compared to a national growth rate of 1.9%. Continued 
migration to South Tarawa is giving rise to a serious health and environmental 
problems, where the population density now exceeds 2,300 persons per square 
kilometres. Urban employment is mainly limited to the public service and there is 
strong competition for those jobs. Thus prospects for employment for migrants 
into South Tarawa are often very difficult ADB (Asian Development Bank) 
(2002). 
 
From an urban/ rural perspective, 8,068 (61.4%) of the cash workers were in the 
urban area while only 5,065 (38.4%) held cash paying jobs in the rural areas. The 
urban population of South Tarawa, at 37,000, grew twice as fast as the total, while 
rural population declines. Migration to Kiritimati is relieving pressure on Tarawa, 
but South Tarawa is starting to spill over into North Tarawa as densities increase.   
 
On the contrary, in the case of village workers, only 5,272 (24.4%) were in the 
urban area with 16,310 (75.6%) in the rural areas MOF (Ministry of Finance) 
(2006). The main concern must be for the future of the young people already born 
and those sure to be born in the coming years. Just over 40% of the population are 
less than 15 years old. Thus, within the next decade it was estimated that there 
will be an increase of some 40% in the number of people in the labour force, from 
44,000 in 2000 to around 62,000 in 2010 ADB (2002). 
 
Formal employment was estimated at 9,200 persons in 2000, equivalent to 21% of 
the workforce of 44,000. With 40% of the population below 15 years and 3% 
above 65 years, the overall ratio of dependents to working-age persons (15-64) is 
0.75. The ratio reflects the combination of a high birth rate, moderate life 
expectancy, and the 1,700 working age adults (almost all males) overseas – 
equivalent to about 10% of the resident male workforce in the 18-49 age group.  
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2.4.3 Recent trends in economic growth. 
 
The growth performance of the Kiribati economy has been sluggish over the past 
years since independence. Real GDP per head has fluctuated over this period 
without showing any consistent upward trend. During the 1990s, there was a 
period of accelerated growth, due primarily to expansionary government spending 
from 1994 to 1998. But from 1998 to 2000, a fall in fishing license fees, a 
weakening copra price, lowered output of both copra and fisheries, and a decline 
in construction activity (following completion of several major projects including 
the new port in Betio and the new Parliament House), reduced growth in real 
GDP, such that between 1999 - 2000 real GDP per capita is estimated to have 
fallen by almost 4 percent. On average GDP grew by 1 to 3% in the last three 
years, which was less than the world’s average growth rate of 5%. (Dr. Rouatu : 
Statistics Office (MFED) 
 
Figure 2.7: GDP level and Growth rate from 1991 – 2006. 
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Figure 2.7: GDP level and Growth rate from 1991 – 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : (Dr. Rouatu : Statistics Office (MFED)). 
 
2.4.4 Barriers to economic development. 
 
A significant problem in the structure of the Kiribati economy is the inadequacy 
of its economic infrastructure. Most of the existing infrastructure including 
government buildings, bridges and causeways, ports and wharf facilities were 
built with the assistance of foreign donor agencies. However maintenance of these 
infrastructure facilities in most cases was left for the government of Kiribati, 
however, maintenance is still expensive and sometimes poor maintenance is 
experienced because of the lack of funds to keep up with the maintenance work 
and quality of the facility. This however is also affecting the interest of foreign 
investors to come and invest in Kiribati. There is lots of foreign interest in the 
large and rich EEZ of Kiribati but poor infrastructure, in particular the port 
facilities, is discouraging foreign investors from establishing businesses to 
Kiribati.  
 
There is a general perception that the basic services including health services and 
education in Tarawa (main city) are better than those available in the outer 
islands. A lack of production bases like manufacturing and or processing industry 
GDP growth rate: 1992--2006
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
years
%
Nominal GDP
Real GDP
35 
 
is also one of the major constraints to economic growth. Kiribati for so many 
years struggled with deficit in its trade accounts or balances mainly because there 
is increasing consumption of imported goods and products. Since the end of the 
phosphate company in Banaba in 1979, Kiribati had been experiencing negative 
balance of payment or trade deficits. The trends of trade are clearly shown in the 
following graph.  
Figure 2.8: Exports and Imports – 1982 – 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Dr. Rouatu: Statistics Office, MFED). 
 
The soils are predominantly coralline and of low agricultural value, and the 
islands experience periodic droughts. These factors result in a narrowly based and 
shallow economy. This is reflected in a very high import dependency, a low level 
of exports, and little manufacturing activity. The ratio of imports to GDP is in the 
order of 75%, while export typically account for 10 to 20 percent of GDP ADB 
(Asian Development Bank) (2002). 
 
Furthermore, the economic effects of the physical remoteness of the Kiribati 
islands includes, limited and costly international shipping and air services, 
because of the distance from regular routes and low volumes (because of limited 
space particularly on air services). The dispersed geography presents very great 
difficulties for developing efficient domestic transport and communications 
facilities. Domestic air services are intermittent and inter-island shipping services 
are generally low quality and infrequent. For many islands, the products are not 
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included in the export activity. The delays and cost of getting the product to 
Tarawa where they can be transported to the international markets are so large 
unless these costs are reduced by subsidy. Transport costs are very expensive, 
thus making it difficult for the government especially the small and private 
businesses to cope with the regular transportation of their products from local to 
international markets.  
 
2.4.5 The Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund (RERF). 
 
The Revenue Equalisation Reserve Fund (REFR) is regarded as another important 
component of the government’s revenue. It was established by the British colonial 
administration in 1956 on the basis of the Banaban phosphate revenues. The 
initial allocation was A$555,580, from that amount A$155,580 was from the war 
(WWII) assets and $400,000 was from the general phosphate revenue. Since the 
end of the phosphate mining operations in 1979, the government has used the 
return earned on the reserve fund to finance the recurrent operations of the 
government where there are short falls in government revenue, in particular the 
revenue from access fees. The ADB report stated that this fund had been managed 
well and that its return to government revenue has been satisfactory. It has 
continued to provide a fiscal buffer in the framing of Kiribati budgetary policy, 
and has also acted as a stabilising influence in helping the government to deal 
with internal and external variability. The REFR is administrated through a 
‘special fund’ under the Public Finance (Control and Audit) Act, Cap 79 in the 
Laws of Kiribati.  
 
The trends in the annual RERF by market value are clearly illustrated in Figure 
2.9. The graph below shows the record of annual RERF by market value which is 
generally increasing from 1984 to 2008. ADB (Asian Development Bank) (2002) 
also reported that the fund was worth AUS$68 million in 1979, AUS$200 million 
in 1989 and AUS$636 million at the end of 2001. During the 1980s, drawings on 
the RERF provided 20 - 40% of total government revenue, as expected by the 
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Kiribati government. Strong growth in fishing license revenues reduced the need 
for RERF drawings from 1990 and from 1997 to 2000 there have been no 
drawings. It is therefore concluded that the decline in license fees is also affecting 
the RERF in terms of drawings. Any environmental effects or other changes that 
causes a sharp drop in fishing license revenues, bring pressure upon the 
Government’s limited cash reserves and then upon the RERF to fill the revenue 
gap.  
Figure 2.9: Annual RERF – Market Value 
 
2.5 Importance of Fisheries to the Kiribati Economy 
 
2.5.1 Economic, Cultural and Social Importance of Fisheries to Kiribati 
 
Kiribati ranked the third largest behind PNG and FSM in terms of tuna catch in 
the WCPO (Western and Central Pacific Ocean). According to official data, 
Gillett and Lightfoot (2001) the percentage contribution of fishing to GDP in 
1999 is 0.6% in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and 12.0% in Kiribati. Twenty percent 
of the total tuna catch from the WCPO is taken from the Kiribati’s waters. 
Kiribati received a range of 40 to 60 percent of the total government revenue from 
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license fees. This large proportion of the government’s revenue from access fees 
shows the vital importance of tuna resource to the economy of Kiribati.  
 
The Kiribati government is concerned not only for the economy but also for the 
sustainability of the tuna stock for consumption and for livelihoods. Seafood and 
in particular fish is the main source of protein of the majority of the Kiribati 
population.  Fish consumption estimates for Kiribati indicates that it has the 
highest rate of fish consumption in the world at 185.0 kg/ capita in the late 1990s 
Gillet & Lightfoot (2001).  Fisheries Division (1978) estimates that 335,936 cans 
of fish are purchased in South Tarawa annually. The annual fresh fish 
consumption for the 14,824 residents of South Tarawa was estimated to be 113.0 
per kg per capita.  
 
2.5.2 Fisheries Employment in Kiribati. 
 
NEPO (National Economic Planning Office) (1999) reported that the 1995 record 
shows that of the 7,848 people who had cash work, 349 people (4.4%) had 
fisheries related jobs. This includes seaweed grower, coastal fishermen, deep-sea 
fishermen and others. Of the 11,940 households in Kiribati, 64% practiced fishing 
in the ocean flat, 64% in the lagoon flat, 49% in the ocean, and 59% in the lagoon. 
The main source of cash income for 29% of the 11,920 households in Kiribati was 
fishing. Preston (2000) estimates fisheries employment in Kiribati in 1996 at 
1,131 people employed in commercial harvesting and 20,000 people employed in 
subsistence fishing. ADB (1998), states that almost all rural households and about 
65% of urban households are engaged in fishing for subsistence purposes. About 
1,100 household were engaged in seaweed production, however seaweed 
production declined and the seaweed company closed in 2006. Mees (1987) 
reported that 40 to 50 % of the weekly South Tarawa (where 50% of the total 
population resided) fish landings of 128 tons are made by full time commercial 
fishermen. Fisheries Division, in 1998 indicates 12% of the households in Kiribati 
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do not fish. Of those that do fish, 17% fish commercially full time, 22% fish 
commercially part time, and 61% fish only for subsistence. 
 
 
2.5.3 License fees in Kiribati. 
 
The licensing agreements between Kiribati and the Distant Water Fishing Nations 
(DWFNs) formally began in 1978, following the declaration of a 200 mile 
economic fishery zone (EFZ) around the Gilbert Islands group in March 1978. 
Since the end of the government’s revenue from the phosphate in Banaba, 
revenue from access fees was the main criterion in Kiribati’s policy of 
encouraging the major DWFNs to fish within its extensive EEZ (Teiwaki, 1987). 
 
In 1996 Kiribati government revenue from access fees was only 9.9% and in 1999 
it was 34% of the total government revenue. In 2004, fishing license fees 
exceeded 50% of the total government revenue. On average licensing fees 
amounted to over 40% of the total government revenue in most years. The aim of 
the government is to get as much revenue as possible from negotiating with 
DWFNs. Unfortunately by international standards, the Kiribati government 
received less than average from the DWFNs.  
 
Previous studies like Roniti (1987), Petersen (2002) and Barclay (2006) have 
identified the cause of the above concern, and they concluded that there was an 
issue of bargaining power between the Kiribati government and DWFNs. PICs 
lose their bargaining power to negotiate for higher access fees even though they 
feel underpaid. It was then recommended that PIC governments be encouraged to 
increase their participation in the tuna industries, or develop their own tuna 
fisheries industry and onshore processing plant, enter the international market and 
export their tuna products with a view to obtaining more benefits from tuna rather 
than just obtaining the licensing fees from DWFNs.  
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In terms of fee payment system, Kiribati and most Pacific Island Countries have 
been using a lump sum system payment for many years. The amount paid by 
DWFNs is based on the bilateral negotiations between Fishing nations and 
concerned Countries who own the EEZ, and the bargaining power of small island 
nations. However this has been replaced last December with the new system 
‘Vessel Day Scheme’ (VDS). This new system was adopted by the FFA and 
Pacific Island Countries are being encouraged to use the new VDS, although a 
few countries resist continue to resist the new scheme (PC: Clark (2008), Tumoa 
(2008), Awira, (2008)). 
 
The ‘VDS’ was implemented in December 2007. The idea is to determine licence 
fees based on actual fishing effort and catch.  It emphasises the idea of the more 
catch you get the more money you pay. The VDS is designed to provide more 
control for resource owners. The calculation is based on the amount of catch over 
the last six (6) years, using the FFA data. The allocation processes requires FFA 
member countries to meet and calculate the VDS applicable to respective 
countries based on historical data. They allocate the number of fishing days for all 
member countries. For instance, if Kiribati is allocated 2000 - 3000 fishing days, 
those days are then available for sale to fishing nations. Rate per day is 
determined by respective countries. On a regional scale, some countries have 
limited the number of days depending on their historical catch data. 
 
2.6 The History of tuna industry in Kiribati. 
 
The government is anxious to add value to its tuna resource, which today 
represents a source of licensing fees only. On many occasions the government has 
tried to identify the appropriate strategy and development policy for developing 
the tuna industry in Kiribati. Over the past 10 to 20 years, researches and trials 
have continued. Many proposals for the development of the tuna industry have 
been submitted to concerned authorities. Some of the proposals have been 
declined while others require further research. Until now the government of 
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Kiribati is still looking for the best possible option in order to invest in a 
successful tuna fishing industry. The Kiribati Tuna Development and 
Management Plan is one of the outputs of the tuna task force appointed in October 
1999 by Cabinet to address the development and management of the tuna industry 
for Kiribati. This special tuna task force was formed to develop options and 
recommendations for the development and management of the tuna industry in 
Kiribati. Its purpose was to address the vision of Cabinet to: i) develop sustainable 
tuna industry that maximises the benefits to all I-Kiribati; and ii) ensure effective 
participation by Kiribati in arrangements for the management and conservation of 
regional tuna resources. Government of Kiribati (GoK) (2003). 
 
The patterns of economic gains for PICs from tuna development vary widely. 
Some countries are most likely fully exploiting the available resources in their 
waters and landing them for processing. In some cases national fleets are also 
bringing back catches from high seas and other zones. Other PICs, facing 
constraints of infrastructure and transport services to markets, or with less well 
developed private sectors, have to depend more on licensing and serving foreign 
vessels. Several studies have been conducted to analyse the net benefit of 
domesticating fishing and fish processing in several neighbouring Pacific Island 
countries like PNG, Samoa, Tonga and the Solomon Islands where the 
domestication of the tuna fishery has been proven quite successful if managed 
properly. (Gillet, Preston and Associates Inc, 2000: Barclay 2005; Hamilton 2007; 
SPC 2006, 2007). Fiji is not a fishing nation but they earn more revenue from 
fisheries than Kiribati earned because of superior infrastructure. The high quality 
port in Fiji attracts fishing vessels for transhipments. Port fees are one of the 
important sources of revenue for Fiji. In terms of fishing, Fiji has limited tuna 
catch allocation. Fiji did not sell its quota to DWFNs but to domestic fishing 
industry. Fishing companies in Fiji pay domestic fee, they process raw and can 
tuna for export to the international market. Overall the total benefit and revenue 
from tuna fishing in Fiji including employment benefits and others exceeds the 
revenue earned by Kiribati from access fees alone.  
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Kiribati is one of those who have relied heavily on licensing fees. Since 1991 
annual fishing access fees earned by Kiribati averaged $23million in Australian 
dollars. However, during this period the revenue received ranged from a low of 
A$6.2 million in 1996 to A$46.6 million in 2001. In 1996 fishing revenues made 
up of only 9.9% of total government revenue. It is extraordinarily difficult to have 
good fiscal management when the revenue side of the budget is so unstable. 
Therefore the government of Kiribati for many years has been trying to change its 
focus from licensing to do more on domestication of tuna fishery with a view that 
it will bring more benefit to the country and the people Awira (2004). 
 
2.7 Potential Options for domestic tuna fishery in Kiribati. 
 
The Kiribati Tuna Development and Management Plan (KTDMP) 2003 – 2006 
identified a range of policy options for Kiribati to develop its tuna industry. Such 
policy options are explained in the objectives of the plan as follows; i) promoting 
longline development; ii) maximising government revenues; iii) securing more 
jobs and more business from foreign vessels iv) developing larger scale servicing 
capacity for fleets operating in the region; and v) Promoting industrial scale tuna 
fishing and processing Government of Kiribati (GoK) (2003).  
 
According to the KTDMP, the development of locally based and locally owned 
longline fleets has been identified as the highest priority target. There are 
prospects for successful development of small scale and medium scale longlining, 
given the availability of technological skills that are making the smaller scale 
longlining more feasible and also the favourable market trends coupled with the 
growing I-Kiribati capacity in the necessary business and technical skills required 
Government of Kiribati (GoK) (2003).  Also the government is continuing to look 
for ways to encourage investment in medium and large-scale longlining, including 
necessary infrastructure development, access to financing other economic 
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incentives and improvement of the foreign investment application and approval 
system.  
 
Beverly (2003) stated that the SPC team who visited Kiritimati in 2003 
recommended that among other things, further efforts be made to develop tuna 
longlining and small-scale fishing around FADs; and that more attention be paid 
to safety at sea, especially considering the remoteness of Kiritimati and the lack of 
any search and rescue vessels or aircraft.  
 
The view of the SPC team is consistent with a previous conference paper by 
Savins (2001), stating that while the establishment of the longline industry was 
stated as a government priority. It should be noted however, that an analysis of 
Pacific Fisheries by the World Bank (1995) found that medium size Japanese 
longliner’s (approximately 250 ton) were loss making in the most reasonable of 
scenarios. Savins (2001) further stated that the economics of the new (5 ton), 13 
m wood outrigger medium scale longliner (Tekokona III) recently introduced to 
Kiribati is proving to be a viable option and even within reach of I-Kiribati 
fishermen provided financing is made available.  
 
A lot of efforts have been made to investigate viable option for the tuna industry 
in Kiribati. Between 1998 and 2000, SPC visited Tarawa several times in 
conjunction with a small-scale tuna longline project conducted by the Fisheries 
Division using a 12 m plywood outrigger canoe, F/V Tekokona II Sokimi et al 
(2001). However many problems were encounted during that project trial but 
eventually the vessel got out fishing and overall results produced a CPUE of 
54.9kg/100 hooks of all saleable fish. Records were kept of all transactions and 
the results were that the vessel suffered a net loss of AUD $ 2351 during the 
project trial. The vessel was determined to have some limiting factors such as 
being underpowered, having a small fuel carrying capacity. Recommendations 
were given to improve the design for the next generation Tekokona and to 
44 
 
improve fishing operations and infrastructure requirements for processing and 
packing sashimi grade tunas.  
  
In 2002 Fisheries Development Adviser Lindsay Chapman, visited Tarawa and 
Kiritimati to report on development options, training needs and infrastructure 
requirements within the tuna fishing industry Chapman (2003). Chapman reported 
that Kiribati has a good potential for a domestic longline fishery and it was 
recommended that the government’s role should be to provide an enabling 
environment. Tarawa and Kiritimati both could use dedicated fishing ports with 
safe anchorages for medium-scale vessels, processing facilities, slipways etc.  
 
Airfreight capacity was identified as a limiting factor in domestic tuna fishery 
development. A potential of baitfish farming was also identified. It was also 
suggested that the government should set up an ongoing FAD programme to 
support the small scale tuna fisheries. Value added products were identified as 
one potential for marketing tuna. Beverly (2003) also pointed out that to 
implement a tuna development and management plan, training needs are 
identified in the areas of boat skippers, engineers, hydraulic systems, and 
refrigeration systems as well as for surveillance, compliance, and observer 
coverage of longline operations.  
 
Beverly (2003), stated that the development of the longline industry may require 
the phased reduction in fishing effort by the foreign fleet. There is some potential 
for increased catches of albacore tuna, particularly in the Southern portion of the 
Line and Phoenix Islands EEZ.  
 
2.7.1 Tekokona III Project. 
 
F/V Tekokona III was a 13 m wood outrigger canoe powered by a small inboard 
diesel engine. The vessel was designed by Oyvind Gulbrandesen. The design is 
called a KIR-16 and was built by Michael Savins at Betiraoi Boatbuilding in 
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Tarawa, Kiribati. The construction of the vessel was funded by government of 
Japan. It is the property of the government of Kiribati and is operated by Central 
Pacific Producers Ltd (CPPL), a Government of Kiribati enterprise. The main 
engine was a Yahama 4JH-YE four-cylinder diesel rated at 45 HP. It was 
mounted in the engine room of the port hull, the larger of the two hulls. It 
consumed about 3.5 litre of fuel per hour. The fuel tank is 600 litres, giving F/V 
Tekokona III a range of about seven days continuous steaming.  
 
There was a 200 litre tank of fresh water mounted above the deck on the port side 
hull. Usual practice was to take along several plastic jugs of water as reserve and 
a 200 litre plastic barrel of water for bathing. Fish were iced on the boat. The total 
maximum fish capacity would probably be around 1.5 to 2 MT under the best 
circumstances. The crew complement on F/V Tekokona III was usually eight 
men. The usual range which the boat can travel is of 20 miles from the Island.  
 
2.8 Summary. 
 
SPC and FFA play an important role by providing fisheries information and data 
to member countries and appropriate committees like the WCPTC for decision 
making and tuna management. The WCPTC in particular is mandated to 
determine and allocate the total allowable tuna catch for member countries. Thus 
the SPC and FFA provide statistical data to the Scientific Committee of the 
WCPTC. Domestication of the tuna industry however is dealt with more at the 
national level than the regional level but with technical advice and assistance from 
the regional organisations. 
 
The idea of domestication of the tuna fisheries in Kiribati has been alive since 
independence in 1979 and has been discussed and proposed from government to 
government. However little has been accomplished in this area until now, but the 
government still believe and insist in developing a domestic tuna industry. The 
Kiribati Tuna Development and Management Plan (KTDMP) 2003 - 2006 is one 
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of the outputs of the tuna task force appointed in October 1999 by Cabinet to 
address the development and management of the tuna industry for Kiribati, 
however nothing has been done to follow up the plan. New information and new 
plans came up lately but still the government searches for the right option with 
assurance of good investment returns. Given all that, the many efforts of 
government officials with assistance from SPC and FFA, the government still 
believe that they will increase their benefit by developing the domestic tuna 
industry. The question remains as to what will be the appropriate policy and 
strategy for the government to invest in.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Domestication of tuna fisheries is believed to be one of the main paths for 
economic development for small PICs. Ram-Bidesi and Tsamenyi (2003) argue 
that the ‘Rights-based fisheries management’ contributed to the opportunity for 
domestic development. The current level of participation of PICs in the tuna 
fishery varies from one country to another. DWFNs are currently still the 
dominant players in the Pacific region. Researchers from SPC and FFA support 
the general idea that PICs have the potential to domesticate their tuna fisheries 
with a view to maximising the benefits from the tuna fishery (Gillet, Preston and 
Associates Inc. 2000; Ram-Bidesi & Tsamenyi, 2003; Campbell 2004; Barclay 
2005; Parris & Grafton 2005; Hamilton, 2007 and others.  
 
3.2 What is domestication? 
 
For the purpose of this study, the domestication of the tuna fishery refers to a 
Pacific Island country becoming involved in the harvesting and fish processing 
activities of the tuna fishery, functions that in most cases are carried out by 
various DWFN. This means, therefore, that the PICs become more pro-active in 
owning or operating longline or purse-seine fishing vessels as well as fish 
processing plants such as cannery factories to process the tuna catch and thus add 
value to the fish for export.  
 
Parris and Grafton (2005) defined domestication as “the process of developing 
and/or then integrating domestically located harvesting and processing sectors to 
serve an export market” – to extract more of the economic benefits from their tuna 
fisheries. In other words, it is the process of developing a domestic tuna industry 
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with a view to extracting benefits involved in the tuna fishery such as 
employment benefits, wages, taxes, and profits.  
 
Barclay (2005) reported that Pacific Islander interviewees believed that “the best 
way to capture more wealth from tuna resources is through ‘domesticating’ the 
tuna fishery”. Domesticating the benefits from tuna resources is most often 
understood as Pacific Island nationals as resource owners displacing DWFNs, 
establishing locally based tuna fishing operations and doing the actual fishing. 
Gillett (2003) stated that since the late 1990s, FFA member countries decided that 
reducing their reliance on distant water access fees and growing domestic tuna 
industries is a way to improve economic benefits from their tuna resources. 
McCoy and Gillett (1997) also argued that domestication of the tuna fishery will 
potentially generate employment benefits, technology transfer and forward and 
backward linkages that will promote economic development.  
 
Ram-Bidesi & Tsamenyi (2003) further suggested that one domestic development 
strategy pursed by some PICs is to re-flag foreign vessels under the State’s 
national flag as domestic vessels such as Vanuatu and Tonga. In this arrangement, 
the beneficial ownership may rest with the Pacific Island State but the legal 
ownership is foreign. This includes vessels under joint ventures, leases or 
charters. If PICs wanted to charter foreign vessels, it is advisable that they 
contract or charter foreign fishing vessels from ‘responsible States’. 
 
Barclay (2005) also added that there are two important principles policy makers 
should consider when domesticating the tuna industries. One is that for domestic 
tuna development to be successful, the economic and policy environment has to 
enable private sector development. The second principle for success is that 
national domestication plans must take account of the geographic, economic and 
biological realities.  
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Domestication of the tuna fisheries however is not an easy task especially for the 
small island countries. The government of Kiribati had this dream of developing 
its own domestic tuna industry. The government of Kiribati presumed that if they 
could develop a successful tuna industry and managed it well, the government 
will earn more benefits and revenue. Not only will the government enjoy the 
benefits of the industry but there will also be employment creation opportunities, 
improved opportunity for the locals to participate in the fisheries business, 
exposure to the international market, and so on. However despite having this 
dream since its independence in 1979, Kiribati has never been able to fully 
operate the industry. 
  
3.3 Domestication Results in the South Pacific. 
 
The Pacific island countries have long sought to increase their share of economic 
rent from the South Pacific tuna fishery. Their struggle started towards the end of 
the 1970s when they attempted to extract access fees from Japan, and continued 
into the 1980s when United States fleets entered the fishery. In reaction to the 
meagre returns from access fees, Pacific island governments adopted a new 
strategy in the 1990s of trying to force domestication of the industry in the belief 
that they could duplicate DWFNs activities to yield greater benefits from the 
fishery. This domestication came in a range of forms varying from large scale 
public investments in fishing vessels, to public investments in aeroplanes, port 
infrastructure and bases from which tuna can be processed for shipping. Many of 
the region’s governments have invested many millions of dollars of aid funds and 
public revenues into a variety of domestication projects. These investments were 
made with government as the sole owner and operator, or in joint ventures with 
foreign countries (predominantly Japan and the United States). Unfortunately, all 
the investments that have been operating for more than 2 years, with only a few 
minor exceptions, have failed financially, some repeatedly. Due to the pressing 
need for employment and foreign exchange, some public sector investments have 
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been sustained despite their financial losses, receiving massive injections of 
additional public funds. 
 
Petersen (2002) stated that the government of the Federated States of Micronesia 
has made the greatest effort towards domestication, investing over US$120 
million by 1995 through state-owned fishing enterprises (The National Fisheries 
Corporation, The Caroline Fishing Corporation, The Yap Fishing Corporation and 
Westpac). All enterprises have been operating at a loss. Other examples of 
unsuccessful public operations include Solomon Taiyo Limited in the Solomons, 
Te Mautari Ltd in Kiribati and two purse seine joint ventures between Marshall 
and the United States of America (the latter requiring US$15 million from the 
government of Marshall Islands). Private investment in tuna ventures has been 
minor compared with public investment. However most have proved successful. 
Private ventures in Fiji, the Cook Islands and Tonga show promising results. 
Improved economic conditions in Samoa resulting from reforms aimed at 
encouraging private sector development, amongst other things, have lead to the 
growth of domestically owned fishing companies. Evidently according to 
Hamilton (2007), the Samoan case proved success in the fishing industry 
prospered without government support. This provides one important strategy 
where private sector development or involvement is vital in the industry, provided 
there exists a secure investment environment and comparative advantage. 
 
History shows, therefore, that some countries were able to succeed in the tuna 
industry with encouraging returns. Other countries especially the smallest 
countries like Kiribati and Tuvalu, struggled to survive in the fishing industry or 
even repeatedly failed. Some of the common reasons for failure include poor 
management, lack of ‘know how’, and poor infrastructure. This study will attempt 
to identify what the smaller PICs like Kiribati and Tuvalu need to do to survive in 
the fishing industry. 
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3.4 The theory of Comparative Advantage. 
 
Munro (1985) argues that a modern industrial fishing industry is capital and skill 
intensive and that, given the relative endowments of developing and developed 
economies, the distant water fishing nations may have a comparative advantage in 
the fishery.  
 
However Salvatore (2004) states that according to Ricardo’s law of comparative 
advantage, even if one nation is less efficient than (has an absolute disadvantage 
with respect to) the other nation in production of both commodities, there is still a 
basis for mutually beneficial trade. The first nation should specialise in the 
production of and export the commodity in which its absolute disadvantage is 
smaller (this is commodity of its comparative advantage) and import the 
commodity in which its absolute disadvantage is greater (this is the commodity of 
its comparative disadvantage).  
 
Duncan et al. (1997) argues that while the theory of comparative advantage is one 
of a few economic theories that can be proven to be true and nontrivial, it is 
frequently misunderstood by policy makers. The theory of comparative advantage 
states that any economy will be most productive when it specialises in the 
production of those goods and services that it does relatively ‘best’. While a 
country may have absolute advantage in production of all goods and services (it 
can produce these goods and services at an absolute lower cost than other 
countries), no country has comparative advantage in all goods due to the 
differences in the relative costs of production. Hence, even the smallest and 
poorest countries stand to benefit from specialisation and trade.  
 
Pugel and Lindert (2000) states Ricardo’s principle of comparative advantage 
saying that: “a nation, like a person, gains from trade by exporting the goods and 
services in which it has its greatest comparative advantage in productivity and 
importing those in which it has the least comparative advantage. Pugel and 
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Lindert (2000) further explained that the word ‘comparative’ means relative and 
not necessarily absolute. Even if one nation is the most productive at producing 
everything and another is the least, they both gain by trading with each other and 
with third countries as long as their (dis)advantages in making different goods are 
different in any way.  
 
Petersen (2002) states that there are no techniques for directly measuring a 
country’s comparative advantage, as it requires the knowledge of pre-trade 
relative prices that are unobservable. She further states that it is a natural 
inclination to try to determine the industries in which a country has comparative 
advantage. However Duncan et al. (1999) noted that comparative advantage is too 
fluid and too complex for governments to impose a decree in favour of the 
development of certain industries. While it is not appropriate for governments to 
try to select industries in which their countries have a comparative advantage, 
government have an overwhelming responsibility to create an environment where 
private agents can use information efficiently to search out areas of comparative 
advantage. Petersen (2002) added that this process involves providing the 
economic policies and institutional framework needed for efficiently functioning 
markets. 
 
A more recent study of fisheries policy in PNG by Campbell (2004), states that 
for PNG to obtain full value from its tuna fisheries they needs to achieve an 
appropriate balance between foreign and domestic exploitation. The theory of 
comparative advantage suggests that the appropriate strategy for PNG may be to 
use its fishery to generate access fees from DWFNs. On the other hand, McCoy 
and Gillett (1997) argues that domestication of the tuna fishery will potentially 
generate employment benefits, technology transfer and forward and backward 
linkages which will promote economic development. Campbell (2004) concluded 
that since processing, as opposed to harvesting, requires a large amount of 
unskilled labour the principle of comparative advantage may also favour 
domestication in some cases.   
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The Kiribati government, like PNG and other PICs whose EEZ is large and 
resourceful, believes that they have a comparative advantage in the production 
and export of fisheries products for two main reasons. First they believe that they 
have the raw material because they control a large and rich EEZ. Second, in the 
Pacific Island countries, labour is readily available and cheap. They have a 
relatively large pool of unemployed young men and women who posses good 
basic skills that could be trained to work in various sectors of the fishing industry.  
 
3.5 Methodologies used to measure economic benefit of fisheries industry. 
 
Many studies have been conducted to measure the benefit of the tuna fisheries in 
the Pacific. The methods used in the assessment of the fishery within the WCPO 
range from a broad and complex bio-economic model to a more focused social 
cost-benefit analysis to financial performance analyses of particular tuna 
industries which were used as case studies. Most PICs are most interested in 
assessing the benefits to the national development of their economy rather than 
measuring the benefits accruing to DWFNs. Because of that, and given the scope 
of this study, more focus will be placed on the literature of the financial and 
benefit-cost analysis of the specific studies in the PICs. The purpose of the 
literature review is to seek appropriate strategies and in particular measures of 
economic benefits accruing to the local people of the implementing country. In 
this case we consider Kiribati as the implementing country of the fisheries project. 
  
3.5.1 Bioeconomic model of tuna fishery. 
 
Bio-economic models are broad and complex class of models that consider the 
economic assessment of the impact of policy and regulations on natural resources 
and human activity. These models often consist of three components; i) economic 
components, ii) biological components and iii) Industry or fishermen’s behaviour. 
The most widely used model was developed by Gordon and Schaefer in the mid 
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1950s and had been adopted and used widely by recent researchers like Homans 
and Wilen (1997), Bertignac et at (2000), Campbell (2004), Hampton and Hand 
(2001), Grafton, Kompas and Hilborn (2005), Kompas & Che, (2006), Grafton 
and Kompas (2006), and others. The emphasis of the bio-economic model is 
focused on the economic impact of catch and effort levels on the tuna fishery. 
From the fisheries management point of view it is a complex process that requires 
the integration of resource biology and ecology, with socio-economic and 
institutional factors affecting the behaviour of fishers. It is a multidisciplinary 
field that aids decision-making to achieve a sustainable development of the 
activity, so that future generations can also benefit from the resource.  
 
Several bio-economic models have been applied to the Western and Central 
Pacific Tuna Fisheries (WCPTF) and they also follow the Gordon-Schaefer 
model. For instance Campbell (1994) also developed a model that uses plausible 
values for economic and biological parameters. Campbell and Nicholl (1995) 
examined the effect of a hypothetical marginal reallocation of the yellowfin tuna 
from the purse-seine to the longline fishery. Hampton et al. (1997) modelled the 
interaction between the purse-seine and pole-and-line fleets in the Solomon 
Islands. Bertignac et al. (2000) uses a bio-economic model of the WCPTF and a 
linear simplex algorithm to estimate the effect of changes in levels and 
composition of fishing effort in the waters of member countries of the FFA on 
profitability of the fishery in that area. Reid et al. (2006) provides an analysis of 
hypothetical effort reductions using the Western and Central Pacific Ocean 
Bioeconomic Tuna Model (WCPOBTM). Reid uses a spreadsheet model to 
conduct an analysis of economic tradeoffs in terms of an across the board 
reduction in effort of 15 percent and was undertaken based on the results of work 
done for the WCPFC SCI  by Bertignac et.al. in 2000, Hampton et. al. 2005, 
Langley Hampton 2005 and Langley et.al 2005.  
 
The results of the bio-economic models in the WCPTF share the same conclusion 
and suggest some reduction levels to fishing efforts. Bertignac, Campbell, 
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Hampton & Hand (2000) indicate that fishery rent could be increased 
substantially above the current level by decreasing the size of all fleets, with the 
possible exception of the tuna longline fleet. They also reported that the countries 
of the region could benefit significantly by changing the level and structure of 
access fees levied as a percentage of total catch revenue. Kompas & Che, (2006) 
also recommended that in order to maximise economic profits, a substantial effort 
reduction is required in the fishery for the three main species, with optimal stocks 
significantly larger than stocks at maximum sustainable yield (MSY) in all cases. 
(Reid et al., 2006) indicated that if an across-the-board effort reduction were 
implemented in the WCPTF the total level of rent generated in the WCPTF as a 
whole is likely to increase, but the net benefits gained are likely to be borne 
disproportionately by particular fisheries and jurisdictions. Reid et. al., (2006) 
further concluded that the major beneficiaries of an across the board reduction in 
effort levels would be the frozen longline fleet targeting sashimi grade tuna which 
operates primarily on the high seas while the economic cost of such a policy 
would be borne by the purse seine fleet and Pacific Island Countries (PICs) in 
whose waters this fleet operates. 
 
Researchers of PICs however argued that whilst bio-economic models can 
provide important and efficient measures of economic rent, they have not 
considered the question of who benefits. A national tuna fishery could have a high 
expected economic rent, but with most of this taken offshore as profits by foreign 
companies.  
 
Furthermore in other cases, the government of PICs in general and Kiribati in 
particular have argued that reducing effort is not an option. The catch per unit of 
effort (CPUE) for the tuna fishery in Kiribati shows that fishing effort has 
fluctuated around an increasing trend since the early 1990s but increased until 
2006. This is mainly because the policy focus for Kiribati as well as other PICs 
who rely on access fees, will be to increase economic benefits by increasing 
government revenue from access fees. In this case, some PICs argued that whilst 
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sustainability of tuna stock should be dealt with urgently they are reluctant to 
reduce fishing effort. They believe that a reduction in fishing effort will have a 
negative impact on the revenue received from access fees. Vessels of DWFNs are 
willing to pay for higher access fees for more catch.  
 
An alternative to bio-economic modelling is the cost-benefit (or benefit-cost) 
analysis which uses primarily financial analysis model to measure the benefit of 
various fisheries projects. The following section will discuss briefly the benefit-
cost/ financial/ economic analysis. 
 
3.5.2 Benefit-Cost/ Financial Analysis 
 
Gillett, Preston and Associates Inc. (2000) develop a purpose built dynamic 
optimisation model of the PNG commercial offshore fishery to aid in policy 
development by assisting policy-makers to evaluate the economic consequences 
of different fishery management strategies. Their spreadsheet-based model that 
includes seven worksheets and they use the Excel Solver program to calculate the 
number of vessels in the fleet required to maximise the domestic value added by 
the offshore fishery to the PNG economy subject to a variety of constraints. The 
worksheets consists of i) bio-economic model, ii) lookup tables iii) value to PNG 
economy, iv) domestic value added (DVA) assumptions, v) domestication 
constraints, vi) time series vii) input/output. These authors concludes that while 
the domestication policy has succeeded in attracting a number of investors in the 
purse seine fishery, the analysis shows that the long run domestic value added is 
around kina (PNG currency) 43 million per annum less than the potential of the 
fishery. They also strongly recommend that substantial benefits will be obtained 
from increasing the speed at which crew are trained. A 50% increase in output 
over the rate proposed in the AusAID funded Fisheries Training College project 
could add as much as Kina 5 million per annum to the long term value of the 
fishery.  
 
57 
 
More recently, Campbell (2004) developed a spreadsheet-based social benefit-
cost analysis model which includes twelve spreadsheets. Three sheets for data 
input, eight sheets for four different analyses for both cannery and fishery 
operations (i) project analysis, ii) private analysis, iii) referent group analysis and 
iv) economic efficiency analysis), and one summary sheet of results, which 
includes other data used for sensitivity analysis. Campbell’s model includes the 
implications of various taxes and tariffs in the domestication of the tuna fishery 
and in the overall net benefit to the host country. His results suggest that for PNG 
tax revenues are the main form of benefit to the host country. He further argued 
that the fiscal regime assumed in the social benefit-cost spreadsheet models needs 
to be examined carefully to ensure that it applied to the case being considered. 
 
In comparing the two models the Gillett at. el. (2000) model is a detailed model 
of the domestication of tuna that involves lots of data and information showing 
PNG’s government fisheries policy and its impact on PNG’s economy. Whilst 
these authors did a very good job in measuring the ‘domestic value added’ to 
describe the real benefits that flow to the economy, it fails to show the distribution 
of the benefits to different groups within the economy. This model is also 
consuming and data intensive to build and requires a group of individual to 
conduct the study. Campbell (2004) on the other hand, shows a detailed account 
that explains the flow of benefits to different groups within the economy, plus the 
environmental cost of implementing the project. Another advantage of 
Campbell’s spreadsheet model over Gillett’s is that Campbell’s model provides an 
in-built check on internal consistency.  
 
Hamilton (2007) in his assessment of small-scale fisheries for the case of the 
Samoan tuna fishery uses three different types of analysis. These include; i) 
financial analysis to compare annual returns and costs of alia (small-scale tuna 
fishery in Samoa – dominated by operators from the rural areas) -  with 
commercial vessels (large-scale tuna fishery in Apia) ; ii) sensitivity analysis to 
investigate the impact on net profit/loss of an average vessel resulting from 
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changes in tuna price and catch rates, and iii) economic benefits and cost to 
estimate; the value added to GDP, net local purchases, employment earnings, 
balance of payments, government earning and other important cost involved 
including the opportunity cost of access fees and labour. Hamilton also considers 
a number of technical and biological issues such as the causes of reduced catch 
rates, the impact of reduced effort on albacore stocks, the impact of 50 Nautical 
Mile Zone on albacore stocks, alternative fishing strategies, technical options for 
reducing fuel costs and others.  
 
The results of the above studies indicate a mixed result of positive and negative 
economic impacts of implementing the domestication of tuna in the PICs. 
Individual studies needs to be conducted to identify and address the case by case 
issues of the individual countries. Researchers like Barclay, McCoy, and Gillett 
and others argued that there is potential for PICs to generate more benefits from 
their tuna fisheries if they actually participate in the fishing, processing and export 
of tuna through ‘domestication’ projects. Gillett (2003) stated that the FFA 
member countries are determined to see an improvement in the level of economic 
benefits they receive from their tuna resources, and become less reliant on 
revenue from access rights sold to the distant water fishing fleets. 
 
The results of Gillett, Preston and Associates Inc. (2000) also indicate that the 
domestic value added (DVA) to the PNG economy would be increased if the fleet 
were fully domesticated. However they also shows that domestication cannot be 
achieved quickly and that providing generous concessions and incentives will not 
greatly speed up the process. At least in the short term, maximising the DVA 
requires a mix of both domestic and foreign fishing. This is consistent with 
Campbell (2004), who argues that the issue for a developing country like PNG is 
to find the appropriate balance between domestic and international operations. In 
this circumstance, it makes sense to encourage short-term foreign access while 
proceeding with the medium and long-term domestication strategy. Hamilton 
(2007) concluded that for the Samoa, the alia tuna fishery generated positive 
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profits, contributing slightly higher value-added per tonne to Samoa’s GDP and 
are generating more than three times the number of jobs per 100 tonnes of catch 
than larger commercial longliners. However, Hamilton further reported that the 
low Internal Rate of Return (IRR) on the small fishing vessels indicates that it 
would not be worth investing in a second-hand vessel, let alone a brand new 
vessel. Only vessels which are already paid off are economically viable. Hamilton 
also reported that the profitability of the alia tuna fishery was heavily impacted by 
fuel prices. 
 
Gillett (2003), however, stated that in the Pacific Islands region, there are very 
few cases of small-scale commercial operators up-grading to become successful 
owners of medium-scale tuna vessels, with or without external assistance. The 
operators of almost all successful tuna fishing companies presently located in the 
region were originally i) local non-fishing businessmen who identified an 
opportunity in tuna fishing, ii) managers of local non-tuna fishing businesses who 
moved laterally into tuna fishing, or iii) managers of overseas fishing companies 
who moved into the country.  
  
3.5.2.1 Risk and Uncertainty. 
 
It is important to stress that the projects involving the domestication of fisheries 
operations are subject to a high degree of risk and uncertainty. The future is 
uncertain, we do not know with certainty what the future values of the project’s 
costs and benefits will be. Uncertainty arises either because of the factors internal 
to the project – we do not know precisely what the future response will be to, say, 
some management decision or action taken today – or, because of factors external 
to the project – for instance, we do not precisely know what the world prices of 
the project’s traded inputs and outputs will be. Campbell and Brown (2005) stated 
in brief; 
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“Uncertainty implies that there is more than one possible value for any project’s 
annual net benefits. The range of possible values a variable can take may vary 
considerably from one situation to another, with the two extremes being complete 
certainty, where there is one known value, to complete uncertainty where the 
variable could take on any value. Most situations lie somewhere between the two 
extremes”.  
 
A decision about the project will involve taking a risk. In some situations the 
degree of risk can be objectively determined, for instance when flipping a fair 
coin; there is a 50% chance it will be heads and a 50% chance it will be tails, 
about which there can be no disagreement. In most situations, however, much less 
is known about the degree of risk. Campbell and Brown (2005), for example, 
states that estimating the probability of an El Nino effect next year involves some 
judgement being made on the part of the analyst on the basis of the current 
information available. In these situations estimating the probability of an event in 
order to quantify the element of risk involves subjectivity.  
 
The most common way to incorporate risk into a cost benefit analysis is with the 
use of sensitivity analysis. This involves determining how sensitive the results of 
the cost benefit analysis are to changes in the values of key parameters. Hamilton 
(2007), for example, conducted a sensitivity analysis to investigate the impact of 
changes in catch rates and fish price on annual net profit for an Apia-based alia 
and large commercial vessel. Sensitivity analysis is necessary and it is the kind of 
information that can be very useful for the decision-maker in various ways.  
 
3.5.3 SWOT (Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) Analysis. 
 
SWOT analysis means analysing Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities and 
Threats. A scan of the internal and external environment is an important part of 
the strategic planning process. Environmental factors internal to the firm usually 
can be classified as either Strength (S), or Weaknesses (W), and those external to 
61 
 
the firm can be classified as Opportunities (O) or threats (T).  It is a really useful 
and simple tool that can be applied, to groups or organisation, to projects and 
other managerial decisions. SWOT analysis provides information that is helpful in 
matching the firm’s resources and capabilities to the competitive environment in 
which it operates.  
 
It is a qualitative analysis mostly used as a management tool to analysis a business 
decision or goal. For instance it can be used to assist the development of strategies 
and plans, and how can the organisation manage in the environment in which it 
operates. A firm may have a better chance at developing a competitive advantage 
by identifying a fit between the firm’s strengths and upcoming opportunities. In 
some cases, the firm can overcome a weakness in order to prepare itself to pursue 
a compelling opportunity.  
 
Akca et al. (2006) conducted a SWOT analysis for a fishery sector in Turkey. The 
purpose of the SWOT analysis as used in the case of Turkey is to study and 
explore the current constraints and future possibility of the fishery sector through 
systematic approach of introspection into both the positive and negative concerns. 
Piggin (2003) also uses the SWOT analysis to identify the potential for 
agricultural development in East Timor. Gislason et. al. (2004) provided a 
comprehensive SWOT analysis of the BC (British Columbia) seafood and tidal 
recreational fishing sectors. For the SWOT analysis, an extensive research 
program was conducted, including interviews, reviews of reports and 
publications, surveys on international seafood markets and numerous case studies, 
and analyses of economic and statistical information.  
 
While the case studies of tuna domestication show some successful stories, they 
also demonstrate that domestication efforts often fail. The government of PICs 
have invested millions of dollars in domestication of tuna, but most projects have 
not been successful. Van Santen and Muller (2000) summarised some of the 
investments made by three PICs (FSM, Fiji and Marshall Islands) in tuna 
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harvesting totalling over US$70 million – a sum in excess of the region’s annual 
access fees Parris and Grafton (2005). Van Santen and Muller (2000), Gillet, 
(2003), Lindley (2006), Barclay (2006), and Barclay & Cartwright (2007), reports 
that the major problems encountered by fisheries and aquaculture in PICs are 
related to government failures predominantly to invest in infrastructure, 
inadequate port facilities, limited land area, limited water supply, inefficiencies in 
administration, lack of appropriate skills and knowledge, high fuel cost, high 
freight cost and limited cargo space and air services. External to the weaknesses 
within the government and internal system of PICs, PICs are also often faced with 
poor returns on international markets, due to the weakening of the US dollar, 
exacerbated by a sustained decline in catch rates.  
 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) (1997) also stated that the cause of the 
public investment failures in fisheries projects in the South Pacific are related to 
inadequate management, weak direction at the board level (usually composed of 
civil servants), inappropriate government operating procedures, low labour 
productivity, deteriorating prices, shortages of fish, and comparatively high cost 
operations. The first four determinants are typical problems associated with 
government involvement in business activities. It has been acknowledged that 
addressing the above mentioned issues will take time and a concerted effort by all 
stakeholders involved in the Western and Central Pacific tuna fishery Batty and 
Rodwell (2006). 
 
SWOT analysis as is going to be used in this present study to incorporate all the 
important information about fisheries in Kiribati that could not be directly 
reflected in the cost-benefit analysis. The information is important for decision-
makers to consider and take into account to ensure the proposed fisheries 
development options fits the current situation in Kiribati. The SWOT analysis will 
also identify the problem areas and obstacles to fisheries development in Kiribati. 
By identifying the problem areas, appropriate strategies and recommendations 
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may easily be formulated for government’s commitment and business 
environment’s improvement.  
 
 
3.6 Summary and Conclusion. 
 
In this chapter we identify two methods of measuring economic rent; i) Bio-
economic modelling or statistical approach that seeks an estimate of willingness 
to pay for the rights of access, however this is not applicable to tuna fisheries of 
the South Pacific. The procedure relies on the availability of time series data so 
that current willingness to pay can be statistically inferred from past observations; 
ii) Budgeting technique which requires estimates of the expected revenues and 
cost involving in fishing operations. Assuming that the rent between estimated 
receipts and estimated opportunity costs is available, it is then possible to estimate 
rent by forecasting the likely levels of receipts and costs. The result of the models 
used in the Pacific region indicated two sides of the story, where some are 
successful and others are not. The literature however indicates that there is need to 
conduct individual studies for each respective country, because of the differences 
in the economic structure, infrastructure level and other issues that are affecting 
the fisheries development. There is particular need to investigate the economic 
benefit of the tuna industry in Kiribati as limited has been done for the case of 
Kiribati.  
 
Given the scope and main focus of this present study, the study will employ a 
cost-benefit analysis model to measure the net worth of establishing the tuna 
fishery in Kiribati. As researchers of PICs argued, bio-economic models can 
provide important and efficient measures of economic rent, but they do not 
consider the question of who benefits. A national tuna fishery could have a high 
expected economic rent, but with most of this taken offshore as profits by foreign 
companies. For this reason, cost-benefit analysis is appropriate in this study.  
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The study will simply adopt Campbell’s spreadsheet model to analyse the case of 
Kiribati to investigate the net worth or loss of domesticating the tuna industry in 
Kiribati. Campbell’s cost-benefit analysis model is also designed to provide 
useful information to decision makers and those affected by the project. Chapter 4 
will be a discussion of the SWOT analysis. The SWOT analysis will provide the 
information important in decision making but are not reflected in the cost-benefit 
analysis. Chapter five will discuss how Campbell’s cost benefit analysis is used in 
this study to calculate the NPVs for different development options or projects. 
The identified development options are also discussed in Chapter five. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SWOT ANALYSIS – METHODOLOGY AND RESULT DISCUSSION. 
 
4.1 Theoretical Framework – SWOT Analysis. 
 
A first analysis used in this study is SWOT analysis. SWOT analysis is a strategic 
planning method used to evaluate the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and 
Threats (SWOT) involved in a project or in a business venture. It involves 
specifying the objective of the business venture or project and identifying the 
internal and external factors, favourable and unfavourable to achieving that 
objective. The SWOT analysis presented in this Chapter will give brief details of 
those factors both internal and external to the projects, which will be affecting the 
overall operation of the projects.  
 
In general, SWOT analysis involves specifying a four-cell matrix to identify the 
‘Helpful’ and ‘Harmful’ factors of Internal and External Origin shown in figure 
4.1.  The strengths are attributes of the organization that are helpful to achieving 
the objective. The weaknesses are attributes of the organization that are harmful 
to achieving the objective. The opportunities are external conditions that are 
helpful to achieving the objective. Finally the threats are external conditions 
which could do damage to the business’s performance.  
 
Figure 4.1 SWOT ANALYSIS – FOUR MATRIX ANALYSIS 
 
(source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWOT_analysis) 
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4.2 Empirical Application. 
 
SWOT analysis is going to be used in this study to investigate whether the 
situation in Kiribati is favourable or not to fisheries development activities. 
Previous studies have identified both the pros and cons associated with 
developing a fishing industry in Kiribati (Barclay (2006). Some authors favour 
developing the fishing industry in Kiribati given the large EEZ of Kiribati 
Government of Kiribati (GoK) (2003); Awira (2004); Savins (2001). However 
others do not favour developing the fishing industry in Kiribati given the limited 
infrastructure, limited knowledge in today’s modern fishing methods, and in 
particular the weakness of the fishers in Kiribati to compete in the international 
market (Chapman (2003). 
 
The SWOT analysis in this Chapter will provide a qualitative picture of the 
factors that may either help or hinder the development of a tuna fishing industry 
in Kiribati. The identified fisheries development options will then be analyzed 
using a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) to measure the net worth or net benefit of 
investing in these identified fishing options. The identified development options 
are case studies which have already been identified by fisheries experts. The CBA 
is the second analytical tool that is also going to be used in this study. The 
identified development options and the CBA will be discussed further in detail in 
Chapter Five. 
 
The SWOT analysis should reveal whether there is need to improve some areas 
like infrastructure and flight availability, before a successful fisheries project can 
be undertaken, or whether there is need for the government to review some of the 
government policies in order to be more supportive of the tuna industry. Most 
importantly the SWOT analysis will also suggest what the government should do 
to ensure that the strengths and opportunities are taken into account to ensure that 
viable opportunities are considered and enable them to fit and work well. 
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Data and information for the SWOT analysis, was obtained mainly from 
interviews with fisheries experts in Kiribati, and throughout the region who 
shared their views and experiences on the existing situation and business 
environment in Kiribati with specific regard to developing the tuna fishery. The 
interviews were conducted primarily face to face and via emails when the 
interviewee could not be interviewed in person. Secondary data was also gathered 
from published researches and articles from regional organization mainly from 
SPC, FFA, and WCPTC. Unpublished but Official information and data are also 
collected and used in this study.   
 
4.3 SWOT Analysis: Implications for fisheries development in Kiribati. 
 
The following two tables (table 4.1 and 4.2) summarize the list of helpful and 
harmful factors related to the establishment of the tuna fishing industry in 
Kiribati. The first table relates specifically to a small-medium scale tuna fishing 
project and the second table relates to the large scale tuna fishing project. The two 
summary tables are followed by a detailed discussion of the SWOT analysis. As 
can be easily seen from the two tables, many of the elements of the SWOT 
analysis are independent of the scale project. As a consequence, most of the 
detailed discussion in the SWOT analysis will apply to both small-medium and 
large-scale projects. Specific comments will be made to highlight those factors 
(either harmful or helpful) that favour a specific scale or size of investment.  
 
The two summary tables clearly demonstrate that there are many potential 
obstacles to the successful development of a domestic fishery in Kiribati, 
regardless of the scale of development. Decision makers and donors would 
probably prefer to see a relatively longer list of strength factors, but it should be 
stressed that the list of opportunities also provides information and requirements 
that favour the establishment of a tuna fishing industry under certain 
circumstances. This is useful information for the government. 
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Table 4.1: Summary Table for SWOT analysis of Small-Medium tuna fishing 
industry in Kiribati. 
 
 
HELPFUL HARMFUL 
STRENGTH 
• Kiribati large EEZ – 3.5 million Km2. 
• Bigeye and Yellowfin tuna Stock 
• Regional Support availability 
• Existing framework and commitment 
from national government to support the 
development of tuna fishery industry  
• Labour availability 
• Availability of training facilities 
• Availability of ship building and other 
basic skills 
 
WEAKNESSES 
• Remoteness of the islands and limited 
transportation services 
• Lack of ice and storage 
• Limited land area 
• Lack of property rights 
• Limited water supply poor infrastructure 
• Lack of maintenance and other required 
skills 
• Limited access to safety tools and 
limited search and rescue capacity 
• Limited access to capital inputs and 
expensive operating costs 
• Taxation system 
• Obstacles to private Sector Development 
• Government pricing policy in the 
domestic market  
• Distance from international market and 
poor fight availability 
• Foreign Direct Investment. 
• Reliance on foreign aid  
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Sea to Land ratio 
• Longline development 
• Ship Building Skills availability 
• Navigation (Borau) Skills 
• Supporting projects ; i)Baitfish farming; 
ii)the use of FAD; iii)Ice-plants project.  
• Multi-purpose fishing 
• Potential of Kiritimati development and 
its closure to US market. 
• Training Opportunities e.g Japanese 
Fisheries Training Centre 
• Potential labours and Job creation 
opportunities 
• Joint-Venture with Foreign Investors 
• Government support to the Private 
Sector  
• Outer Island Development 
• Community wellbeing 
• Exposure to the international market – 
International recognition 
• Strong demand for fresh tuna 
• Strong domestic market 
• Greater incentives 
• Appropriate improvements (wharf and 
import duty) 
THREATS 
• Tuna resources 
• Future stock of bigye and yellowfin 
• The future of canned tuna market 
• International competitors 
• High cost in relation to good quality 
products 
• Broken family 
• Loss of operation 
• Increase in Fuel Price 
• Use of FAD of the concern of the future 
tuna stock 
• Impact of foreign tuna fishing and 
concern over skipjack 
• Safety at sea 
• Vulnerability to climate change 
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Table 4.2 :Summary table for SWOT analysis of the Large tuna fishing industry in 
Kiribati  
 
 
HELPFUL HARMFUL 
STRENGTHS. 
• Kiribati large EEZ – 3.5 million Km2. 
• Regional Support availability 
• Existing framework and commitment 
from national government to support the 
development of tuna fishery industry.  
 
 
WEAKNESSES 
• Remoteness of the islands and limited 
transportation services 
• Limited land area 
• Limited fresh water supply and poor 
infrastructure 
• Lack of property rights 
• Lack of  maintenance and other required 
skills 
• Lack of ‘know how’ in the industry 
• Limited access to safety tools and 
limited search and rescue capacity 
• Limited access to capital inputs and 
expensive operating costs  
• Poor taxation system 
• Obstacles to private sector development 
• Distance from the international market 
verses limited fights availability and 
cargo space. 
• Poor democracy – slow investment 
process. 
• Lack of bargaining power  
• Lack of qualification and  Shortage of 
potential crew 
• Lack of management skills 
• Lack of experience 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Fisheries management response 
• Potential of Kiritimati development and 
its closure to US market. 
• Employment. 
• Existence of Japanese Training Centre. 
• Community Wellbeing - Employment and 
Job creation. 
• Income 
• Food 
• Joint-Venture with Foreign Investors 
• Capacity development 
• Provision of certified trainings 
• Marketing  
• Price of tuna in the Japanese Sashimi 
market. 
• Exposure to the international market – 
International recognition 
• Appropriate improvements (wharf and 
import duty) 
THREATS 
• New Pacific Entrant 
• Delays – bad weather, poor skipper and 
engineer skills, etc. 
• Debt repayment. 
• Water quality. 
• Work related injuries 
• Regional obligations 
• The future of canned tuna market 
• International competitors 
• High cost in relation to good quality 
products 
• Loss of operation 
• Increase in Fuel Price 
• Use of FAD of the concern of the future 
tuna stock 
• Impact of foreign tuna fishing and 
concern over skipjack 
• Safety at sea 
• Vulnerability to climate change 
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4.3.1 Detailed Discussion of the SWOT analysis – Small to Medium and 
Large Tuna Fishery. 
 
STRENGTH 
 
(1) Kiribati EEZ. 
 
The establishment of the EEZ in 1978 gives Kiribati the right to own or the right 
to explore and use marine resources within 200 nautical miles of the coast. The 
Kiribati EEZ of 3.5 million square kilometres makes it the largest EEZ in the 
Pacific region. This is an important strength to both small-medium and large tuna 
fishery, as it means there is fish for the tuna fishing industry if managed properly. 
The large EEZ makes it possible to divide up the area into 3 different fishing 
zones for licensing purposes (i.e. Gilbert Group, Phoenix group and Line Islands 
Group). There is evidence of good supply of tuna resources within the Kiribati 
EEZ. The DWFNs have been paying access fees since the late 1970s to come and 
fish in the Kiribati waters. Evidently this makes it clear that DWFNs are chasing 
tuna in the Kiribati EEZ. Also the record of the WCPO’s tuna catch shows that 
Kiribati provided an average of 20% of the total WCPO’s tuna catch in the late 
1990s to mid 2000. However the majority of the catch or almost all of the catch is 
being caught by DWFNs and some of its neighbouring PICs. The large EEZ will 
as well have the potential to attract foreign donors or foreign fishing companies 
who can provide funding assistance to Kiribati especially in terms of capital 
inputs. A joint venture operation with a foreign donor will enable Kiribati to start 
the business at the cost of the foreign partner. 
 
(ii) Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna Stock. 
 
In terms of bigeye and yellowfin tuna stock, SPC (2008) reported that Bigeye and 
Yellowfin tuna stock are not yet in an overfished state (i.e Bcurrent > BMSY). 
Although there is relatively high probability that continued fishing at current 
levels of effort will move it to an overfished state. Given the current state of 
bigeye and yellowfin therefore, Kiribati has the potential to supply the frozen or 
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fresh sashimi markets. The bigeye and yellowfin tuna stocks are particularly 
referenced to the development of the medium longline tuna fishery. 
 
(iii)Regional support to the development of tuna fishery industry. 
 
The SPC and FFA are consistently providing support and technical advice to 
member countries including Kiribati. One of the outcomes of these regional 
organizations is the establishment of baitfish farming which has been assisting to 
provide live baitfish for the pole-and-line fishing operations. Pole-and-line fishing 
is encouraged because it is not destructive to the tuna stock. Regional support can 
also be considered strength to the Kiribati tuna resources. The SPC, FFA and the 
WCPTC are working together to support the member countries. The two major 
concerns of these regional organizations are to i) ensure sustainable management 
of the tuna resources; and also to ii) ensure that member countries maximize the 
economic benefits/rents from their tuna resources. Kiribati would find it easier to 
work with the regional organizations within the same objectives of achieving 
maximum economic benefits and sustainable management of the tuna resources 
rather than working on its own against DWFNs.  Having the support of the 
regional organizations and working together as a region could give Kiribati 
strength and a better position to negotiate with DWFNs to maintain the 
sustainable level of tuna catches around the region and in Kiribati as well. 
 
(iv) Existing framework and commitment from national government to 
support the development of Tuna fishery industry.  
 
Fisheries management response in support of sustainable tuna resources, states 
that the DWFNs are prohibited to fish within; i) 60 nautical miles (nm) from the 
baselines of the islands of Tarawa, Kanton, and Kiritimati for DWFNs purse 
seiners ii) 12 (nm) from the baselines from which territorial sea of Kiribati is 
measured and lastly but not the least iii) PIPA (Phoenix Islands Protected Areas) 
are in the Phoenix Islands. The restricted areas may however have a negative 
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impact on the number of DWFNs’ vessels and access fees. The PIPA for instance 
will make the Kiribati EEZ in particular the protected areas less attractive 
however, it may on the other hand favor the long-term sustainability of the tuna 
stock which is good for the future of development of the medium and large tuna 
fisheries.  
 
The key investment areas as highlighted by the government of Kiribati also 
include the marine sector (harvesting and on-shore processing, etc) among others. 
The government has a system in place to ensure thorough consideration of foreign 
proposals. Investment applications will be considered if; i) The projects is viable; 
ii) It provides employment opportunities of I-Kiribati people; iii) There is 
generation of export income through direct export or import substitution; iv) 
There is a sustainable balance between local resource exploitation and the 
investment; v) There is a transfer of skill to I-Kiribati; vi) There is minimum 
impact on the social and natural environment. The above are applied for both 
local and foreign investment policies in Kiribati. Given the idea and the purpose 
of establishing a domestic tuna industry in Kiribati, there is no doubt the 
objectives of the tuna industry meets almost or all of the requirements to be 
considered for investment. In terms of government policy, the national support is 
considered strength to the establishment of the industry. 
 
However the perspective of private sector, contradicts what the government 
policy says. Even-though the private sector believed that there is not enough 
government support to the development of the private sector, there is appropriate 
supports. For instance the fisheries division is keen to support the initiative of 
developing private fishing operations. They provided training in fishing 
technologies, technical advice and support to the private sector. The Commerce 
division on the other hand is also willing to assist and advise on how to start your 
business. It seems fair to say that, there is adequate support from the government 
however it is up to a dedicated businessman and fisherman to utilize what is 
available in the business environment and work out a successful fishing business.  
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(v) Labour Availability  
 
In terms of labour and employment, Kiribati has a pool of skilled fishermen. 
There are basic skills available to start off the fishing industry in Kiribati. There is 
no doubt that while fishing is one of the traditional skills and culture of the 
Kiribati men, almost all I-Kiribati men can fish. The number of young 
unemployed I-Kiribati men can form part of the labor force for the fishing vessels. 
Most young I-Kiribati men are enthusiastic, dedicated and natural fishermen. 
Labor availability in Kiribati is another source of strength to the tuna fishing 
industry especially for the medium-sized longline tuna fishery industry. 
 
(vi) Available training facilities. 
 
The government with the assistance of foreign expertise is also providing training 
facilities to young boys and fishermen. For instance, the Japanese government has 
established its fisheries training centre (FTC) for long-line fishing in Tarawa. The 
intention of the FTC is to train young I-Kiribati fishermen and send them to work 
on the Japanese Vessels. However training is also available to other interested 
fishermen and teachers of the FTC (Fisheries Training Centre).  The long-line 
fishing skill is therefore available with some of the I-Kiribati fishermen. There is 
no doubt this longline skill is an additional skill to the traditional fishing skills of 
the local fishers.  
 
(vii) Availability of Ship Building and Other Basic Skills. 
 
Ship building skills is available in Kiribati. A number of small vessels have been 
built in Kiribati. Therefore there is evidence of ship building skill availability in 
Kiribati. This is a good opportunity for Kiribati especially for the medium 
longline fishing industry. The government should extend its assistance to ship 
building workshops with a view to improving the skill and the capacity of the 
local vessel builders. If Kiribati can improve this, there will be a possibility of 
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having locally built vessels which are expected to be cheap but of course safe and 
suitable for the tuna fishing in Kiribati. The navigation (Borau) skill is also one of 
the traditional skills available with a lot of fishermen. The skill should be made 
available to all fishers. It can be modified by adding modern technologies to assist 
the fishers to show their whereabouts in the ocean. The traditional navigation skill 
also includes the weather. It tells them when the weather or climates is going to be 
good for fishing or not.   
 
WEAKNESSES 
 
(i) Remoteness of the Islands and Limited Transportation Services. 
 
Limited transportation service is one of the major problems affecting the fishing 
operation in Kiribati as a whole both in the outer islands and also to serve the 
international market. Fishers in the outer islands are isolated from the 
opportunities available in Tarawa. 
At the national level, and in particular for the small scale tuna fishery, Tarawa is 
regarded as the main and best market for fish selling as there is good money in 
Tarawa. The majority of the cash employed population is in South Tarawa. 
However the outer island fishers cannot transport fresh fish directly to the market 
in Tarawa because of limited transportation services between the Outer Islands 
and Tarawa.  
 
(ii) Lack of Ice and Storage. 
 
Ice is important to maintain the good quality of the fish, however the nature and 
remoteness of the islands is making it very difficult for the outer islands to have 
good storage facilities for frozen fish or tuna as there is no power supply in the 
outer islands. They have to use a generator to keep the freezer on, but it will be 
too expensive to keep it going to maintain the quality of the fish. This weakness 
poses more of a problem for a small-fishery; it restricts participation of small 
fishery in the tuna fishing industry. For instance, if ice and storage facility is 
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available in the outer island, they (the outer island fishers) can also supply fish to 
the Tuna fishing industry to be exported to international market.   
 
(iii)Limited Land Area. 
 
The total land area of Kiribati is only 820 square kilometers compared to the sea 
area of 3.5 million square km. Developing a processing facility onshore will 
require a good and spacious land area especially with the development of the 
large purse seine fishery industry. It is perceived that a large purse seine fishery 
can provide good supply for onshore processing as well. However limited land 
area is a problem especially in Tarawa, where most of the development took 
place. Land may be available on leasehold areas but access is difficult with 
respect to private land due to disputes over land ownership. Land and fresh water 
availability in Kiribati are real constraints, especially in Tarawa. 
 
(iv) Lack of property rights. 
 
Lack of property rights is a common weakness to Kiribati citizens. For instance, 
there is lack of property right over land ownership in the sense that most private 
lands are owned by extended families. Dispute over land ownership is common in 
this sense. There is limited single owned who can easily make a decision over 
land.     
 
(v) Limited Water Supply and Poor Infrastructure. 
 
Water is an important input for the fisheries or any food manufacturing industry, 
however there is limited water supply in Kiribati. Water is one of the unavoidable 
problems in almost all of the islands and in particular Tarawa where the 
population is high. Freshwater availability is low. Water is distributed on and off 
according to certain times and is not available 24 hours. Each household has to 
have a container or a tank to store (keep) the water, otherwise 24 hour access 
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water is available from the underground well but is not hygienic to use for food 
preparation or drinking. A larger purse seine fishery, with more tuna catch, will 
become more difficult and unproductive with limited water supply. 
 
There are other important issues the government needs to overcome before 
Kiribati can start the tuna industry. Kiribati had a record of poor infrastructure. 
The existing infrastructure is a major weakness. It will certainly impede swift 
growth. Developing infrastructure will take time and proper planning. Even the 
public sector does not have a good record of maintaining infrastructure, buildings, 
or equipment in South Tarawa and elsewhere. Poor infrastructure is also 
discouraging foreign investors to come and invest in Kiribati. If Kiribati had good 
facilities and infrastructure foreign investors would not hesitate to come and assist 
in the development of the fishing industry. The wharf facilities in South Tarawa 
need improvement to be able to meet the required standard and be able to serve 
large vessels.  
 
(vi) Lack of Maintenance and Other Required Skills. 
 
Knowledge for maintenance of infrastructure and equipments (e.g FADs (Fishing 
Aggregated Devices)) is limited in Kiribati. Kiribati has a record of poor 
infrastructure and poor maintenance. FADs can be used for all small to large tuna 
fishing. For instance the government installed the FADs for assistance of the 
small fishermen using fishing-net but there are issues and cases of destroyed 
FADs and of FADs being lost. The local fishermen would have helped with the 
maintenance of the FADs only if they know how to keep and maintain them. For 
large purse seine tuna fishing, FAD is also used. However while FAD is a new 
technology to purse seine fishing, specific FAD technical and maintenance skills 
may be required to keep the vessel operation on.   
 
Also the fact that the Pacific Island Countries including Kiribati, were trying to 
move into developing an industry in which they had virtually no experience or 
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knowledge base did not make the transition easier. It is perceived that there is a 
lack of ‘know how’ in the fishing industry in the Pacific region. Also while the 
exploitation of the marine resources has been an important part of the Pacific 
Island economies and cultures for centuries, the Islander’s experience was limited 
to in- and near-shore fisheries, which were mainly oriented to meeting local 
needs. This did not prepare them for the capital-intensive, commercial offshore 
fishery that was characteristic of tuna. 
 
(vii) Limited Access to Safety Tools and Limited Search and Rescue 
Capacity. 
 
Safety and search services are important for the safety of the fishermen for all 
vessels, small to large fishing vessels. However local fishermen have limited 
knowledge for health and safety. The government or the authority involved should 
ensure that local fishermen should have access to good safety tools and life jacket 
on a boat. Fishermen often get lost when they encounter mechanical problems at 
sea and cannot return home. The other part of the problem is that most local 
fishers are private fishermen who do not have any tracking devices or safety tools 
on board. The government itself however has limited capacity and budget to 
search for lost fishermen. It would have been easier for them if they can easily 
track their whereabouts with a tracking device rather than searching around in the 
ocean with only one patrol and one or two small planes to search for men in the 
large EEZ. The same planes are also used for domestic flights services between 
the main capital Tarawa and the twelve (12) outer islands.  
 
(viii) Limited Access to Capital Inputs and Expensive Operating Costs. 
 
The capital inputs required for the development of a sophisticated fishing industry 
are large. There are lots of interested private businesses who want to expand their 
fishing businesses and capacities but most of them cannot afford to invest in 
bigger fishing businesses like pole-and-line or long-line because of the high 
capital cost. Some fishermen have been in the business for many years but remain 
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on a small artisanal and trolling basis. Most of the exiting private sector fishing 
businesses owns a range of one to three boats at the most. The most commonly 
used skiff boat in Kiribati for ocean fishing is a prototype catamaran flat bottom 
boat, 3 to 4 meters in length. The engine used is the yahama brand (only one 
supplier in Kiribati) which ranges from 25 hp, 35 hp, and some also use 40hp with 
perhaps a maximum number of five (5) men on one boat and where trolling is 
most common. Some boats fish for their own family consumption and sell the 
surplus to the market. 
 
Investing in the medium or large scale fishing vessel is more difficult for private 
individuals. Starting a fishing business requires purchasing, or leasing a fishing 
vessel which is expensive. Continued operation will be an ongoing and major cost 
to the business. Investing in the fisheries business is regarded as too costly and 
risky. Therefore adding pressure to the government or private companies who 
want to invest but are unsure if the business is going to be successful or not.  The 
private sector has limited capacity to invest in the medium to large fishing vessels. 
There is critical need for the government to provide financial support and good 
infrastructure to provide good incentives for the fishing operations. There are 
interests in the marine investment, however there is also greater fear that they 
cannot afford to lose if they invest. 
 
In addition operating cost in Kiribati is high compared to other neighbouring 
countries such as Marshall Islands and Fiji. Basically, the remoteness of Kiribati 
from the major trading centres in the world is a disadvantage and therefore 
relatively high fuel and transportation cost exist. The high freight cost is regarded 
as one of the barriers to the development of the tuna fishing industry. While the 
investment required to develop the tuna industry is large, high freight costs add 
more cost to the industry. The government may need to review its freight levy to 
be more accommodative to the development of tuna industry. Sea-freight cost 
ranges between USD$32 to USD$100 per cubic metre, while air-freight cost 
ranges between AUD$4 and AUD$11 per kilogram. SPC (2003) 
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(ix) Taxation System. 
 
The taxation system is another issue in Kiribati. The private sector is also facing 
high business taxes. This may be good for government revenue, but the private 
sector who is still weak and small is also struggling to pay for the government 
charges in particular the company or business taxes. Kiribati’s company tax 
structure is different from the other Pacific Island Countries as different tax rates 
are imposed according to the level of income/ profit comparison. For income 
levels AUD$25,000 or less, AUD$25,001-50,000, AUD$50,001+, are charged tax 
rates of 20% 30% 35% respectively SPC (2003) 
 
(x) Obstacles to Private Sector Development. 
 
Even though the government is committed to the development of the private 
sector, however the private sector considers the government policy not helpful 
and supportive to the private sector. They consider the government support to the 
private sector as only a ‘lip service’. As stipulated in the NDS (National 
Development Strategy), the government is committed to the private sector 
development. A number of constraints were highlighted in the NDS and actions to 
address them were also identified. For instance and in relation to (vii) above, two 
of the notable constraints include a high and inequitable tax structure, and 
relatively high import duties. It is however evident that a small country like 
Kiribati depends heavily on its revenue like fishing license and income tax. It 
should therefore be noted that the government is supporting the private sector but 
the government is sensitive to the change in the tax structure as it will be affecting 
its revenue. Tax income comprises 20 to 30 % of the total government revenue. 
 
(xi) Government Pricing Policy - Low Price of Tuna in the domestic market. 
 
In terms of the price of tuna, in Kiribati the price of tuna per kilo in the local 
market is very low compared to other countries. For instance the price of tuna 
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ranges from AUS$1.00 to AUS$1.50 per kilo. The government however is setting 
the ceiling for most prices of food and including fish. The local council is also 
another political factor which is putting pressure on the government to keep the 
price of fish low in the local market. This is because fish is the main diet for the 
majority of the population in Kiribati. In Samoa, the tuna price is $4.00 a kilo and 
in New Zealand it is a range of NZ$20.00 to NZ$25.00 a kilo.  
 
Fish sellers in the local market are facing difficulties to compete with the CPPL 
(government’s company) who is trying to sell all kinds of fisheries products at the 
very low prices. The intention of the CPPL is to provide the standard and 
affordable marine products to the local people, but however it is forcing the 
private sector to reduce the prices of their fish if they want to maintain their 
customers. The customers may be enjoying the low price of tuna but fishers are 
struggling to maintain their business in the local market.  
 
On the other hand, the increase in fuel prices is affecting the price of the fish in 
the market but to very minimal effects. For instance a $0.10 increase in fuel price 
per litre can cause a range of $0.10 to $0.50 increase in fish prices. In many 
occasions when there is increase in price of food, the government always comes 
in to intervene and force the licensed fishers to reduce their price. In other food 
cases like rice and sugar the government had to meet the subsidy cost to cover for 
the fixed prices of food.  In the case of the price of fish, there is high demand in 
the local market. Any increase in the price of fish would make public press which 
is not good for the government. It is however perceived that future increases in 
the fuel price will make fishing businesses less profitable. 
 
(xii) Distance from International Market and Poor Flight Availability. 
 
Distance from the international market is another problem to Kiribati. If Kiribati 
has to export fresh tuna, it needs to take fast and quick route to maintain the good 
quality of the fish. However, all flights from Kiribati have to go via Fiji. Flight 
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availability and cargo space is another problem. Flights in and out of Kiribati are 
only twice a week. Given the current flight schedule, exporting fish from Kiribati 
will therefore take days to reach its destination which is not good for the sashimi 
grade tuna. At the current situation, passengers are given priority. The cargo space 
depends on the remaining space after passengers, which can be very small given 
the number of flights a week. Mostly a problem for the larger fishery, aimed at 
serving international market.   
 
(xiii) Foreign Direct Investment. 
 
While the Kiribati government has tried to support local domestic investment in 
fisheries (discussed under strength), the support for foreign direct investment 
(FDI) has been less successful. Kiribati is disadvantaged in global/ regional 
competition to attract private capital from overseas because of its ‘endowed 
handicaps’ of remoteness, narrow base, small physical and economic size, and 
vulnerability to climate change. However, not only the physical nature of the 
country is causing delays and failures, but the investment process itself is very 
slow. Even though FDI is less successful, the Kiribati government still receives 
expressions of interest from foreign investors for fisheries related investment. 
However the long process to get approval for foreign investors is one of the 
obstacles. The government intention however, is to encourage foreign investment 
in their fishing industry but because it involves high risk, they have to go through 
thorough consideration to ensure that such investments are viable to the 
development of the social well being of their country and of course to the 
investors.  In most cases the applicants lost hope and gave up their proposals 
during the process of their applications.  
 
(xiv) Reliance on Foreign Aid. 
 
Lastly but not the least, Kiribati is one of the Pacific Island Countries who relied 
on foreign aid for some of its development projects. Most of the huge projects in 
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Kiribati are foreign funded projects. This however is a disadvantage to Kiribati, 
especially when they are negotiating for fisheries related issues as donors are also 
DWFNs. At one time Kiribati requested Japan to donate a medium size fishing 
vessel, but the request was refused by Japan. Japan refused to assist Kiribati in 
purchasing its own fishing vessel because they fear that in the future when 
Kiribati developed its own fishing industry they may refuse to give away or even 
reduce quota allocation to Japan. 
 
OPPORTUNITIES 
 
(i) Sustainability and Conservation of the Tuna Stock. 
 
Sustainability of the tuna stock is vital for the development of both the small-
medium and the large tuna fisheries. Even though the bigeye and yellowfin are 
considered not in an overfished state, there are however concerns over the future 
stock of their tuna resources especially the skipjack. The emphasis on the 
conservation and sustainability of the tuna stock is not only the concern of the 
individual countries, but is also the concern of the regional organizations. Thus 
gives small individual countries like Kiribati the opportunity to voice themselves 
against DWFNs who are the major fishers in the region. 
 
(ii)Longline and Pole-line Development Opportunities. 
 
Kiribati should be encouraged to focus on the development of longline tuna 
fishing. As also discussed in the opportunities for small scale fishing, the 
establishment of the Japan’s Fisheries Training Centre (FTC) in South Tarawa, 
can be considered part of the development of the longline tuna industry. The FTC 
provided the opportunity to train a number of unemployed young I-Kiribati men. 
The experienced I-Kiribati working on the Japanese vessels can be good sources 
for the domestic F/Vs. Instead of working at the Japanese Vessels they may 
choose to work on the domestic vessels so they do not have to leave their families 
for a year or so. The government can always utilise the existing Japanese FTC 
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(Fisheries Training Centre) to include pole-and-line training for the local 
fishermen. The government can always ask SPC and FFA to assist with the 
teaching programme.  
 
(iii) DWFN’s or Foreign Assistance to Support Fishing Operations in 
Kiribati. 
 
Japan is one of the DWFNs who had been providing financial support to Kiribati 
in return for low access fees. Japan is keen to assist Kiribati to develop its 
domestic tuna industry and has provided small fishing vessel for the Tekokona 
project, together with the provision of the large vessel for joint venture with 
Kiribati and Japan under the KAO project. 
 
(iv) Government Support to Small Private Fishing Operations.  
 
The government has been trying to assist where possible to small private fishing 
operations. A 7 ha pilot farm was established in Tarawa for use as live milkfish 
bait for the pole-and-line fishing operations. The results of the trial were 
encouraging, and this lead to the establishment of the Temaiku Fishfarm on 
Tarawa in 1975. This project was funded by the UK. Later the farm expanded, 
which covers 40 ha, comprising of 7 small ponds (7ha) and 5 large ponds (33 ha). 
The project provided good opportunity for use of live baitfish of small fishing 
vessels.  
 
(v) Use of New Fishing Technology. 
 
One of the most popular fishing techniques used throughout the region is the FAD 
(Fishing Aggregating Devices) system. The FAD is used to attract small fish to 
gather at one point. Those small fishes are attracting bigger fish including tuna. 
The use of the FADs system however, should only be encouraged at the national 
level for small and medium fishing vessels only. The domestic countries through 
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the regional organisations are proposing to ban the use of FADs by DWFNs’ large 
purse seine vessels which are very destructive.  
 
However at the national level, the Fisheries Division in Kiribati is providing 
training to the local fishermen on FADs. The purpose of the government in 
implementing this, is to prevent local fishermen from getting lost at sea, as they 
don’t have to go far away looking for the fish. The FAD therefore also saves time 
and fuel for the local fishermen. The installation of the FAD system is simple and 
cheap for small scale fishing operations. Basically the material at the top is just 
something that floats like a ship beacon but below the floater a few meters below 
the surface is attached another material like a big sack of copra bag, about 2 or 3 
meters by 3 meters. This is like a small size net attached below the surface. This 
small net traps algae etc over time will attract small fish to come and feed on it 
and stay with it permanently. As the smallest fishes start to accumulate around the 
FAD the bigger fish including tuna will also be attracted and start to aggregate at 
the FAD. This idea came about from floating logs out in the open sea. It was 
discovered that Tuna is always plentiful around floating logs and that is why 
fishing boats always look out for floating logs where they can easily find plenty of 
tuna. This was being implemented by the government but has been on trial since 
its implementation in the late 1980s. It is good opportunity for the local fishers if 
the government could train people how to use this fishing technology.  
 
(vi) Development Project in relation to Fisheries Operations in Kiribati. 
 
The ice plant project is another project to assist the private subsistence fishing 
particularly in the outer islands. The implementation of the ice plant in the outer 
islands is to provide cold storage for local fishermen. It will also allow them to 
save their catches before the ship came to collect them and transport them to 
Tarawa where they can be sold to the local market in Tarawa. Ice plants normally 
consist of a small building to house the ice plant with a power generator and a 
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small room for an Ice box to store fresh fish from people and an ice making 
machine. The objectives of the ice plant project is to; 
 
i) ensure food security on the islands i.e when there is bad weather there is 
always fresh fish available at the ice plants for people to buy. 
ii) provide opportunity for fishermen – as a means of self employment and 
earning money for fishermen. 
iii) ensure that fish sold to public are fresh and properly processed (assist in 
educating the people on the outer island on how to keep fish fresh and 
process them properly) 
iv) where there is surplus in the outer island or where ice plants capable of 
providing catches that is more than their own needs are encouraged to 
sell their excess catches to Tarawa or neighbouring islands. 
 
The ice plant project is also a multi-purpose fishing project. They also cater for 
the lagoon fishing catches. Lagoon fishing is most common in the outer islands 
because of the type of fishing canoes used in the outer islands. The locally built 
canoes are most popular in the outer islands because they are cheaper than the 
skiff flat bottom boats. However for safety reasons they have to fish inside the 
lagoon.   
 
Multi-purpose fishing is common with small boats and vessels. Small boats can 
be easily used for other fishing purposes when it is not a good year for tuna or 
when the tuna market dropped. For instance small vessels and boats can also turn 
to fish fresh snapper, wahoo, lobster, shrimps and others.  This allows the boat to 
continue its operations and for labours to continue their work and pay when it’s 
not a good time for tuna. 
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(vii)Domestic Market. 
 
Domestic market in Kiribati and in particular Tarawa (capital city) is strong and 
reliable for small and private fishing businesses. There is high demand of fish in 
the local market. The consumption of fish by the Kiribati population is very high. 
Those engaged in selling fish at the local market have to maintain their position in 
supplying the fish to keep up with the everyday demand of the customers. The 
domestic market is particularly an important opportunity for the small private 
fishing operations. 
 
(viii)International Market. 
 
The world’s fresh tuna demand can be regarded as an opportunity in establishing 
the medium and large tuna fishing industry. Fresh tuna import is increasing given 
the increase in fresh tuna consumption against the consumption for canned tuna. 
The following markets shows evidence of increases in fresh tuna import 
http://www.worldfishing.net/analysis/analysis.ehtml?o=1839#top);  
 
i)  EU tuna market; The demand of tuna in the EU market is strong. Of the 
total tuna import to France in 2006, 60% are tuna loins. For Spain tuna 
loins accounts for 40% of total tuna imports for Spanish tuna canneries. 
This figure was only 8% back in 2002. To enter the EU market, Kiribati 
should be able to comply with the current EU sanitary regulations, in 
order to survive in the market. 
ii)  US tuna market; The non-canned tuna market in the USA remains an 
important outlet for Asian and Latin American exporters. After Japan, 
the USA has emerged as the second largest import market for fresh tuna 
and tuna products such as loins, saku, steaks and tuna cubes. Fresh 
yellowfin is the main species used for sashimi in the US market, and total 
imports in the first three months of 2007 were 4,500 tonnes (5% more 
than in the same period of 2006). 
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iii) Japan tuna import values; Following several tuna management 
programmes and fishing restrictions worldwide, global tuna landings 
have started to shrink but import values are moving up. Japanese tuna 
import figures during Jan-Mar 2007 show that the total tuna (fresh and 
frozen) imports during this time fell by nearly 20% in quantity from 
86,439 MT in 2005 to 69,502MT in 2006. Import value on the other 
hand, increased by 11.5% to $70 billion Yen during the same period. 
(Fresh tuna imports were at low at 10,334 MT).  
 
(ix) Joint Venture Operation. 
 
Joint venture with foreign investors can also be viewed as an opportunity. It is fair 
to say that the involvement of the foreign investors is an opportunity in the sense 
that the foreign partner can provide financial support to the fishing industry in 
Kiribati even when it is expensive. The joint venture operations will also involve 
the employment of expertise at all levels of operations in support of existing local 
expertise. The expertise will be in the fields of logistics and finance as well. 
Through the joint venture operation, the Republic has access to the necessary 
funds to operate within the EEZ. The funds will allow the Republic to purchase 
the necessary vessels and employ the necessary expertise to operative effectively. 
The funds will also allow the set up of all the necessary logistic support to 
transport catches to markets within the required time span. Joint venture operation 
and the availability of funds will enable Kiribati to invest and start the large purse 
seine fishery which Kiribati alone finds expensive.  
 
THREATS 
 
There are possible opportunities to consider in the development of the tuna fishing 
industry in Kiribati, however there are also threats to consider. 
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(i) International Tuna Market. 
 
In terms of the international tuna market, there is a decline in the tuna market for 
canned tuna imports. Official canned tuna consumption figures for 2005 shows 
that the tuna consumption is on a continuous decline. For instance; 
 
i)  EU tuna market; The long term decline in French tuna imports (raw 
material for tuna canneries), is in line with the gradual closure of canning 
factories. Total imports in 2006 were 20% lower than 2005. 
ii)  US tuna market; The imports of tuna loins as raw material for canneries 
in the USA continue to decline, as an obvious result of the closure of 
canneries. In the first three months of 2007, total imports of tuna raw 
material were 14,400 tonnes, slightly below the 2006 amount. 
iii)  Thailand tuna market; with the increasing raw material price and supply 
shortage, canned tuna will no longer be a cheap item in the future. 
Bangkok tuna price has been reported to be over US$1300/MT. Even at 
this price supplies are hard to get as poor catches continue everywhere.  
 
Not only is there a decline in the import of tuna canned but, it was also reported 
that there is a decline in the Japanese (fresh and canned) tuna market: While the 
value of tuna imports in Japan increases, the imported quantity is decreasing. 
Fresh tuna imports during the first quarter of 2007 were at 45,822MT worth 
nearly $40 billion Yen but were low compared to previous years. The current 
demand for imported frozen tuna from supermarkets are low, as consumers are 
mostly after locally caught fresh skipjack. Therefore sales of frozen sashimi tuna 
are quite low at present in Japan. 
 
(ii) Coping with the International Standard. 
 
Kiribati is small and weak in terms of international competition. Also the fishery 
business environment is becoming very competitive even within the Pacific 
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region. The neighbouring countries of Kiribati like Samoa, Vanuatu, Solomons 
and Fiji are competing to enter the international market. The tuna industries of 
these countries are well established and equipped with good infrastructure. 
Kiribati therefore is facing the problem of trying to catch up with its neighbouring 
countries to enter the international market and at the same time struggle with its 
poor infrastructure. Developing a large purse seine tuna fishery will require a 
major improvement in infrastructure, wharf facilities, water supply and others. 
Also a large purse seine vessel needs a deeper wharf than the existing wharf in 
Tarawa (Betio). The wharf in Kiritimati is deep enough for the purse seine 
vessels, however it is specifically designed for the larger cruise ships. Major work 
is needed to improve the wharf if the medium and large fishing vessels. 
 
(iii) Volatility of the Market.  
 
At the national level, one of the obvious threats of investing in medium and large 
scale fishing is the risk of operational capacity. Buying a fishing vessel is very 
expensive. The cost of operation and maintenance of the vessel and other 
equipments will then continue to be part of the expenses to ensure the operation 
continues. Coupled with that, the instability of the market is also very damaging 
to the business. For instance, the current world economic crisis, overall, has been 
making the business environments not good for investment returns. The increase 
in oil/ fuel world price, is affecting the cost of operation in the fishing industry 
overall, and therefore the tuna prices worldwide. While the tuna price is unstable, 
the NPV of the project is also unclear and unstable. The greatest fear here, is that 
while it involves a huge amount of cost to operate, it will also involve a huge loss 
if the business is not successful. 
 
(iv) Use of FADs System.  
 
Whilst the introduction of the FADs is to assist the local fishers to easily locate 
their fishing spots it is however considered not favourable to the enforcement of 
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the conservation and sustainability of the tuna resources. With FADs they can 
also take small tuna (juveniles). This is not encouraged and the FFA, SPC and 
WCPTC are proposing to stop the use of FAD by DWFNs. This however is 
affecting the skipjack stock which is very important for the local fishermen.   
 
(v) Impact of DWFNs on Tuna Stock.  
 
At the existing government policy, the government of Kiribati is selling its quota 
to DWFNs in exchange for access fees. While this is the case, FFA (2008) reports 
stated that the local fishers felt that there is already an impact of foreign tuna 
fishing vessels on their tuna catch. The local fishers now have to go further in the 
ocean to find tuna schools. The local fishers perceived that there is already an 
impact of foreign tuna fishing vessels on their tuna catch. FFA, (2008). The 
principal small-scale commercial fishery that has and continues to be affected by 
DWFVs (Distant Water Fishing Vessels) is the extensive domestic troll fishing 
business. Salvins, (2001). SPC and FFA (2007), also states that effort to enforce 
sustainable and conservation measures should be emphasized sooner before the 
tuna stock is approaching its overfished stage.    
 
(vi) Vulnerability to Climate Change. 
 
Given the geographical and low land surface of the Kiribati islands, the 
government acknowledges that Kiribati is vulnerable to climate change. There is 
increasing concern over the rumors of increasing sea level rise where Kiribati and 
its neighbouring country Tuvalu will be the first countries to be affected. Both 
foreign and domestic investors may think that there would be no future to invest 
in Kiribati. This is however, not very attractive to foreign donors and foreign 
investors who wanted to invest in Kiribati.  
 
While the SWOT analysis has discussed how the tuna fishing industry could cope 
with the exiting situation in Kiribati, the next chapter (chapter 4) will then analyze 
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the proposed options in calculating the Net Present Values (NPVs) of the different 
options and compare which brings more benefit to the country. Most importantly 
the findings of CBA will confirm and double check the conclusions made in the 
SWOT analysis. 
 
4.4 Summary and Conclusion. 
 
The SWOT analysis is a qualitative form of analysis that has been used widely in 
researches to assist decision makers in evaluating the pros and cons of any 
business venture in the existing situation. The tables in 3.1 and 3.2 shows a list of 
SWOT analysis or items for a small-medium and large fishing scale. Even there is 
lots of important information and data to note that are related to fishermen issues, 
however the information presented in this thesis is only for the two fishing scales 
under study.  
 
The SWOT analysis tells the story by looking at the real situation of the project if 
it is going to be implemented in Kiribati. What are the strength provided by the 
society that will support these fishing development projects and what are the 
obstacles that might be harmful to the project. It identifies the importance of good 
infrastructure and other required facilities in particular water, ice and flight 
availability to be improved to ensure that the fisheries operations at all levels 
works well in Kiribati. The major difference identified by the SWOT analysis for 
the medium and large tuna fishery, is that the medium tuna fishery is less 
complicated than the large tuna fishery. Other than infrastructure and government 
policy review requirements, management skill and specific qualified crews are 
important requirements for the complicated large purse seine tuna fishery. 
However a joint venture operation may be the potential option to enable Kiribati 
to invest in the large purse seine tuna fishery. The joint venture operation and the 
access to funds will enable Kiribati to meet the expensive requirements for the 
fishing type. Not only the funds may be available but also the employment of 
foreign expertise at all levels is essential. However if Kiribati considered full 
92 
 
domestic operation of the large purse seine fishing operation, it is perceived 
expensive and difficult for Kiribati to learn and upgrade their capacity over a 
short period of time, however long-term human resource development and 
capacity building may be an option but will require time, money and commitment.  
 
Finally there are two concluding remarks from the SWOT analysis result as 
presented in the summary tables of 4.1 and 4.2, and also in the detailed 
discussion. First, it is apparent from the summary tables that there is a long list of 
harmful issues than the helpful issues for both small-medium and large scale 
fishing industries. This seems to conclude that the existing situation in Kiribati is 
not friendly enough to encourage investment in the tuna fishing industry. 
However, it should also be stressed that the list of opportunities provides 
information and requirements that favours the establishment of the tuna fishing 
industry under certain circumstances. Secondly, there are more opportunities and 
less threat to the small-medium scale compared to those of the large fishing scale. 
Investment in a large fishing industry is regarded risky and expensive than that of 
the small fishing industry. To this end, the SWOT analysis seems to favour the 
establishment of the small-medium scale tuna fishing industry with less cost 
implication required. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS – DISCUSSION OF METHODOLOGY AND 
RESULTS 
 
5.1 Introduction. 
 
The development options for the tuna fishing industry in Kiribati, which were 
identified in Chapter 4, will be further analysed in this chapter using cost benefit 
analysis. More specifically Campbell’s (2004) cost benefit analysis model will be 
adapted to calculate the NPV of each development option, and to examine the 
distributional consequences of fishery development versus continued reliance on 
access fees from DWFNs. The intention of the economic analysis in this study is 
to provide an estimate of the worth of investing in each proposal compared to the 
others. As a consequence, it will assist policy makers and other interested 
stakeholders in determining the best investment option for Kiribati in the tuna 
fishing industry. 
  
While the SWOT analysis in Chapter 4 provides a qualitative analysis of the 
fishery development options, the CBA will take a more quantitative approach, 
calculating the net worth or net gain of investing in the tuna fishing industry for 
all potential stakeholders. 
 
5.2 Theoretical Framework – Cost Benefit Analysis. 
 
Campbell and Brown (2003), define Cost-Benefit analysis as a process of 
identifying, measuring and comparing the social benefits and costs of an 
investment project or program. A program is a series of projects undertaken over 
a period of time with a particular objective in view. Projects, whether public or 
private, need to be appraised to determine whether they represent an efficient use 
of resources. Campbell and Brown further state that projects that represent an 
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efficient use of resources from a private viewpoint may involve costs and benefits 
to a wider range of individuals than their private owners. When conducting a 
social cost benefit analysis it is important to keep the analysis as broad as 
possible. 
 
An investment project is a particular allocation of scarce resources in the present 
which will result in a flow of output in the future. The cost of the project is 
measured as an opportunity cost – the value of the goods and services which 
would have been produced by the capital resources and inputs had they not been 
used for the project in question. The benefits of the project are measured by the 
value accruing to the decision makers and those affected in terms of net returns, 
employment benefits, taxes and other social benefits. The role of cost-benefit 
analysis in this study is to provide information to the decision-maker or those who 
will appraise or evaluate the project.  It will assist in providing relevant 
information about the level and distribution of benefits and costs to the decision-
maker, and potentially to the referent group – the group of individuals deemed by 
the decision-makers to be relevant.  
 
As stated earlier the Kiribati Government’s continued dream is to establish its 
own domestic fishing industry. To date, a domestic fishing industry has not been 
fully established due to the lack of capital and funding. While investing in the 
tuna fishing industry is regarded as risky, the Government and potential funding 
agencies are interested to see whether the net social benefits of a domestic tuna 
industry are positive. This is the kind of information any funding agency, 
implementing agency, and the Government, would be interested to know before 
they can commit funding to the project in question.      
 
For the purpose of this research, the design of a framework for analyzing the net 
benefits of a tuna fishing industry project is guided mainly by the information 
requirements of the decision-makers in the host country which in this case is 
Kiribati. Campbell’s cost-benefit model includes four related analyses. These 
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include; i) The Referent Group Analysis; ii) The Private Analysis; iii) The Project 
Analysis; and iv) The Efficiency Analysis. 
 
The referent group analysis is a detailed account of net domestic benefits in the 
form of employment benefits, rents and tax revenues, and also includes an 
account of disadvantages such as, environmental costs. Within the current 
context, the referent group can be broadly defined as the residents of Kiribati, and 
the results of the referent group analysis are primarily of interest to the Kiribati 
Government. Government policy analysts require information on tax revenues for 
budget formulation and forecasting, and human resource analysts would be 
interested in the gains to Kiribati in the form of employment benefits. It is also 
important to understand any potential negative impacts associated with the 
project. For example, fisheries development may impose external costs that would 
be of interest to the Environment Division, and the negative impacts must be 
weighed against revenue and/or employment gains.      
 
Campbell’s model also incorporates a detailed account of the net benefits from the 
viewpoint of the private sector. Two ways of looking at this for the private sector 
are from the viewpoint of the equity holders (the Private Analysis) and from the 
more general viewpoint of the market (the Project Analysis). Within the current 
context the net benefits calculated in the Private Analysis represent the financial 
returns (after taxes and financing charges have been paid) to those who ‘own’ the 
fishing vessel. The Project Analysis is defined more broadly, and provides an 
indication of whether the proposed project has a positive NPV from a market 
perspective. The Project Analysis values all project inputs and outputs at market 
prices, and does not include tax flows, depreciation or any explicit consideration 
of how the project is financed. These results may be of interest to a Regional 
Advisory Organisation or an aid-based funding organisation. As explained by 
Campbell and Brown (2004), the net benefits of the Private Analysis are those 
identified by the Project Analysis, net of tax and debt flows. Note that the private 
NPV may be positive despite a negative project NPV if the proposed project 
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involves generous tax, access fee or financial incentives. Similarly, conflicting 
results in the referent group versus private analysis might indicate that there are 
social benefits to the referent group that are not shared by those funding the 
project.  
 
Also the framework includes an economic model which assesses the project in 
terms of economic efficiency. The Efficiency Analysis is the traditional social 
cost-benefit model in which inputs and outputs are shadow-priced to correct for 
market failure arising from the traditional kinds of problems: incomplete property 
rights, market power, and distortions resulting from the tax and regulatory 
framework in the economy. Shadow prices may be used to adjust an observed 
market price or to place a value on a non-marketed output or input. Inputs and 
outputs are valued at prices which reflect marginal benefit or opportunity cost. 
Campbell (2004) states that the efficiency analysis will contain the categories of 
costs and benefits included in the project analysis, but where shadow-prices have 
been substituted for market prices the valuations will be different. The efficiency 
analysis will include a category of benefit or cost not contained in the project 
analysis.  
 
Furthermore, since the efficiency analysis measures the net benefits of the project 
to whomsoever they accrue, for instance, the host country, the banks and any 
other entity involved, whether or not they are measured by market prices, there is 
an important adding up property – the total Efficiency Net Benefit equals the sum 
of the net benefits to the host or domestic country (the referent group), the foreign 
banks and any other private groups or individuals affected by the project (the 
private analysis) Campbell (2004).  
 
Another important spreadsheet in Campbell’s overall model is the ‘summary 
sheet’ which provides a synopsis of the result of the analysis for each project. A 
sample of the summary sheet for Option 1 is shown in Figure 5.1. This sheet 
gathers together the critical information that the decision maker requires. It can be 
97 
 
used to conduct sensitivity and scenario analysis. Cells B4 to B10 contain the 
variables which allow the decision-maker to give (DX=0) or withhold (DX=1) a 
number of concessions which may be requested by the company Campbell 
(2004). Cells B13 to B15 contain shadow-prices. Cell B13 reflects the shadow-
price of labour expressed as a proportion of the gross wage, before taxes and other 
deductions. The value 0.5 reflects the facts that there is widespread 
unemployment in Kiribati, so that the market wage is an over-estimate of the 
opportunity cost of labour. Cell B14 sets the shadow-price of the tuna catch 
between 0 and 1 given that the fishery in Kiribati is exploited but not fully 
exploited. 1 implies that the fishery is fully exploited while 0 implies that there 
are plentiful fish to catch. In the thesis, we assume that a large vessel will have a 
major impact on the fishery in particular the allocated quota Kiribati would sell to 
DWFNs, while the small and the medium vessel have less impact on that quota or 
fishery.  For that reason, B14 is set to 1for the large vessel project and 0.5 for the 
small and medium vessel projects. This will also be part of the sensitivity 
analysis. Adjusting these shadow-prices values will change the overall net benefit 
of the project as calculated in the efficiency analysis and the referent group 
analysis where shadow-prices measure the opportunity costs of inputs. The 
external cost of the project is assumed to be $5/ mt for the large vessel and $1/mt 
for small and medium fishing vessel. While these values represent only a small 
fraction of the overall gross value of the catch there is very little empirical 
evidence in the literature as to the magnitude of the external cost imposed by 
various fishing vessels. Note that this value can be modified as more information 
becomes available. 
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Figure 5.1 Sample Summary Spreadsheet. 
 
 
The case studies in this research involve proposals to establish a domestic tuna 
fishing industry in Kiribati to target the Japanese frozen and fresh sashimi 
markets. It is important to emphasize that all of the identified options focus on 
fishing rather than processing as there is very minimal processing involved in any 
of the options.  
 
5.2.1 Proposed Development Options. 
 
The options in this thesis have been developed from a review of the available 
literature, as well as interviews with fisheries officers in Kiribati. All of the 
options reflect the Government’s dream to develop its own tuna fishing industry. 
 
The proposals in Option 1 and Option 2 are for a small-medium freezer longliner 
which will target Bigeye catch for the Japanese sashimi market. The vessel size is 
42.5 meters and the ton capacity is approximately 110 metric tons (PC; Moote 
Tira; Operation Manager KSSL). The proposed operating data of the vessel in 
terms of proportion of catches is 60 % bigeye tuna, 30 %  Yellowfin tuna and the 
remaining 10 % wahoo (king fish) and by-catch. Given the proportion of the 
catches, the average price of tuna used for this proposal is AUD$9,082.27.  The 
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total days at sea is 9 days plus 2 turn around days. The total number of trips in a 
year is 22 for options 1 and 2.   
 
The proposals in Options 3 and 4 are similar to that of Options 1 and 2 however 
these options involve a bigger vessel. These options involve a medium freezer 
longliner vessel targeting both Yellowfin and Bigeye for the Japanese sashimi 
market. The proportion of the catch is 43% Bigeye and 41% Yellowfin. The 
remaining 16% of the catch is comprised of billfish, albacore, and others. The 
fishhold capacity for the proposed vessel is 357 tonnes, catch per day is expected 
to be 1.52 tonne, average fishing days is 234, the days at sea is 327 and the 
average operations days is 234. The medium freezer longliner is assumed to make 
one trip per year.   
 
The final proposal is Option 5, which involves a large 1,700 MT purse seiner with 
the use of a FAD (Fishing Aggregate Device) system. It is assumed that the vessel 
will make six (6) trips a year and the expected catch per trip is 1,200MT. The total 
catch per annum is expected to be 7,200 MT. There are however disagreements 
regarding the viability of such a large project for the Kiribati government, given 
the total cost involved and the limited capacity and limited access to capital 
resources. However other fisheries officers are very optimistic. They believe that 
the Kiribati government should thoroughly investigate the larger project, with a 
view that, if the project is managed well it may be quite profitable for the 
government. Their primary objective is to invest in a big fishing vessel which will 
allow them to compete with the DWFNs’ vessels. It may ultimately be too hard 
for Kiribati to enter into competition with the DWFNs. There are other important 
issues, infrastructure requirements and the review of the government’s fisheries or 
business related policies that need to be improved to ensure good support to the 
business in question.   
 
The spreadsheet reports associated with each option are reported in the appendix 
section at the back of the thesis. The variable sheets and summary results are 
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presented along with the discussion of the results in this chapter. The data or 
variable sheets are an important feature of the spread-sheet model, because all 
cost and revenue parameters are entered only once, in the data sheets. All the cells 
in the project, private, efficiency, and referent group sections of the spreadsheet 
consist of references to the cells in the data section. Therefore the model can be 
used to conduct sensitivity analyses to assess the implications of any changes in 
the parameters of the data sheets.   
 
5.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis - Risk and Uncertainty. 
 
It is important to stress that the projects involve a degree of uncertainty with 
regards to some of the underlying assumptions and parameter values. The future 
is uncertain, we do not know with certainty what the future values of the project’s 
costs and benefits will be. For instance estimating the market price of fish and the 
size of the catch involves some judgement being made on the part of the analyst 
on the basis of the current information. A sensitivity analysis (SA) is the study of 
how variation in the output of a mathematical model can be apportioned, 
qualitatively or quantitatively, to different sources of variation in the input of a 
model. Campbell and Brown (2003) describe the term ‘sensitivity analysis’ as the 
“simple process of establishing the extent to which the outcome of the benefit-
cost analysis is sensitive to the assumed values of the inputs used in the analysis”. 
 
For all of the identified options, sensitivity analysis was conducted around the 
discount rate, the magnitude of the operating costs, and the size of the catch. 
Performing a sensitivity analysis by varying the discount rate constitutes one 
commonly used method of taking risk into account, termed the use of a risk 
premium on the discount rate. Under this approach, if one project is believed to be 
more risky than usual, the analyst uses a higher discount rate than that which 
would be used in the absence of risk. In this case we assume that the discount rate 
in the absence of risk is 0.05, therefore we will test how sensitive the NPV of the 
project is to the choice of 0.02, 0.05, 0.1 0.2 and 0.3 discount rates. 
101 
 
 
Campbell and Brown (2003) state there are a few important drawbacks to using a 
risk premium on the discount rate. These includes; “i )often the analyst will be 
relying on a totally subjective estimate of what value the risk premium should 
take, although it should be noted that inter-sectoral comparisons of rates of 
return are sometimes used to estimate sector-specific risk premia; ii) by attaching 
a constant premium over the life of the investment it is being assumed that the 
case that it is the earliest years of an investment project that are the riskiest; iii) 
applying the premium to the net cash flow effectively assumes that the forecasted 
cost and benefit streams are affected equally by the risk, whereas it is likely that 
each is subject to a different degree of riskiness”.  
 
Given the few important drawbacks highlighted above, a sensitivity analysis was 
conducted around the volume of the catch, and the level of the output (tuna) price. 
More specifically, it was assumed that the actual operating costs and volume of 
catch could vary by up to 25% above or below their ‘best guess’ estimate. 
 
 5.3 Data Collection. 
 
The present study uses a combination of both primary and secondary data. The 
primary data is based on personal interviews conducted with various Fisheries 
Officials as well as Fisheries Consultants from both the Forum Fisheries Agency 
(FFA) based in the Solomon Islands and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
(SPC) based in New Caledonia. The interviews were largely conducted via either 
face to face communications, by telephone or through the use of the more modern 
electronic telecommunication devices such as e-mail, internet, and fax. 
 
Secondary data has been sourced from the literature reviews of similar previous 
studies, information and data collected from published as well as unpublished 
official documents, and finally, from some cost and financial data obtained from 
local fishing companies as well as from similar projects within the Pacific region 
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where data is not available from Kiribati. Notwithstanding the above, the present 
study must also acknowledge that the limited and often non availability of data for 
the purpose of analysing, modelling and projecting had posed a great deal of 
difficulty for this study.  
 
Every effort has been made to construct data sets that accurately reflect the size 
and operation of the vessels identified for each option. This data has been applied 
to Campbell’s spreadsheet model and the outcome will produce a quantitative 
result that will indicate whether the projects produce a positive or negative Net 
Present Value (NPV). The sensitivity analysis will then be carried out to 
investigate the effect of changes in the level of operating costs, the tuna catch and 
the discount rate on the NPV for the referent group (Referent group Analysis), the 
private sector (Private and Project Analysis) and society as a whole (Efficiency 
Analysis). The result of both the CBA and the SWOT analysis will be able to 
demonstrate to the reader whether the idea of encouraging domestication of the 
tuna industry in Kiribati is desirable from an economic perspective, and if its 
going to work, what would be the best policy option to recommend that will bring 
certain and meaningful economic benefit to the Kiribati economy.  
 
5.4 Cost-Benefit Analysis – Result Discussion. 
 
5.4.1 Variables for the Spreadsheets Model. 
 
Variables; 
• Capital Costs; 
The capital cost for the spreadsheet model developed by Campbell and applied to 
the case of Kiribati in the present study includes; Vessel costs, lands and 
improvement, buildings and facilities, equipment, and working capital. The 
salvage values are set for the vessels, land and improvements, buildings and 
facilities and equipment at 20%, 80%, 50% and 15% respectively. The salvage 
values are adopted from Campbell’s model. 
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• Operating Costs; 
Operating cost includes labour, materials, maintenance, fuel, electricity, 
insurance, and miscellaneous. Note that the materials item includes the costs for 
bait fish, packing materials and other materials. The equipment item includes 
fishing gear and other fishing equipment. The miscellaneous item includes other 
expenses like transportation cost, marketing expenses such as airfreight and 
processing and depreciation costs on vessels and fishing gear.  
 
• Market Price and Efficiency Prices 
For both capital and operating costs, data in the Market Prices column reflects 
current market conditions, and is used in the Private Analysis and the Project 
Analysis because the results of these analyses will be used primarily to determine 
whether the overall project is wealth enhancing for potential funding agencies. 
Data in the Efficiency Prices column reflects any adjustments that need to be 
made for market failures. The most notable adjustment involves the cost of 
labour, and reflects the fact that there is widespread unemployment in Kiribati. 
These prices are used in the Referent Group Analysis (to reflect the rent obtained 
by Kiribati workers) and the Efficiency Analysis (to reflect the lower opportunity 
cost of labour). The fuel price is also adjusted for the existence of the fuel tax.  
 
• Tax rates. 
Information on the tax rates applied in this study is extracted from the Kiribati 
government’s tax act ‘Income Tax Act 1990’. Direct taxes like resident and non-
resident company tax rates, and personal income tax rate are, 28%, 30%, and 20% 
respectively. The personal income tax rate is the average rate of tax paid by the 
employees and crews in Kiribati. The personal income tax rates for Kiribati are 
relatively high. Personal tax rates ranges from 20%, 25% and 35% for income 
levels AUD$1,801 - 25,000, AUD$25,001 - $50,000, and AUD $50,001 plus 
respectively. Those who earn AUD$1000 or less are exempted from tax. In the 
case of personal income tax rate for foreign labour, the tax rate depends on the 
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MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) or agreement of the two parties (Kiribati 
agent and foreign agent), but in most cases, the 20% local labour rate is applied.  
 
Kiribati’s company tax structure is different from the other Pacific Island 
countries as different tax rates are imposed according to the level of income/profit 
comparison. In other PICs, only one rate is imposed for all levels of company 
income, however there is a distinction between resident and non-resident 
companies. The resident companies are charged a range of 20%, 30%, and 35% 
for income levels AUD$25,000 or less, AUD$25,001 - 50,000, and AUD $50,001 
plus respectively.  
 
Campbell’s model is general, and allows the analyst to apply a variety of indirect 
taxes such as a VAT, import duties, export taxes, and a fuel tax. For the 
information of the readers VAT, export fuel and land taxes have not been 
implemented in Kiribati, however the tax authority does plan to impose these 
taxes. Export tax in Kiribati has not been implemented maybe because there is 
limited export from Kiribati. Tariffs on imported fishing gears are exempted in 
this case as the tuna industry is a new industry in Kiribati. 
 
5.4.2 CBA - Result Discussion 
 
The results are summarised in the summary results sheet of each of the 
spreadsheet models of the different options. Details of the results are explained as 
follows according to the different options examined in this study.  The Private, 
Project, Efficiency and Referent Group analysis sheets are in the appendix section 
at the back of the thesis. The results are expressed in millions of Australian 
(AUD) dollars.  
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Option 1 : 1, 110 MT Longline Vessel. 
 
Option 1 is one medium scale tuna fishing vessel that will employ 20 crews of 
which 5 are Japanese and 15 are locals. The price of labour is modified in the 
referent group analysis and the efficiency analysis to reflect the level of 
unemployment in Kiribati. Table 5.1 below lists the capital cost and the operating 
costs involved in this option. The proposed annual catch is 185 MT. The total cost 
of the project per annum is AUS$2,860,406.00 comprising of capital cost of 
AUS$855,800.00 and operating cost of AUS $2,004,606.00. Appendix 1 shows 
the detailed spreadsheet model for the cost-benefit analysis for option 1 for the 
Project, Private, Efficiency and the Referent group analysis.  
 
Table 5.2 shows the result summary sheet for the cost benefit analysis for option 1 
using a 5% discount rate. The results show that option 1 will give an overall 
efficiency NPV of AUD$-13.85 million. The referent group analysis is also 
negative by AUD$-2.00 million. Of the total referent group the government and 
the community are going to incur a loss of AUD$-3.92 million and AUD$-0.00 
million respectively, whereas in terms of employment benefits there will be a gain 
of AUD$1.93 million. The cost of this option to the government reflects two 
things. One is that the project is loss-making, and so the ‘owners’ of the project 
not only do not pay any tax to Kiribati, they offset these loses against taxes owed 
elsewhere. In terms of employment benefits there will be a gain of AUD$1.93 
million reflecting the fact that the wage is higher than the opportunity cost of 
labour in Kiribati.  
106 
 
Table 5.1 : Capital Cost and Operating Costs for Option 1. 
Capital costs Market Prices 
Vessels 280,000 
Land and Improvements 50,000 
Buildings & Facilities 139,383 
Equipments 86,417 
Working Capital (Finance Loan) 300,000 
Operating costs  Market Prices 
Labour 714,224 
Materials (Bait) 59,400 
Maintenance 50,000 
Fuel 396,000 
Electricity 30,206 
Insurance 21,500 
Miscellaneous 733,276 
(Source : PC; CEO CPPL, Betio, Aug, 2008).  
 
Table 5.2 Summary result for Option 1. 
Summary 
sheet             
         
Concessions Switches  
Results ($ 
millions)     
Access 
(Dom=0, 
DWFN=1) 1  
Referent Group 
NPV -$2.00
Non-Referent 
Group NPV   
Company Tax 
(Dom=0, For=1) 1  
Type of Net 
Benefit  
Private Analysis 
NPV -$14.20
Japan Tuna 
Agreement 0  Direct Taxes -$4.53
Foreign Banks 
NPV $0.25
Sales 
Tax(Exempt=1) 0  Indirect Taxes $0.00 Japan NPV $2.10
Tariff 
(Exempt=1) 0  Access Fees $1.21 Total -$11.86
Export Tax 
(Exempt=1) 0  
Employment 
Benefits $1.93    
Fuel Tax 
(Exempt=1) 0  
Opportunity Cost 
of Catch -$0.60    
    External Cost -$0.00 WTP IRR #DIV/0! 
Shadow-Prices   Total -$2.00    
Labour (0-1) 0.5  
Stakeholder 
Group  Consistency Check   
Tuna Catch (0-
1) 0.5  Government -$3.92
Efficiency 
NPV(Aggregate) -$13.85
External Cost 
($/mt) 1  Labour $1.93 Efficiency NPV -$13.85
    Community -$0.00    
Discount Rate 0.05  Total -$2.00    
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The total non-referent group NPV is also negative by AUD-$11.86 million. The 
negative NPV for the Private analysis reflects the fact that the proposed option is 
loss making, and represents a poor use of private funds. The positive Foreign 
Bank NPV reflects the assumption that the Capital owners will continue to meet 
their financial obligations to the banks despite their negative cash flow. 
Essentially this is the present value of the interest paid on the loans that financed 
the capital expenditure for the project. The positive NPV for Japan reflects the 
duty paid on fish imported to Japan.  
 
Option 2 : 2, 110 MT Longline Vessels. 
 
Option 2 involves two vessels with the same specification (small/medium 
longliners) as the one chosen for option 1. It was assumed that the cost involved 
in doubling the operation will be close to but less than double the cost of one 
vessel given some fixed costs involved for the industry. The total cost involved in 
this case is AUS$5,531,429, where capital cost is AUS$1,522,217 and operating 
cost of AUS$4,009,212.00. The annual tuna catch is now going to be 370 MT per 
annum. The project will employ up to 40 crew members, of which 75% of the 
total crew will be recruited locally. Table 5.3 below shows the list of costs 
involved in the project. 
 
Table 5.3 : Capital cost and operating cost for option 2. 
Capital costs Market Prices 
Vessels 560,000 
Land and Improvements 50,000 
Buildings and Facilities 139,383 
Equipment 172,834 
Working Capital (Finance Loan) 600,000 
Operating costs  Market Prices 
Labour 1,428,488 
Materials 118,800 
Maintenance 100,000 
Fuel 792,000 
Electricity 60,412 
Insurance 43,000 
Miscellaneous 1,466,552 
(Source : PC; CEO CPPL, Betio, Aug, 2008).  
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Appendix 2 shows the variable sheets of the spreadsheet model for other results 
sheets for the private, project, efficiency and referent group analysis of the cost 
benefit analysis for option 2.  
 
Table 5.4 Summary Result for Option 2. 
 
Summary 
Sheet           
         
Concessions Switches  
Results ($ 
millions)     
Access 
(Dom=0, 
DWFN=1) 1  
Referent Group 
NPV 
-
$5.30
Non-Referent 
Group NPV   
Company Tax 
(Dom=0, 
For=1) 1  
Type of Net 
Benefit  
Private analysis 
NPV 
-
$26.90
Japan Tuna 
Agreement 
(Exempt=1) 0  Direct Taxes 
-
$7.93 Foreign Banks NPV $0.45
Sales Tax 
(Exempt=1) 0  Indirect Taxes $0.00 Japan NPV $4.19
Tariff 
(Exempt=1) 0  Access Fees $0.00 Total 
-
$22.27
Export Tax 
(Exempt=1) 0  
Employment 
Benefits $3.85    
Fuel Tax 
(Exempt=1) 0  
Opportunity Cost 
of Catch 
-
$1.21    
    External Cost 
-
$0.01 WTP IRR #DIV/0!
Shadow-
Prices   Total 
-
$5.30    
Labour (0-1) 0.5  
Stakeholder 
Group  Consistency Check   
Tuna Catch 
(0-1) 0.5  Government 
-
$9.14
Efficiency 
NPV(Aggregate) 
-
$27.56
External Cost 
($/mt) 1.5  Labour $3.85 Efficiency NPV 
-
$27.56
    Community 
-
$0.01    
Discount 
Rate 0.05  Total 
-
$5.30     
 
Table 5.4 shows the result summary sheet for the cost benefit analysis for option 
2. The results are very similar qualitatively to those presented for Option 1 above. 
The negative NPV in both the Efficiency and the Private Analyses indicates that 
the two vessels are a poor use of resources from both a private and a social 
perspective. The largest component of the (negative) Referent Group NPV 
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accrues to the Kiribati government, and is associated with the forgone tax revenue 
from the loss-making vessels. Although there are benefits to Kiribati from 
employment creation these benefits are outweighed by the losses to the 
government from foregone tax revenue. 
 
As in Option 1, the only non-referent stakeholders who gain from this option are 
the foreign banks who finance the capital expenditure and the Japanese 
government who collects an import duty on the fish entering Japan.  
 
Option 3 : 1, 300-500 GT Longline Vessel. 
 
Option 3 features one 300-500 medium longline vessel that will also employ 20 
crew members. The underlying assumptions with respect to resources and 
industry structure are the same as the two options above. When valued at market 
prices, the total cost involved in this option is approximately AUD$3.0 million, 
comprised of AUD$1.27 million in capital costs and AUD$1.7 million in 
operating costs. The annual tuna catch (MT) per annum is 357 MT.  
 
Table 5.5 : Capital and Operating Costs for Option 3. 
Capital costs Market Prices 
Vessels 560,000 
Land and Improvements 74,627 
Buildings & Facilities 208,034 
Equipments 128,981 
Working Capital (Finance Loan) 300,000 
Operating costs  Market Prices 
Labour 714,224 
Materials (Bait) 30,579 
Maintenance 82,090 
Fuel 396,000 
Electricity 30,206 
Insurance 32,090 
Miscellaneous 453,442 
(Source : PC; Raikaon Tumoa, (Senior Fisheries Officer), Aug 2008). 
 
Table 5.6 shows the result summary sheet for the cost benefit analysis for option 3 
at a 5% discount rate. Although this is much closer to breakeven compared to 
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options 1 and 2, the negative NPVs for this option indicate that it is not a good use 
of resources. As with the previous options, the employment benefits represent the 
only gain to the referent group, but they are outweighed by the overall loss in tax 
revenue to the government. External costs imposed on the community by the 
fishing activity are minimal.  Appendix 2 shows the detailed private, project, 
efficiency, and referent group analysis sheets for option 3. 
Table 5.6 Summary Result for Option 3. 
Summary 
Sheet            
         
Concession
s 
Switche
s Results ($ millions)     
Access 
(Dom=0, 
DWFN=1) 1  
Referent Group 
NPV 
$0.7
2
Non-Referent 
Group NPV   
Company 
Tax 
(Dom=0, 
For=1) 1  Type of Net Benefit  
Private analysis 
NPV -$9.20
Japan Tuna 
Agreemtn 
(Exempt=1) 0  Direct Taxes 
-
$2.1
0 Foreign Banks NPV $0.37
Sales Tax 
(Exempt=1) 0  Indirect Taxes 
$0.0
0 Japan NPV $4.04
Tariff 
(Exempt=1) 0  Access Fees 
$1.8
1 Total -$4.79
Export Tax 
(Exempt=1) 0  
Employment 
Benefits 
$1.9
3    
Fuel Tax 
(Exempt=1) 0  
Opportunity Cost 
of Catch 
-
$0.9
0    
    External Cost 
-
$0.0
0 WTP IRR 
#DIV/0
! 
Shadow-
Prices   Total 
$0.7
2    
Labour (0-1) 0.5  Stakeholder Group  Consistency Check   
Tuna Catch 
(0-1) 0.5  Government 
-
$1.2
0
Efficiency 
NPV(Aggregate) -$4.06
External 
Cost ($/mt) 1  Labour 
$1.9
3 Efficiency NPV -$4.06
    Community 
-
$0.0
0    
Discount 
Rate 0.05  Total 
$0.7
2     
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The total non-referent group NPV is also negative by -$4.79 million. A closer 
look at the distribution of the non-referent group analysis indicates that 
(presuming there is no loan default) only the funding institution and the Japanese 
duty collectors will benefit from this option. The negative Private NPV indicates 
that it would be difficult to convince a potential overseas joint venture partner to 
participate in this option.  
 
Option 4 : 2,  300-500 GT Longline Vessels 
 
The fourth option is similar to the third option, but will employ two 300-500 GT 
longline vessels. It is assumed that 40 crew members will be recruited in this 
project. The total cost involved in the project is over AUD$5.7 million. The 
capital cost is AUD$2.3 million and the operating cost is around AUD$3.5 
million. The total catch per annum is assumed to double the catch of the third 
option so that is going to be 714MT.  
 
Table 5.7 : Capital and operating costs for Option 4  
Capital costs Market Prices 
Vessels 1,120,000 
Land and Improvements 75,758 
Buildings & Facilities 211,186 
Equipments 261,870 
Working Capital (Finance Loan) 600,000 
Operating costs  Market Prices 
Labour 1,428,448 
Materials (Bait) 62,084 
Maintenance 166,667 
Fuel 792,000 
Electricity 60,412 
Insurance 64,179 
Miscellaneous 920,624 
(Source : PCs; Raikaon Tumoa,  (Senior Fisheries Officer), Aug, 2008). 
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Table 5.8 : Summary Result of Option 4. 
 
Detailed analysis of the Project, Private, Referent Group and Efficiency analysis 
are in the appendix section of the thesis. The result summary (Table 5.8) shows 
that the slight scale economies associated with spreading some capital costs 
across two vessels are not significant enough to reverse the conclusions from 
Option 3. The Referent, Private, Project and Efficiency NPVs are all negative, 
indicating that the proposed project is wealth decreasing. The only beneficiaries 
of the option are Kiribati labour, who would be paid excess of the opportunity 
cost of their labour, the foreign banks who are assumed to receive interest on their 
Summary 
Sheet             
         
Concessions Switches Results ($ millions)     
Access 
(Dom=0, 
DWFN=1) 1  
Referent Group 
NPV $0.36
Non-Referent 
Group NPV   
Company Tax 
(Dom=0, 
For=1) 1  Type of Net Benefit  
Private Analysis 
NPV 
-
$18.32
Japan Tuna 
Agreement 
(Exempt=1) 0  Direct Taxes 
-
$4.20 Foreign Banks NPV $0.67
sales tax 
(Exempt=1) 0  Indirect Taxes $0.00 Japan NPV $8.09
Tariff 
(Exempt=1) 0  Access Fees $3.61 Total -$9.57
Export Tax 
(Exempt=1) 0  
Employment 
Benefits $3.85    
Fuel Tax 
(Exempt=1) 0  
Opportunity Cost 
of Catch 
-
$3.61    
    External Cost 
-
$0.01 WPTP IRR #DIV/0!
Shadow-
Prices   Total $0.36    
Labour (0-1) 0.5  Stakeholder Group  Consistency Check   
Tuna Catch 
(0-1) 1  Government 
-
$4.20
Efficiency 
NPV(Aggregate) -$9.93
External Cost 
($/mt) 1  Labour $3.85 Efficiency NPV -$9.93
    Community 
-
$0.01    
Discount 
Rate 0.05   Total $0.36     
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loans despite the poor performance of this project, and the Japanese government 
who will collect duty on the imported fish.  
  
Option 5 : One (1) FV - 1700 GT PS 
 
The fifth option that resulted from the interviewees with fisheries experts is a 
1,700 GT purse seine (PS) vessel, combined with a use of FAD (Fishing 
Aggregate Device) system. Table 4.9 shows the list of costs involved in the 
project. The total cost is over AUD$40 million, reflecting a much larger capital 
investment along with higher annual operating costs. The capital cost is 
approximately AUD$32.6 million, the majority of the cost being the cost of 
purchasing a 1,700 GT MT PS vessel. The estimated cost of purchasing a 1,700 
MT vessel is around US$15,000,000.00 or around AUD$22 million. The land and 
improvements costs include the cost of improving the wharf, and other onshore 
facilities including land leases. The buildings and facilities cost item consisted of 
the building, ice plant, vehicles, and other facilities. Equipments mainly consist of 
a purse seine net and the FAD equipment. The total operating cost of the project is 
around AUD$7.5 million.  
 
Table 5.9 : Capital and Operating cost for option 5 
Capital costs Market Prices (US $) Market Prices (AUD $) 
Vessels 15,000,000 22,727,273 
Land and Improvements 1,500,000 2,272,727 
Buildings & Facilities 4,000,000 6,060,606 
Equipments 700,000 1,060,606 
Working Capital  330,000 500,000 
Operating costs  Market Prices  
Labour 1,167,436 1,768,843 
Materials (Bait) 400,000 606061 
Maintenance 600,000 909091 
Fuel 1,800,000 2727273 
Electricity 731,808 1,808,800 
Insurance 120,000 181,818 
Miscellaneous 300,000 454,545 
(Source : PCs; Phil Robert, email, Jan 2009; & Ribwanataake Awira, DoF, Aug, 2008). 
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The expected total catch of the vessel is 7,200 MT per annum. The number of 
trips per annum is 6 and the catch per trip is 1,200 MT. In terms of employment, 
the project will begin by recruiting 50 crew members. Seventy five percent (75%) 
of that number will be recruited locally. More job opportunities will be expected 
to occur in the future if the project is managed properly. The remaining 25% will 
be recruited from overseas possibly from Japan.  
 
Table 5.10 : Summary Result for Option 5. 
Summary 
Sheet             
         
Concessions Switches 
Results ($ 
millions)     
Access 
(Dom=0, 
DWFN=1) 1  
Referent Group 
NPV $20.13
Non-Referent 
Group NPV   
Company Tax 
(Dom=0, 
For=1) 1  
Type of Net 
Benefit  
Private analysis 
NPV $20.44
Japan Tuna 
Agreement 
(Exempt=1) 0  Direct Taxes $15.80
Foreign Banks 
NPV $9.57
Sales Tax 
(Exempt=1) 0  Indirect Taxes $0.00 Japan NPV $81.55
Tariff 
(Exempt=1) 0  Access Fees $58.55 Total $111.56
Export Tax 
(Exempt=1) 0  
Employment 
Benefits $4.77    
Fuel Tax 
(Exempt=1) 0  
Opportunity Cost 
of Catch 
-
$58.55    
    External Cost -$0.43 WPTP IRR 17%
Shadow-
Prices   Total $20.13    
Labour (0-1) 0.5  
Stakeholder 
Group  
Consistency 
Check   
Tuna Catch 
(0-1) 1  Government $15.80
Efficiency 
NPV(Aggregate) $131.69
External Cost 
($/mt) 5  Labour $4.77 Efficiency NPV $131.69
    Community -$0.43    
Discount 
Rate 0.05   Total $20.13     
 
Appendix 3 shows the detailed spreadsheets for the Projects, Private, Efficiency 
and Referent Group analyses for Option 5. The results in Table 5.10 show that 
while a project such as the 1,700 GT PS vessel will involve a large initial 
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investment, it is the only option that results in positive NPVs for each of the 
analyses. This is a very encouraging result and the government should be 
encouraged to consider investing in the project. Borrowings from foreign 
investors or banks may be an option to secure funding for the project. The huge 
positive NPV associated with the Project and Private Analyses indicates that it 
may be possible to attract foreign investors knowing that they will get good return 
from it. The other alternative is to encourage a joint venture with a foreign fishing 
company with a view to reducing capital risk to Kiribati. 
 
The total gains to the referent group are approximately AUD$20.13 million and 
collectively the non-referent groups are expected to gain by AUD$111.56 million. 
The biggest beneficiaries among the non-referent participants are those who 
collect the import duty for the fish imported into Japan. However, the positive 
Project NPV indicates that this Option is, in fact, wealth enhancing and the 
positive Private NPV indicates that potential investors will gain even after taxes 
and finance are taken into account. The project is expected to catch 7,200 MT per 
annum, meaning more volume of catch to be exported and more revenue will be 
generated, more job opportunity will be created and more participation in the tuna 
fishing industry compared to the outcome of the small and medium scale tuna 
fishing project.  
 
Also it is important to stress that Kiribati could improve the net present values of 
the project if they can improve the size of the project, maybe by purchasing more 
second hand vessels of similar size, provided the opportunity cost of the fish is 
considered, in charging access fees to fishing vessels and for government to earn 
revenue in return for selling its quota.    
 
5.4.3. Perspective over medium versus large fishing scale in Kiribati. 
 
Based on the results of the cost benefit analysis it is clear that a large fishing 
project like a 1,700MT purse seine vessel has the potential to bring an overall 
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economic benefit for the Kiribati government and its stakeholders. The generated 
income and benefit is encouraging as it is close to or more than half the average 
government annual revenue from access fees. This is a good indication for the 
government to start moving away from relying on the revenue earned from the 
access fees and start earning from harvesting their own tuna resources as well.  
 
However still there is an issue of limited domestic capacity. As stated in the 
SWOT analysis some interviewees stressed that Kiribati is small and poor. 
Investing in the PS fishing project like this one would be too costly for Kiribati. 
The CEO of the CPPL suggested that investing in the fishing industry is too risky 
and a small country like Kiribati cannot afford to invest in something big if it may 
not work in Kiribati. He believed that Kiribati should be encouraged to invest in 
the fishing industry but rather start small with a view that they will learn and 
improve their skills and capacity as they move along. In the long run Kiribati can 
then seek the possibility to invest in the larger vessels as recommended in option 
5 when they are ready and have the required skills and capacity to move on to a 
larger fishing scale with a view to attracting more benefits to Kiribati even larger 
than the fishing access fees currently paid by DWFNs. The large PS vessel like a 
1,700 MT can be set for a long-run plan or target for Kiribati. 
 
5.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis  
 
Given the uncertainties of the environment like El Nino and La Nina and or the 
future cost of the project, it is important to see how sensitive the results of the cost 
benefit analyses are to changes in the values of a range of the parameters. 
Sensitivity analysis (SA) is going to be conducted, first to examine how sensitive 
the results are to change in the level of tuna catches per annum. Second is to test 
how sensitive the NPV is to the choices of the discount rate while also taking into 
account the varying values of particular key inputs over a range of possible 
values.   
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The analyses were conducted assuming a ‘no risk’ discount rate of 5%. The 
analyses for Options 1, 3 and 5 will be re-run assuming a social discount rate of 
2% as well as risk-adjusted rates of 10%, 20%, and 30%. In addition, we will 
consider how variation in the total catch and the operating costs affects the NPV 
for both referent and non-referent groups. Specifically, the catch and operating 
costs will vary 25% above and below the ‘base-line’ levels for Options 1, 3 and 5.  
 
An important and interesting question raised in this study given the different 
levels of tuna catch for the small and medium fishing vessels and their output 
compared to that of option 5 is How much does catch have to increase to get a 
positive NPV for the medium vessel? To answer the above question as part of the 
sensitivity analysis, we will develop a scenario proposing new levels of tuna catch 
per annum for each of the different options. The suggested and proposed new 
levels are based on the capacity of the vessel, their fishhold capacity and the 
vessel’s number of trips per annum, assuming ‘ceteris paribus’. To be effective 
and to ensure that capital resources are utilised effectively and efficiently, vessels 
are encouraged to utilise their fishing capacity, as close to the maximum capacity 
of the vessel as possible. It is perceived that vessels are more likely to produce 
positive NPV by increasing their catches than in the initial catch proposals in 
options 1 to 4.  
 
Generally speaking the tuna catch (MT) per annum estimated in the proposed 
models are very small compared to other domestic targets or catches in the region. 
Based on expert opinion and the data available in Kiribati at the time of the study, 
the proposed per annum catches for the ‘base cases’ are 185 MT for Options 1 
and 2, and 357 MT per annum for Options 3 and 4. The sensitivity analysis 
considers a risk where the annual tuna catch declines because of the failure in the 
market, cancellation of flights and/or changes in environmental conditions. For 
the purpose of examining the effect of the change in the tuna catch on the NPV, 
the parameter “Annual Catch” (corresponding to cell C29 in the “Variables” 
spreadsheet) was varied. For option 1, the “Annual Catch” parameter took on 
118 
 
values of 50 MT, 185 MT and 1300 MT per annum. For option 3 the parameters 
were set to 180 MT, 357 MT and 750 MT per annum. For option 5 the parameters 
were set to 3600 MT, 7200 MT and 10800 MT. The scenarios are set according to 
the anticipated levels of tuna catch when it is a good time for fishing or when the 
weather is bad, or when the market is good and so on.  
 
The relationship between the operating cost and the catch per annum is also part 
of the sensitivity analysis. If the project increases/decreases its tuna catch per 
annum above the initial proposal, we would expect the operating cost to 
increase/decrease by some proportion if good information about the market for 
instance is available to fishermen. Cost uncertainties are incorporated by varying 
the “Operating Cost” parameters (corresponding to cells C16 – C22 in the 
Variables spreadsheet). 
 
Lastly but not the least, the sensitivity analysis is also conducted around two 
switches in the ‘Summary spreadsheet’ which includes “Access fees” parameter 
(corresponding to Cell B4) and the extent to which the fishery is fully exploited or 
“Tuna Catch” parameter (corresponding to Cell B14). In doing this, the switches 
are sets between 0 and 1 and we examine how the changes in the switches affect 
the overall NPV of the projects.   
 
5.4.4.1 (a) Sensitivity Analysis for Option 1 – Tuna Catch and Cost 
Parameters    
 
Recall that Option 1 involves one 42.5 meter longline vessel with a hold capacity 
of up to 110 MT. The number of trips per year is assumed to be 22 for this 
Option, therefore the catch per trip is 8.4 MT, given the total catch of 185 MT per 
annum. If the vessel were able to operate at capacity, the total catch for the 22 
trips is 2,420 MT. Given that the estimated maximum capacity of the vessel 
allows up to 2,420 MT, it would be more efficient to increase the annual tuna 
catch with a view to better utilising the capital resource. For the sensitivity 
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analysis the catch is set to 1,300 MT per annum. From the efficient and referent 
group point of view, an increase in an annual tuna catch from 185 MT to 1,300 
MT will at least give a positive NPV both at the national and international level.  
 
Nonetheless, the increase from 185 to 1,300 MT per annum is huge. However, it 
is assumed that there is room for distribution of catch in this option as there are 22 
trips per annum. To get a 1,300 tonnes per annum without increasing the number 
of trips, requires a single fishing vessel to get at least 60 MT per trip. The 22 trips 
will make up for 1,300 tonnes per year.  
 
To cater for the increase or decrease in the tuna catch for option 1 (longline 
project), we would expect bait cost, ice expenses, marketing expenses like 
processing, transportation and airfreight cost to increase or decrease. The cost 
changes are required for medium scale longline vessels.  
 
An increase in tuna catch by more than double will increase the operating cost by 
some proportion. For option 1 the material item and the miscellaneous item are 
only 3% and 37% of the total operating cost respectively. The increase in tuna 
catch from 185MT to 1,300MT is a 600% increase. Therefore given the 3% 
proportion of bait fish item from the total operating expenses, the increase from 
185MT to 1,300MT will give an estimated 20% increase in the material cost. In 
terms of miscellaneous items the increase from 185MT to 1,300MT will cause an 
estimated 6% increase in the miscellaneous costs. 
 
As part of the sensitivity analysis we should also anticipate what will happen to 
the NPV when the tuna catch is low. To this effect, we propose to investigate the 
effect of decreasing the tuna catch to 50MT.  A decrease from 185MT to 50MT 
will cause a 10% decrease in material costs, because less bait fish is used. We also 
anticipated a 10% decline in miscellaneous cost because of less transportation 
cost due to less catch is processed and transported.   
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Based on the four criteria of the sensitivity analysis; i) the choice of discount rate 
(corresponding to B17 in the summary sheet); ii) the change in tuna catch per 
annum (corresponding to C29 of the variable sheet), with the estimated increases 
in the operating cost over the range of possible costs, iii) Access fees 
(corresponding to B4 of the summary sheet) and iv)Tuna Catch (corresponding to 
B14 of the summary sheet), are analysed and the summary results of the total 
efficiency NPVs are presented in table 5.11 (a-e) as follows.  
 
Table 5.11 (a) - (e): Sensitivity Analysis Result: NPVs for Hypothetical Tuna 
fishing project (option 1), ($ millions at 2%,5%,10%,20%,30%), Tuna catch 
Switch (0.5) and Access fees Switch (1). 
       
(a)2% Discount Rate         
MT/NPVs    Efficiency  Project  Private  Ref.Group 
1300  75%  47.76  18.09  12.56  15.34 
   100%  41.27  10.08  6.94  14.44 
   125%  34.73  2  1.3  13.48 
185  75%  ‐10.19  ‐18.35  ‐12.94  ‐0.39 
   100%  ‐16.67  ‐26.36  ‐18.56  ‐1.29 
   125%  ‐23.22  ‐34.43  ‐24.2  ‐2.26 
50  75%  ‐17.21  ‐22.76  ‐16.03  ‐2.3 
   100%  ‐23.69  ‐30.77  ‐21.65  ‐3.2 
   125%  ‐30.23  ‐38.84  ‐27.29  ‐4.16 
(b)5% Discount Rate         
MT/NPVs    Efficiency  Project  Private  Ref.Group 
1300  75%  35.84  13.42  9.33  11.56 
   100%  30.92  7.34  5.07  10.87 
   125%  25.94  1.21  0.79  10.14 
185  75%  ‐7.95  ‐14.11  ‐9.94  ‐0.33 
   100%  ‐12.87  ‐20.19  ‐14.2  ‐1.02 
   125%  ‐17.85  ‐26.33  ‐18.49  ‐1.75 
50  75%  ‐13.25  ‐17.45  ‐12.28  ‐1.77 
   100%  ‐18.17  ‐23.52  ‐16.54  ‐2.46 
   125%  ‐23.15  ‐29.66  ‐20.82  ‐3.19 
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(c) 10% Discount Rate 
MT/NPVs    Efficiency  Project  Private  Ref.Group 
1300  75%  23.8  8.72  6.11  7.73 
   100%  20.46  4.61  3.23  7.27 
   125%  17.06  0.44  0.33  6.77 
185  75%  ‐5.65  ‐9.79  ‐6.85  ‐0.26 
   100%  ‐8.99  ‐13.91  ‐9.73  ‐0.72 
   125%  ‐12.38  ‐18.08  ‐12.63  ‐1.23 
50  75%  ‐9.21  ‐12.03  ‐8.42  ‐1.23 
   100%  ‐12.55  ‐16.15  ‐11.32  ‐1.69 
   125%  ‐15.94  ‐20.32  ‐14.22  ‐2.19 
 
           
 
(d)20% Discount Rate         
MT/NPVs    Efficiency  Project  Private  Ref.Group 
1300  75%  12.78  4.45  3.22  4.24 
   100%  10.89  2.14  1.62  3.98 
   125%  8.96  ‐0.23  ‐0.01  3.7 
185  75%  ‐3.49  ‐5.78  ‐3.94  ‐0.17 
   100%  ‐5.37  ‐8.09  ‐5.54  ‐0.43 
   125%  ‐7.31  ‐10.46  ‐7.17  ‐0.72 
50  75%  ‐5.46  ‐7.02  ‐4.8  ‐0.71 
   100%  ‐7.34  ‐9.33  ‐6.41  ‐0.91 
   125%  ‐9.28  ‐11.69  ‐8.03  ‐1.25 
(e)30% Discount Rate         
MT/NPVs    Efficiency  Project  Private  Ref.Group 
1300  75%  8.14  2.66  2.04  2.78 
   100%  6.87  1.11  0.98  2.61 
   125%  5.56  ‐0.49  ‐0.11  2.42 
185  75%  ‐2.57  ‐4.08  ‐2.67  ‐0.13 
   100%  ‐3.84  ‐5.62  ‐3.74  ‐0.3 
   125%  ‐5.15  ‐7.22  ‐4.82  ‐0.49 
50  75%  ‐3.87  ‐4.89  ‐3.24  ‐0.48 
   100%  ‐5.13  ‐6.44  ‐4.31  ‐0.65 
   125%  ‐6.45  ‐8.04  ‐5.39  ‐0.84 
 
Clearly the outcome is more sensitive to changes in the tuna catch level and 
benefit values than to the project costs, across their possible ranges as specified in 
table 5.11. For example at 2% discount rate, when we allow both input values to 
vary simultaneously, we see that the Efficiency NPV varies from a minimum 
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value of AUD$-30.23 million, the most pessimistic scenario when tuna catch is 
assumed to be at its lowest level - 50MT (Low) and the project cost are at its 
highest level (25% above the best guess value).  The Project, Private and Referent 
Group NPVs are also negative at AUD$-38.84, AUD$-27.29 and AUD$-4.16 
respectively at the worst scenario. Note also that the NPV result varies more 
between the high and medium levels than the medium and low levels. This is 
because of the big difference between the medium and high tuna catch level.  
 
The information in the sensitivity analysis may provide the decision-maker and 
donors with sufficient information to incorporate risk in the decision making 
process, provided that she is satisfied that these are the only variables that can be 
considered ‘risky’ and that all she is concerned about is knowing where they can 
get a positive NPV for the project. Accordingly, in option 1, the projects will get 
positive NPVs for all, if the vessel catches 1,300MT per annum even at the worst 
scenario, i.e. at the discount rate of 30% and at the highest cost. On the other hand 
it is also important to stress at the initial or medium level, the project will get a 
negative (-) NPV across the range of the possible cost even at the lowest discount 
rate (Table 5.11(a)).  
 
5.4.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis for Option 3 – Tuna catch and Cost Parameters 
 
Option 3 is a freezer longliner vessel targeting Bigeye and Yellowfin for Japanese 
tuna market. The average gross ton (MT) of the vessel is 342.5 and the expected 
catch per day is 1.31 tonnes. The average fishing days are 234, the average days 
on sea are 327 and the average operation days are 346 which makes up for only 1 
trip per year for this fishing vessel. 
 
This option requires the vessel to go out at sea for almost a year, therefore it 
would be more economical if the vessel can utilise its days at sea fishing. This 
will require the government or whoever owns the vessel to consider getting a 
larger fishhold capacity for the vessel that can be filled up for as long as almost a 
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year. The other option is for this vessel to act as a mother ship which stays and 
fish at sea while the smaller vessels (feeder boat/vessel) came to offload the 
catches and transport them to land for processing and shipment. For the purpose 
of this analysis, the annual catch for Option 3 will be doubled (to 750 MT) with a 
view to getting a positive NPV.  
 
The other part of the analysis is to consider the risk of having the vessel’s catch 
fall below the expected or initial proposed catch. Based on the catch and project 
cost of the initial proposal, the material item and the miscellaneous item are only 
2% and 24% of the total operating cost. The proposal to increase tuna catch from 
357MT to 750MT is approximately a 110% increase. This 110% increase in tuna 
catch  will cause an increase in the operating cost for the material items in 
particular because more bait fish and more ice is required for more catches. It is 
also anticipated that there will be an increase in miscellaneous item for airfreight 
cost and processing for more catch. In addition, while the capacity of the vessel is 
only 357 there is need to purchase a bigger fishhold capacity that will allow the 
vessel to fish for up to 750MT. In this case we assume an increase in facilities 
cost by 25% to cater for purchasing a larger fishhold capacity.  
 
Lets now consider the case when it is a not a good year for fishing. Here we 
assume that the vessel’s catch per annum could fall to 180MT per annum. Again 
if good information is available, and fishermen could anticipate the fall in tuna 
catch, they will as well assume the project cost to decline by some proportions. To 
this effect, we assume a 10% decrease in material costs, fuel and miscellaneous 
items across the range of all possible cost. The sensitivity analysis result for 
option 3 is presented in Table 5.12 (a-e).  
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Table 5.12 (a) – (e) : Sensitivity Analysis Result : NPVs for Hypothetical 
Tuna fishing Project (Option 3), ($ millions at 2%,5%,10%,20%,30%), Tuna 
catch Switch (0.5) and Access fees Switch (1). 
         
(a)2% Discount Rate         
MT/NPVs    Efficiency Project  Private 
Ref. 
group 
750  75%  25.51 8.16 5.32 8.46 
   100%  13.61 ‐4.94 ‐3.94 5.72 
   125%  1.72 ‐18.04 ‐13.2 2.97 
357  75%  1.05 ‐9.1 ‐6.76 1.98 
   100%  ‐4.85 ‐16.22 ‐11.84 ‐1.52 
   125%  ‐10.78 ‐23.34 ‐16.91 0.7 
180  75%  ‐8.32 ‐15.23 ‐11.05 ‐0.45 
   100%  ‐14.23 ‐22.35 ‐16.13 ‐3.95 
   125%  ‐20.15 ‐29.47 ‐21.2 ‐2.36 
 
 
(b) 5% Discount Rate         
MT/NPVs    Efficiency Project  Private 
Ref. 
group 
750  75%  18.95 5.84 3.8 6.36 
   100%  9.9 ‐4.12 ‐3.24 4.27 
   125%  0.84 ‐14.09 ‐10.28 2.18 
357  75%  0.48 ‐7.19 ‐5.33 1.46 
   100%  ‐4.06 ‐12.64 ‐9.2 0.72 
   125%  ‐8.6 ‐18.09 ‐13.08 ‐0.01 
180  75%  ‐6.61 ‐11.83 ‐8.57 0.38 
   100%  ‐11.15 ‐17.28 ‐12.45 ‐3.03 
   125%  ‐15.69 ‐22.73 ‐16.33 ‐1.84 
(c)10% Discount Rate         
MT/NPVs    Efficiency Project  Private 
Ref. 
group 
750  75%  12.35 3.54 2.34 4.23 
   100%  6.18 ‐3.25 ‐2.44 2.82 
   125%  0 ‐10.04 ‐7.22 1.41 
357  75%  ‐0.07 ‐5.23 ‐3.8 0.94 
   100%  ‐3.21 ‐8.98 ‐6.45 ‐0.86 
   125%  ‐6.35 ‐12.73 ‐9.11 ‐0.07 
180  75%  ‐4.83 ‐8.34 ‐5.98 ‐0.29 
   100%  ‐7.97 ‐12.09 ‐8.63 ‐2.09 
   125%  ‐11.11 ‐15.84 ‐11.21 ‐1.3 
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(d) 20% Discount Rate 
MT/NPVs    Efficiency Project  Private 
Ref. 
group 
750  75%  6.34 1.47 1.09 2.31 
   100%  2.81 ‐2.39 ‐1.59 1.52 
   125%  ‐0.71 ‐6.26 ‐4.28 ‐0.72 
357  75%  ‐0.53 ‐3.38 ‐2.3 0.49 
   100%  ‐2.37 ‐5.56 ‐3.81 ‐0.52 
   125%  ‐4.22 ‐7.11 ‐5.32 ‐0.09 
180  75%  ‐3.16 ‐5.1 ‐3.51 ‐0.2 
   100%  ‐5 ‐7.28 ‐5.02 ‐1.2 
   125%  ‐6.85 ‐9.47 ‐624 ‐0.77 
(e) 30% Discount Rate         
MT/NPVs    Efficiency Project  Private 
Ref. 
group 
750  75%  3.82 0.61 0.61 1.5 
   100%  1.41 ‐2.02 ‐1.18 0.98 
   125%  ‐0.99 ‐4.64 ‐2.97 0.45 
357  75%  ‐0.7 ‐2.58 ‐1.62 0.3 
   100%  ‐2 ‐4.1 ‐2.64 ‐0.36 
   125%  ‐3.3 ‐5.62 ‐3.66 ‐0.08 
180  75%  ‐2.43 ‐3.71 ‐2.42 ‐0.14 
   100%  ‐3.73 ‐5.23 ‐3.43 ‐0.81 
   125%  ‐5.03 ‐6.75 ‐4.45 ‐0.53 
 
 
Table 5.12(a) shows that the NPV for the project is most positive when the vessel 
catches 750MT at the lowest possible cost – at the most optimistic scenario. 
However at the worst case scenario, the NPV will be negative when the vessel 
catches only 180MT at the highest possible cost, the same conclusion drawn from 
the sensitivity analysis in Option 1.  
 
In comparison, Option 1 will bring more benefit to the investors and the 
government given that it provides greater NPVs than Option 3. For instance, at 
the best case scenario at the lowest cost possible, and at the highest expected 
catch, Option 1 will earn AUD$47.76, AUD$18.09, AUD$12.56 and 
AUD$15.34, while Option 3 will earn AUD$25.51, AUD$8.16, AUD$5.32 and 
AUD$8.46 (in million) for Efficiency, Project, Private and Referent Group 
analysis respectively.  Clearly, Table 5.11 and 5.12 indicates that Option 1 catches 
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1,300MT and Option 3 catches 750 MT at the highest expected catch, which 
seems to confirm the importance of tuna catch levels, in particular, to the overall 
efficiency NPV(s) of the project.  The project will get more benefit when it 
catches more fish.      
 
5.4.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis for Option 5 – Tuna catch and Cost Parameters 
 
Option 5 is the proposal for the large purse seine vessel. The efficiency NPV 
using ‘base-line’ values for the parameters for this Option is AUD$131.69 
million. The referent group will be earning a total of AUD$20.13 million in taxes 
and employment benefits. However policy makers will still be interested to know 
what happens to the NPV, when there are changes in cost and when risks are 
involved in the project. Here we will propose a 50% increase/ decrease in the 
annual tuna catch over the initial proposal, and over the possible cost ranges at 
different discount rates.  
 
It is assumed that the increase in tuna catch per annum by 50% will be 
accompanied by increases in the operating cost. More specifically, an estimated 
10% increase in material and miscellaneous cost is specified to cater for the 50% 
increase in tuna catch. Similarly, to reflect a lower tuna catch level the “Annual 
Catch” is reduced by 50%. This reduction was accompanied by a 10% decrease in 
the cost items associated with the fall in tuna catch.  
 
Large fishing vessels are also assumed to have major impact on the fish stock; 
therefore we set the ‘Tuna catch’ switch to 1, indicating that the fish stock is fully 
exploited. ‘Access fees’ is set to 1, to reflect the government policy of selling 
fishing quota to foreign fishing vessels in exchange for access fees. The 
sensitivity analysis result of the Efficiency, Project, Private and Referent Group 
NPVs are presented in Table 5.13 (a-e) below. 
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Table 5.13 (a-e): Sensitivity Analysis Result: NPVs for Hypothetical Tuna 
fishing Project (Option 5), ($ millions at 2%,5%,10%,20%,30%),Tuna Catch 
(1) and Access Fees (1) 
         
(a) 2% Discount Rate       
MT/NPVs    Efficiency Project  Private 
Ref. 
group 
10800  75%  381.128 215.35 141.43 66.31
   100%  350.13 177.18 111.67 61.18
   125%  318.97 139.01 81.91 56
7200  75%  217.6 105.34 64.62 33.66
   100%  186.45 67.17 34.67 28.47
   125%  155.29 29 4.91 23.28
3600  75%  53.92 ‐4.66 ‐12.58 0.94
   100%  22.76 ‐42.83 ‐42.34 ‐4.25
   125%  ‐8.39 ‐81 ‐72.1 ‐9.43
 
(b) 5% Discount Rate       
MT/NPVs    Efficiency Project  Private 
Ref. 
group 
10800  75%  281.18 155.79 102.52 49.12
   100%  235.38 124.69 78.63 44.86
   125%  229.58 93.59 54.74 40.6
7200  75%  157.49 72.66 44.33 24.4
   100%  131.69 41.56 20.44 20.13
   125%  105.89 10.46 ‐3.45 15.87
3600  75%  33.8 ‐10.47 ‐13.86 ‐0.33
   100%  8 ‐41.57 ‐37.75 ‐4.59
   125%  ‐17.8 ‐72.67 ‐61.65 ‐8.85
   
 
(c)10% Discount Rate       
MT/NPVs    Efficiency Project  Private 
Ref. 
group 
10800  75%  180.33 96.02 64.35 32.01
   100%  160.15 72.28 46.81 28.81
   125%  139.97 48.53 29.27 25.6
7200  75%  97.17 40.13 25.23 15.38
   100%  76.98 16.38 7.69 12.18
   125%  56.8 ‐7.36 ‐9.86 8.98
3600  75%  14 ‐15.77 ‐13.9 ‐1.24
   100%  ‐6.18 ‐39.51 ‐31.44 ‐4.44
   125%  3.58 ‐63.26 ‐48.98 ‐7.64
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(d) 20% Discount Rate 
MT/NPVs    Efficiency Project  Private 
Ref. 
group 
10800  75%  88.4 41.81 31.19 16.84
   100%  73.58 25.03 20.08 14.79
   125%  58.77 8.25 8.96 12.75
7200  75%  42.45 10.93 9.57 7.66
   100%  27.63 ‐5.85 ‐1.54 5.61
   125%  12.82 ‐22.64 ‐12.65 3.65
3600  75%  ‐3.51 ‐19.95 ‐12.05 ‐1.53
   100%  ‐18.32 ‐36.74 ‐23.16 ‐3.58
   125%  ‐33.14 ‐53.42 ‐34.27 ‐34.27
 
(e) 30% Discount Rate       
MT/NPVs    Efficiency Project  Private 
Ref. 
group 
10800  75%  49.8 19.13 18.08 10.71
   100%  37.31 5.35 9.97 9.24
   125%  24.82 ‐8.44 1.87 7.77
7200  75%  19.55 ‐1.2 3.85 4.67
   100%  7.06 ‐14.98 ‐4.27 3.2
   125%  ‐5.43 ‐28.77 ‐12.38 1.78
3600  75%  ‐10.7 ‐21.53 ‐10.38 ‐1.38
   100%  ‐23.19 ‐35.31 ‐18.5 ‐2.85
   125%  ‐35.68 ‐49.1 ‐26.61 ‐4.32
 
Table 5.13(a)-(e) shows very interesting results with more potential for improved 
NPVs compared to those of Options 1 and 3.  Again the project will tend to bring 
more benefits with more tuna catch than with less tuna catch levels.  At the 2% 
discount rate the project will get positive NPVs at all tuna catch levels with an 
exception to the lowest tuna catch possible, which in this case 3,600MT.   
 
However, this does not mean that option 5 will always be associated with a 
positive NPV.  Here we see how the NPV responds as we increase the discounts 
rates. Table 4.14 (c) at 10% discount rate, the project will get a negative NPV at 
the lowest tuna catch level at the highest possible cost. Note also that at the initial 
proposal, 7,200 MT, even at 30% discount rate the project will still be earning 
some positive NPV at AUD$7 million at the best guess value.    
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5.4.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis – ‘Tuna Stock’ and ‘Access Fees’ Switches  
 
In addition, it is also important to consider how sensitive the NPVs of the project 
are to changes in government policy and fish availability. We examine how the 
two switches in the summary sheet ‘Access fees’ and ‘Tuna catch’ affect the 
NPVs of the project. In the initial case scenario, for the small to medium fishing 
vessels (Options 1 and 3) we assume that the ‘Tuna catch’ switch is 0.5, 
indicating that the tuna stock in the Kiribati waters are exploited but not fully 
exploited. The ‘Access fees’ switch is set to 1, which indicates the fact that 
whoever catches the fish should pay access fees to the Kiribati government. For 
the large fishing vessel (Option 5), we assume that they are more exploitive, so 
we set the tuna catch switch to 1 and access fees to 1 because they should also pay 
for access to Kiribati waters. Charging access fees (setting the switch to 1) reflects 
the fact that government is selling its fishing quotas to DFWNs in exchange for 
fishing license. 
 
The sensitivity analysis will be conducted using Option 1 to test and examine how 
sensitive the overall results are to changes in these two switches. As a policy, the 
government would also want to consider charging no fees to fishing vessels as an 
incentive for a fishing vessel to invest in Kiribati. To do this, we will set the 
‘Access fees’ switch to 0 indicating that no fees are charged to fishing vessels. 
We will also test how the ‘Tuna catch’ switch affects the NPVs, in varying the 
switches between 0 – 1. Table 5.14 gives the results of NPVs by varying the 
‘Tuna catch’ and ‘Access fees’ switches in the summary sheet. 
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Table 5.14(a): Sensitivity Analysis Result: NPVs for Hypothetical Tuna 
fishing project (option 1), ($ millions at 5%), Tuna catch Switch (0.5) and 
Access fees (0) 
 
MT/NPVs    Efficiency Project  Private 
Ref. 
group 
1300  75%  35.84  21.91  15.27  5.61 
   100%  30.92  15.83  11.01  4.93 
   125%  25.94  9.7  6.73  4.19 
185  75%  ‐7.95  ‐12.9  ‐9.1  ‐1.18 
   100%  ‐12.87  ‐18.98  ‐13.36  ‐1.86 
   125%  ‐17.85  ‐25.12  ‐17.64  ‐2.6 
50  75%  ‐13.25  ‐17.12  ‐12.05  ‐2 
   100%  ‐18.17  ‐23.2  ‐16.31  ‐2.68 
   125%  ‐23.15  ‐29.33  ‐20.59  ‐3.42 
           
 
Table 5.14(b) : Sensitivity Analysis Result: NPVs for Hypothetical Tuna 
fishing project (Option 1), ($ millions at 5%), Tuna catch switch (1) and 
Access fees (0) 
MT/NPVs    Efficiency Project  Private  Ref.Group 
1300  75%  31.59  21.91  15.27  1.37 
   100%  30.92  15.83  11.01  4.93 
   125%  21.69  9.7  6.73  ‐0.05 
185  75%  ‐8.55  ‐12.9  ‐9.1  ‐1.78 
   100%  ‐12.87  ‐18.98  ‐13.36  ‐1.86 
   125%  ‐18.46  ‐25.12  ‐17.61  ‐3.2 
50  75%  ‐13.42  ‐17.12  ‐12.05  ‐2.16 
   100%  ‐18.17  ‐23.2  ‐16.31  ‐2.68 
   125%  ‐23.32  ‐29.33  ‐20.59  ‐3.58 
 
Table 5.12(a) shows the result of sensitivity analysis when the tuna catch switch is 
set to 0.5 and access fees switch is set to 1. The result indicates some 
improvements in the Project and Private NPVs, some short falls in the Referent 
Group NPV while there is no effect to the Efficiency NPV. The improvement in 
the Private and Private NPVs reflect the fact that the fishing vessels are not 
paying any fees or taxes to the government. The short fall in the Referent Group 
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NPV is the result of losing some revenue by the government, by charging zero 
access fees as an incentive to investors.  
 
Table 5.12(b) gives the result of the sensitivity analysis when tuna catch switch is 
set to 1 and access fees switch is also set to 0. The result shows some decrease in 
the Efficiency NPV indicating the negative effect of setting ‘Tuna catch’ switch to 
1, on the opportunity cost of catch. There are also some decreases in the Referent 
Group NPV as a result of loss of government revenue. 
 
Clearly the tuna catch switch directly affects the Efficiency NPV while the access 
fees switch affects the Project, Private and Referent Group analysis. In the real 
situation, the government would prefer charging access fees in order to earn 
revenue from fishing license, however they should also consider encouraging 
investors to invest in the fishing industry, by providing incentives which can 
provide positive returns to the Project, Private and Referent Group analysis.    
 
5.5 Summary and Conclusion. 
 
In this chapter, we have looked at the three different scenarios recommended by 
Fisheries Officers in Kiribati. The cost-benefit analysis and the sensitivity 
analysis sections are the most important parts of this chapter. The purpose of the 
cost-benefit analysis is to analyse the worth of the project to the Government, 
potential investors, and society at large using “best estimates” for key parameters. 
However, sensitivity analysis is also conducted to analyse how risk and 
uncertainty might affect the initial results. Decision makers in both referent and 
non-referent groups will be interested to know how robust the results are to 
changes in the discount rate, as well as catch and cost parameters and access fees 
and tuna catch switches.   
 
Given the current situation and business environment in Kiribati, the SWOT 
analysis in Chapter four favors the establishment of the small-medium scale tuna 
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fishing industry. However the SWOT analysis also provides a list of opportunities 
prominent to the development of large scale fishing industry.  
 
The cost benefit analysis on the other hand, favours the development of a large 
fishing industry (as in Option 5), given the positive returns of investing in the 
industry. The analysis gives negative return for the small-medium fishing 
industries given very minimal tuna catch levels involved which may not be able to 
compete with the existing market in which they operate. What we learned from 
the sensitivity analysis is important to the findings of the thesis. Tuna catch level 
is a very important variable that affects the overall NPV of the projects. The cost 
parameters are also important to be considered in the sensitivity analysis as they 
provide relevant information to decision makers across the range of possible 
costs. For the purpose of policy and decision making, the government should be 
well advised that not only the revenue from license fees is relevant, but providing 
a good business environment and good incentive to investors is another option if 
they are really keen and believe in developing the tuna fishing industry.  
 
The result of the SWOT and cost-benefit analysis provides a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative information for decision makers to consider in 
developing the tuna fishing industry in Kiribati. While the cost-benefit analysis 
supports the establishment of the large fishing industry, the SWOT analysis 
provides a list of opportunities prominent to the development of the industry. It 
also provides a list of requirements of what needs to be done in particular the 
infrastructure requirements, before the government really steps into establishing 
the industry.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
SUMMARY AND RECOMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 An Overview. 
 
This chapter summarises the main issues addressed in this study. 
Recommendations based on the results of this thesis are provided here for 
fisheries policy-makers in Kiribati as well as for general readers interested in the 
development of fisheries in that country. The development options identified by 
this study for Kiribati represent the outcome of research, consultation, evaluation 
and assessment work carried out by the researcher in close collaboration with key 
Kiribati Fisheries Officials as well regional fisheries consultants and institutions. 
Fundamentally, three development options have been identified and analyzed in 
this study. These include proposals for the operation of two medium-sized 
longline vessels of different sizes and operation of one large purse seine vessel. 
The analysis of the identified options was designed to answer two important 
research questions. The two research questions, which are also the focus of this 
study, are firstly to determine if developing a domestic tuna fishery would provide 
more benefits for the Kiribati economy than access fees from DWFNs, if so, what 
are the appropriate strategies and policies that the Kiribati government should 
adopt and implement to realize such domestication of its tuna fisheries. 
 
The main findings in this thesis can be used as a basis for recommendations to the 
Kiribati government for the enhancement of its domestic tuna fishery 
development. Whilst this is not intended to direct or dictate what the government 
should or should not do, it serves to provide useful information for decision 
makers in government when considering future plans for the development of tuna 
fisheries industry in Kiribati. 
 
The literature on fisheries development in the Pacific indicates that some PICs 
have the potential to develop their tuna fisheries. However, successful 
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development requires careful planning and careful feasibility analysis which 
should be carried out in conjunction with appropriate government development 
strategies.  
 
Furthermore, previous literature in the region has used bio-economic modelling to 
determine how countries might maximise economic rent from their tuna 
resources. The results of the bio-economic models in the WCPTF (Western and 
Central Pacific Tuna Fishery) share the same conclusion and suggest some 
reduction in the current level of fishing effort. However, researchers of PICs 
further argued that whilst bio-economic models can provide important and 
efficient measures of economic rent, they have not considered the question of who 
benefits from the fishery. A national tuna fishery could have a high expected 
economic rent, but with most of this taken offshore as profits by foreign 
companies.  
 
An alternative to bio-economic modelling, is cost-benefit (or benefit-cost) 
analysis which uses primarily economic and financial analysis to measure the net 
benefits of various fisheries projects. Cost benefit analysis can provide useful 
information to decision makers on the NPV of the projects studied. The cost 
benefit analysis approach has been used to investigate the net benefits or losses 
from domestic fisheries projects in several Pacific Island Countries, including 
Samoa, PNG, Solomon, Fiji and others. However a CBA has not been conducted 
for the case of Kiribati. Several fisheries studies have been conducted to 
investigate the potential of domestic tuna fishing in Kiribati but they do not 
conduct a cost benefit analysis or provide a projected NPV for any development 
proposals identified for Kiribati.    
 
A unique and main contribution of this thesis is that it uses a combination of both 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and SWOT analysis to evaluate whether 
domestication of the tuna industry is a good idea for Kiribati. The purpose of 
using a cost benefit analysis in this study is to investigate the net worth or loss of 
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investing in domestic tuna fishing given the development options identified in this 
research. Cost benefit analysis provides financial and economic analysis or 
information to decision makers by providing the expected net present value 
(NPV) of the project over the projected time frame of the project. SWOT analysis 
on the other hand also played an important role in analysing the real situation of 
the development options in the existing business environment in Kiribati. SWOT 
analysis provides a qualitative form of information to decision makers by 
identifying the issues that are expected to be helpful and those that are harmful to 
the projects. Also the purpose of using SWOT analysis in this thesis is to fill in 
the gap in identifying and discussing the information or areas that are important to 
consider in decision making but are not reflected in the cost benefit analysis 
model. 
 
6.2 Lessons Learned from Cost-Benefit Analysis. 
 
The cost benefit analysis reported in this thesis adapted a model developed by 
Campbell (2006) to investigate and evaluate fisheries policy in PNG. However the 
model in this thesis is reflective of the situation and case of Kiribati. In analysing 
the different options, the cost benefit analysis for options 1 to 4, for a small to 
medium sized fishery industry, provided negative NPVs. However option 5, a 
large purse seine vessel, provided a positive and encouraging result (NPV). 
 
Chapter five discusses in more detail the assumptions and key parameters of the 
above five options. The cost benefit analysis of the initial proposals and in 
particular options 1 and 3 implied negative NPVs, which is not what the 
government desires. Over the twenty (20) year lifetime of the project, the overall 
efficiency NPV for option 1 will be around (-) AUD$12.87 million. The net loss 
from investing in option 3 will be around (-) AUD$4.04 million which is closer to 
breakeven than the result from option 1. However while the overall efficiency 
NPV shows negative results, socially the labour or employment benefits gained 
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are worth about AUD$2 million for both options 1 and 3. The other form of 
benefits identified in the CBA is the access fees paid by domestic vessels.   
 
A sensitivity analysis (SA) is also conducted as part of the cost benefit analysis, to 
investigate the effect of changes in the tuna catch on the NPV. The SA indicated 
that the results of the cost benefit analysis will change in certain situations. A 
change in the tuna catch levels will have a major effect on the project’s NPVs. 
The main approach that is being emphasised here is to investigate the fishing level 
that is needed to result in a positive NPV for the project. The information in the 
sensitivity analysis may provide the decision-maker with sufficient information to 
incorporate risk in the decision making process, provided that she is satisfied that 
these are the only variables that are considered ‘risky’ and that all she is 
concerned about is knowing whether there will be a positive NPV for the project. 
The change in government policy can also affect the NPV of the project. We also 
examine how the two switches in the ‘summary sheet’ in particular the ‘Tuna 
Catch Switch’ and ‘Access fees Switch’ affect the NPVs of the projects. The 
result of conducting the SA for the two switches indicates that setting the ‘Tuna 
catch switch’ to 1 (high opportunity cost of fishing) will directly decrease the 
‘Efficiency NPV’ indicating the importance of that parameter. The effect of 
setting the ‘Access fees switch’ to zero will be a decrease in the Referent Group 
NPV as a result of loss of government revenue. Generally speaking the results of 
the SA indicates that there are also some possibilities of positive NPVs for the 
small to medium sized options, which were negative in the initial analysis. 
 
Option 5 implies a very different NPV result to options 1 and 3. The net benefit or 
the overall efficiency NPV over the 20 year lifetime of the project will be around 
AUD$130 million. The distribution of the benefits is also encouraging, as the 
government will gain around AUD$16 million and employment benefits are 
around AUD$5 million. The initial investment required in this project may be 
very large for Kiribati. However loans from foreign investors or banks may be an 
option to secure funding for the project.  
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The projected NPV from the cost benefit analysis in option 5 indicates a positive 
NPV of AUD$130 million over a 20 year project lifetime. The government and 
decision makers would want to know how this compares with the revenue from 
access fees on an annual basis. Simply taking the average of the revenue from the 
project on an annual basis, estimated revenue of around AUD$7 million is going 
to be generated every year from the large purse seine project. This is lower than 
the revenue earned from access fees every year which ranges from AUD$19 to 
AUD$40 million from more than 100 vessels as in 2008. However having both 
the DWFNs and this domestic large purse seine vessel will boost the revenue 
earned from tuna fishery as a whole every year if they are not competitors for 
tuna. It is also important to note that the estimated AUD$7 million revenue 
generated from this project is the result of operating only one large purse seine 
vessel, and the estimated access fee revenue the government can get from only 
one DFWN vessel is around US$190,000 per annum for a purse seine vessel. This 
single vessel scenario comparison confirms that Kiribati will tend to get more 
benefit from developing a domestic tuna fishery industry than the revenue lost 
from fewer DWFN’s access fees. What makes the revenue from access fees so 
huge compared to the projected NPV of this project, is the number of DFWN(s) 
vessels involved which is can be up to 100 or more vessels per year, compared to 
only one large purse seine vessel as proposed in this study.      
 
What has been learned from the cost benefit analysis and the sensitivity analysis 
is that the small to medium sized development options, in particular options 1 to 
4, are only viable under particular conditions and in certain situations. The NPV 
of the initial proposals of the development options in 1 to 4 are negative. The 
sensitivity analysis indicate that the project’s NPV(s) will be positive only if the 
project can improve its fishing efficiency by increasing its tuna catch level per 
annum given that it operates at the least cost possible. The NPV result for option 5 
is positive under a number of scenarios, given the assumptions made about 
logistics, prices and access to markets. The result of the CBA for option 5 also 
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allows us to compare the average revenue earned from the project with the 
average revenue earned from one DWFN’s vessel only, and it is interesting to 
learn that Kiribati will be able to earn more out of domestication of the tuna 
fishery rather than relying on DWFN’s access fees alone. 
 
In addition, it should also be noted that there are additional positive impacts of 
domestication such as employment benefits that are not available under current 
agreements with DWFNs.  However the cost benefit analysis indicates that 
employment benefits are limited. The thesis assumes that social employment 
benefits can be improved but this may not occur in the first and second year of the 
project and only arise in five or ten years time as the government improves the 
size of the projects. It is easy to quantify the cost of domestication of the tuna 
fishery industry, however it is difficult to measure the real benefits of 
domestication. There are potential and important social benefits associated with 
domestication that are not counted in the CBA. This includes social benefits and 
well being of the locals, sustainability of fisheries resources, exposure to 
international or better market, exposure to international standards, and sense of 
ownership over their own EEZ and also the implications of a right-based fisheries 
management which gives the potential to create a more powerful rights-based 
system that can have greater flexibility and add a new commercial dimension to 
the existing sovereign rights. 
 
6.3 Lessons Learned from the SWOT analysis. 
 
The SWOT analysis presented in Chapter four has contributed several insights by 
looking into several practical aspects of establishing a fishing industry in Kiribati, 
and how the project might fare. The intention of the SWOT analysis is to further 
develop the findings of the cost benefit analysis by discussing several important 
issues that are not reflected in the cost benefit model. The findings of the SWOT 
analysis also allow the reader and decision makers to consider the important pre-
requirements needed to develop a domestic tuna fishery. It indicates the 
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weaknesses and threats that are harmful to the projects, and suggests options for 
overcoming those obstacles. It also indicates the strengths and opportunities 
decision makers should note and take advantage of to succeed in the business. The 
main findings of the SWOT analysis are the need for improvements in 
infrastructure especially the port, water, air services and maintenance skills. These 
findings are entirely consistent with previous research. It is also clear that poor 
management and the lack of ‘know how’ and maintenance skills are not helpful 
for the development of the fishery industry. The involvement of the private sector 
and joint venture operations need to aim for successful investment in the business 
while the government’s commitment should be set with a clear target to provide 
long-term support for the investors.   
 
The findings of the SWOT analysis indicate that the existing infrastructure and 
human capital may not support the development option proposed in option five. 
There is need to upgrade and improve the infrastructure and the other supporting 
facilities together with upgrading the required skills such as fisheries, technical, 
management and maintenance skills required for the development of this large 
purse seine tuna fishery. Hence, the SWOT analysis seems to favour the 
development of the small and medium tuna fishery industry because they are less 
risky, less complicated and should be a good starting point for Kiribati given the 
poor condition of its infrastructure. 
 
Furthermore the SWOT analysis indicates that there are lots of potential 
opportunities associated with the small-sized tuna fisheries. Fishing activity in 
Kiribati is dominated by private and small-subsistence fishing not only in ocean 
fishing but also in reef or coral fishing. The majority of the population both in 
Tarawa and in the outer islands are engaged in informal fishing activities for 
household consumption and some sell their surplus catches in the domestic 
market. The domestic market is strong and considered good for the existing small 
private fishing businesses, given the high demand for fresh fish in the market. 
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However there is an issue of low price of tuna in the domestic market compared 
to other PICs.             
  
6.4 Summary Table for pros and cons of developing a domestic tuna fishery 
in Kiribati. 
 
Table 6.1 below shows some general results or outcomes emphasizing the pros 
and cons or the possible implications of developing a domestic tuna fishery 
industry in Kiribati. The table summarises the possible results and expected 
outcomes of domesticating the fishery industry in Kiribati at each different fishing 
industry scale. Because the proposed catch of each of the evaluated domestication 
options is such a small percentage of the historical catch within the Kiribati EEZ, 
these options are not expected to negatively impact DWFN relations. On the 
contrary, there may be potential for joint ventures which would benefit both 
countries involved. 
 
Table 6.1 Possible Outcome of developing a domestic tuna fishery in Kiribati. 
    Outcomes    
   
Developme
nt 
NP
V 
Employme
nt Risk 
Sustainabilit
y DWFNs 
 
Analysi
s Options   Benefit     
Relation
s 
Statu
s SWOT  
Small-
Sized N/A (+) Very low (+) N/A 
          
Quo CBA/ 
(Medium to 
Large)        
 SWOT Option 1 (-) (+) Low (+) (?) 
   Option 2 (-) (+) 
moderat
e (+) (?) 
   Option 3 (-) (+) Low (+) (?) 
   Option 4 (-) (+) 
moderat
e (+) (?) 
   Option 5 (+) (+) high (-/+) (?) 
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6.5 What can be done to Support and Achieve the Proposed 
Recommendations Made in this Thesis. 
 
As the findings of this study have indicated, the initial project proposals show that 
the small to medium scale operation in terms of tuna catch per annum, leads to 
negative NPV results. The sensitivity analysis result indicates that the vessels can 
provide positive NPV(s) only if they are able to increase their catches to the 
maximum tuna levels per annum that the vessel can accommodate, and at the least 
operational cost possible. It indicates that there are some possibilities of positive 
NPV(s) in particular for the small to medium sized options but, only under certain 
conditions that were proposed in the sensitivity analysis in chapter five. This may 
be achieved through astute investment, significantly improved infrastructure, 
good governance, good and honest management, dedication and commitment.       
 
In addition, the SWOT analysis has also highlighted several obstacles to any 
domestication efforts. The recommendations for the small to medium sized 
fishery industry are therefore drawn from the result of the SWOT analysis rather 
than the CBA. For the purpose of developing a small to medium size fishery 
industry, private sector participation would be the key catalyst for this sector. As a 
matter of policy, therefore, it is essential that the government should endeavour to 
promote and encourage private sector development in the fisheries sector. In 
addition, the government should also make a firm commitment as a priority in its 
policy to set up the necessary infrastructure to support fisheries. Building good 
port facilities and fish port centres, for example, or building airports and good 
reliable air transportation or even helping to ensure that adequate supplies of 
water and power are available to the fishing industrywould all go a long way in 
encouraging or supporting development in the fisheries sector. Also as a matter of 
policy, the government should pay more attention to the fisheries sector and 
allocate more budget spending in it.  
 
The cost benefit analysis result for a large purse seine vessel also implies that the 
project is another potential option for Kiribati. The Kiribati government may need 
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to consider development of the tuna fishery such as proposed in option 5 even 
though it may take time for Kiribati to directly invest in such a huge project. This 
is regarded as a huge project for Kiribati because the cost of the project is around 
AUD$40 million which is almost half of the total government recurrent 
expenditure budget in 2008 which stands at AUD$82.6 million. However given 
the result of the cost-benefit analysis in this study, option 5 has the potential to 
provide a huge positive NPV of around AUD$130 million. It is anticipated that 
this NPV result can be very useful information to both potential donors and/ or 
joint venture partners. In this connection, therefore, it is highly recommended that 
the government should encourage joint venture operations for this project and if 
necessary explore external funding assistance as well as technical advice to assist 
with the development of the project.  
 
To ensure that Kiribati will be able to invest in a large-sized tuna fishery, it is 
suggested that the government should make full use of foreign assistance towards 
the development of the industry. Kiribati has limited resources and alone may find 
it difficult to start off the industry unless there is adequate support and assistance 
from foreign and experienced agent and donors, particularly the existing DWFNs. 
The existing DWFNs are the potential donors, since they already have their 
interest in the Kiribati EEZ and they have the capacity and the required expertise 
in the fishery business.  
 
As also indicated in the SWOT analysis, the implementation and, therefore, full 
realization of the tuna fishery industry in Kiribati will be a slow development 
process especially for the large scale fishery. Such state of affairs is mainly 
attributable to the fact that there is an important need first to overcome existing 
deficiencies in the infrastructure requirements before any meaningful 
development could be successfully implemented. This is essential to the 
development and success of the tuna fishery project in Kiribati. In view therefore, 
of this slow development process, it is also recommended in this study that 
government should maintain its close relations with DWFNs to get as much 
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access fees as they can from DWFNs and at the same time start to include 
domestic fishery development in the negotiation with DWFNs. The government 
should consider as a policy to enable them to start off with the investment in 
encouraging foreign direct investment through providing incentives to attract 
foreign investment in the fisheries. This can be in the form of tax concessions or 
exemptions, or perhaps easing restrictions on land acquisition.  
 
Lastly, in terms of effective follow up actions, it is noticeable that there are quite 
a number of written reports and studies which focus on the development of tuna 
and other related fisheries development issues in Kiribati. Nothing, however, 
seems to have been done to follow up those studies. Previous recommendations 
and requirements were suggested but it appears that nothing has been done to 
consider or implement them. The government should take a more serious step to 
overcome the identified issues, not just consider and record them but to act on 
them. Some of the comments and issues discussed in the SWOT analysis of this 
thesis repeat what has been said in earlier studies, however, they remain issues 
and problem areas until today. The next urgent call for the Kiribati government is 
to consider the relative merits of implementing those recommendations. In 
developing a viable fisheries plan it will become clearer to the government as to 
whether those recommendations and suggestions are attainable or not. If they can 
be implemented within the government capacity, a process should be identified as 
to how the government might put them into effect, whether to ask for overseas 
assistance or whether to fund them locally.  
 
Furthermore in moving things forward, the government should be able to identify 
the areas which cannot be remedied, and those problem areas that are going to be 
permanent. The government will be able to respond in a manner suggested by 
studies, and those responses are important for the development of further studies 
instead of re-presenting the same issue and problem from one study to another.  
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6.6 Limitations of this study and recommendations for further research. 
 
The SWOT analysis identified one of the potential development options for the 
tuna fishery industry in Kiribati that focuses on the development of small and 
private fishing operations. The CBA in this thesis failed to investigate the case of 
the small fishing operations in Kiribati mainly because there are no data available 
for the small fishing operations. However the fishing activity in Kiribati is 
dominated by small-sized fishing and private subsistence fishing. These are 
regarded as an informal and everyday activity to serve household consumption, 
while there are also others who fish for their household consumption and sell their 
surplus catches in the local market. An additional study needs to be conducted to 
look into the potential of small fishing operations in Kiribati. The benefit accrued 
to the social well being of the locals and the country at large is not realised 
because there are no formal records, no information, and also there has not been 
any study yet conducted in this regard. This thesis suggests that it would be worth 
investigating the net benefits of this particular small scale fishing operation using 
a CBA to enable decision makers to access such kind of information that is useful 
for government policy.    
   
Bio-economic modelling is being used by regional fisheries economist to evaluate 
the fishing effort that will best give maximum benefit to the region. However this 
is one of the areas of study that has not been conducted for Kiribati. The results of 
bio-economic modelling in the Pacific region suggest some reduction in levels in 
the fishing effort below the current level. However Kiribati is one of those 
countries who rely heavily on revenue from access fees, and it is argued in this 
study that reducing fishing effort is not an option for Kiribati. Further study needs 
to be conducted to determine if this view is correct. This study did not analyse the 
implication of reducing fishing effort on the economy of Kiribati, but focused on 
cost benefit analysis of domestication. It also did not explore sources of funds for 
a large-scale investment, or compare the relative merits of joint venture funding 
versus other sources of capital. 
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In addition, if the findings of bio-economic modelling in the region are correct, 
that there is need for some reduction in the fishing effort sooner or later, decision 
makers in Kiribati may need to know whether they need to restrict and control 
fishing efforts. In order to have a balanced and fair decision, control on fishing 
effort should also be considered part of the study, so that information on both 
sides of the story is fairly provided to decision makers.  
 
Lastly but not the least, while better infrastructure is recommended as an essential 
pre-requisite for tuna fishery development in Kiribati, there is need to conduct a 
specific study on these particular requirements. Such a study will provide good 
information for the government and foreign partners who may provide funding 
assistance for infrastructure improvement. It will provide information on what 
needs to be done, and the likely costs involved. The government need to consider 
improving its infrastructure first before they can develop a domestic tuna fishing 
business. A specific study need to be conducted in this particular area so that the 
government could take a more serious step into developing the infrastructure. 
There is a lot to ask and a lot to do in order to provide good and long term 
incentives towards the development of the fishery industry in Kiribati, but effort 
may not be wasted if the government takes the lead step by step in solving and 
overcoming the identified problems while moving towards developing its 
domestic tuna industry.        
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1 : Spreadsheet models for Option 1. 
 
(a)Project Analysis 
 
(Millions 2007 US$)           
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
           
Capital Costs           
Vessels -0.28          
Land&Improvements -0.05          
Buildings&Facilities -0.14          
Equipment -0.09          
Working Capital -0.30          
Total -0.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
           
Operating  Costs           
Labour  
-
0.36 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 
Materials  
-
0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Maintenance  
-
0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
Fuel  
-
0.20 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 
Electricity  
-
0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Insurance  
-
0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Miscellaneous  
-
0.37 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 
Total  
-
1.01 -2.00 -2.00 -2.00 -2.00 -2.00 -2.00 -2.00 -2.00 
           
Access Fees  
-
0.05 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 
           
Revenues           
Canned Tuna  0.29 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 
Fishmeal  0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Export Tax  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EU Duties  
-
0.09 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 
Total  0.24 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 
           
Net Cash Flow -0.86 
-
0.82 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 
           
IRR #DIV/0!          
NPV -$20.19          
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
           
           
 -0.06         0.06 
          0.04 
          0.07 
 -0.02         0.01 
          0.30 
0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 
           
           
-0.71 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 
-0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
-0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
-0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
-0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 
-2.00 -2.00 -2.00 -2.00 -2.00 -2.00 -2.00 -2.00 -2.00 -2.00 -2.00 
           
-0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 
           
           
0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 
0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
-0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 
0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 
           
-1.62 -1.70 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.14 
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(b) Private Analysis 
 
(Millions 2007 US$)           
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
           
Project Net Cash 
Flow -0.86 -0.82 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 
           
Interest and 
Repayments           
Loan 0.68 
-
$0.04 -$0.04 
-
$0.05 
-
$0.05 
-
$0.06 
-
$0.07 
-
$0.08 
-
$0.09 -$0.10 
Interest  
-
$0.08 -$0.08 
-
$0.07 
-
$0.07 
-
$0.06 
-
$0.05 
-
$0.04 
-
$0.03 -$0.02 
Total 0.68 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 
Equity NCF pre-tax -0.17 -0.94 -1.74 -1.74 -1.74 -1.74 -1.74 -1.74 -1.74 -1.74 
           
Company Tax           
Depreciation           
Vessels  -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Buildings&Facilities  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Equipment  -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Replacement 
Vessels           
Replacement 
Equipment           
Total Depreciation  -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 
           
Taxable Income  -0.99 -1.79 -1.78 -1.78 -1.77 -1.76 -1.75 -1.75 -1.74 
Tax Payable  0.30 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.52 
           
Equity NCF after 
Tax -0.17 -0.65 -1.21 -1.21 -1.21 -1.21 -1.22 -1.22 -1.22 -1.22 
Private Firm           
IRR #DIV/0!          
NPV -$14.20          
Foreign Banks NPV $0.25          
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10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
           
-1.62 -1.70 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.14 
           
           
-$0.11           
-$0.01           
-0.12           
-1.74 -1.70 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.62 -1.14 
           
           
           
-0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06      
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
-0.02           
 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
-0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
           
-1.72 -1.71 -1.71 -1.71 -1.71 -1.71 -1.65 -1.65 -1.65 -1.65 -1.47 
0.52 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.44 
           
-1.23 -1.19 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13 -1.13 -0.70 
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(c) Efficiency Analysis 
(Millions 2007 US$)           
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
           
Capital Costs           
Vessels -0.28          
Land&Improvements -0.05          
Buildings&Facilities -0.14          
Equipment -0.09          
Working Capital -0.30          
Total -0.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
           
Operating  Costs           
Labour  -0.21 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 
Materials  -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Maintenance  -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
Fuel  -0.20 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 
Electricity  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Insurance  -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Miscellaneous  -0.37 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 
Total  -0.86 -1.70 -1.70 -1.70 -1.70 -1.70 -1.70 -1.70 -1.70 
           
Opp. Cost of Catch  -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
External Cost  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
           
Revenues           
Canned Tuna  0.29 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 
Fishmeal  0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
           
Net Benefit -0.86 -0.56 -1.09 -1.09 -1.09 -1.09 -1.09 -1.09 -1.09 -1.09 
NPV -$13.85          
IRR #DIV/0!          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
151 
 
 
           
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
           
           
 -0.06         0.06 
          0.04 
          0.07 
 -0.02         0.01 
          0.30 
0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 
           
           
-0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 
-0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
-0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
-0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
-0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 -0.73 
-1.70 -1.70 -1.70 -1.70 -1.70 -1.70 -1.70 -1.70 -1.70 -1.70 -1.70 
           
-0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
           
           
0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 
0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
           
-1.09 -1.17 -1.09 -1.09 -1.09 -1.09 -1.09 -1.09 -1.09 -1.09 -0.62 
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(d) Referent Group Analysis 
(Millions 2007 US$)          
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
          
Aggregate RG Net Benefits 0.00 -0.12 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.17 -0.17 
          
Disaggregated RG Net Benefits          
          
Direct Taxes          
Personal Income Tax (foreign)  0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Personal Income Tax (domestic)  0.05 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Company Income Tax  -0.30 -0.54 -0.53 -0.53 -0.53 -0.53 -0.53 -0.52 
Total  -0.23 -0.39 -0.39 -0.39 -0.39 -0.39 -0.38 -0.38 
Indirect Taxes          
VAT  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Import Duty 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Fuel  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Export Tax  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Access Fees  0.05 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Employment Benefits  0.08 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Opportunity Cost of Catch  -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
External Cost  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
          
Aggregate RG Net Benefits 0.00 -0.12 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.17 -0.17 
Check 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
          
Referent Group NPV -$2.00         
Type of Net Benefit          
Direct Taxes -$4.53         
Indirect Taxes $0.00         
Access Fees $1.21         
Employment Benefits $1.93         
Opportunity Cost of Catch -$0.60         
External Cost -$0.00         
Total -$2.00         
Stakeholder Group          
Government -$3.92         
Labour $1.93         
Community -$0.00         
Total -$2.00         
          
Non-Referent Group Net Benefits         
WPTP -$14.20         
Foreign Bank $0.25         
European Union $2.10         
Total -$11.86         
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
            
-0.17 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.09 
            
            
            
            
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
-0.52 -0.52 -0.51 -0.51 -0.51 -0.51 -0.51 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.44 
-0.38 -0.37 -0.37 -0.37 -0.37 -0.37 -0.37 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.30 
            
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
-0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
            
-0.17 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.09 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Appendix 2 : Spreadsheet model for Option 3. 
 
(a)Project Analysis 
(Millions 2007 US$)          
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
          
Capital Costs          
Vessels -0.56         
Land&Improvements -0.07         
Buildings&Facilities -0.21         
Equipment -0.13         
Working Capital -0.30         
Total -1.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
          
Operating  Costs          
Labour  -0.36 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 
-
0.71 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 
Materials  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Maintenance  -0.04 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
-
0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
Fuel  -0.20 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 
-
0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 
Electricity  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Insurance  -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Miscellaneous  -0.23 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 
-
0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 
Total  -0.89 -1.74 -1.74 -1.74 
-
1.74 -1.74 -1.74 -1.74 
          
Access Fees  -0.08 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 
-
0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 
          
Revenues          
Canned Tuna  0.56 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 
Fishmeal  0.07 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Export Tax  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EU Duties  -0.17 -0.34 -0.34 -0.34 
-
0.34 -0.34 -0.34 -0.34 
Total  0.46 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 
          
Net Cash Flow -1.27 -0.50 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 
-
0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 
          
IRR #DIV/0!         
NPV -$12.64         
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
            
            
  -0.11         0.11 
           0.06 
           0.10 
  -0.03         0.02 
           0.30 
0.00 0.00 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 
            
            
-0.71 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 -0.71 
-
0.71 
-
0.71 -0.71 
-
0.71 
-
0.71 -0.71 
-
0.71 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 
-
0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 
-
0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 
-0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
-
0.08 
-
0.08 -0.08 
-
0.08 
-
0.08 -0.08 
-
0.08 
-0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 
-
0.40 
-
0.40 -0.40 
-
0.40 
-
0.40 -0.40 
-
0.40 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 
-
0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 
-
0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 
-
0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 
-
0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 
-0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 
-
0.45 
-
0.45 -0.45 
-
0.45 
-
0.45 -0.45 
-
0.45 
-1.74 -1.74 -1.74 -1.74 -1.74 
-
1.74 
-
1.74 -1.74 
-
1.74 
-
1.74 -1.74 
-
1.74 
            
-0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 
-
0.15 
-
0.15 -0.15 
-
0.15 
-
0.15 -0.15 
-
0.15 
            
            
1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 
0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
-0.34 -0.34 -0.34 -0.34 -0.34 
-
0.34 
-
0.34 -0.34 
-
0.34 
-
0.34 -0.34 
-
0.34 
0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 
            
-0.96 -0.96 -1.10 -0.96 -0.96 
-
0.96 
-
0.96 -0.96 
-
0.96 
-
0.96 -0.96 
-
0.36 
            
            
            
            
 
156 
 
 
(b) Private Analysis 
(Millions 2007 US$)          
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
          
Project Net Cash Flow -1.27 -0.50 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 
          
Interest and Repayments          
Loan 1.02 -$0.06 -$0.06 
-
$0.07 -$0.08 -$0.09 -$0.10 -$0.11 -$0.13 
Interest  -$0.12 -$0.12 
-
$0.11 -$0.10 -$0.09 -$0.08 -$0.07 -$0.05 
Total 1.02 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 
Equity NCF pre-tax -0.25 -0.68 -1.14 -1.14 -1.14 -1.14 -1.14 -1.14 -1.14 
          
Company Tax          
Depreciation          
Vessels  -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
Buildings&Facilities  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Equipment  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Replacement Vessels          
Replacement Equipment          
Total Depreciation  -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
          
Taxable Income  -0.68 -1.13 -1.13 -1.12 -1.11 -1.10 -1.09 -1.07 
Tax Payable  0.20 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.32 
          
Equity NCF after Tax -0.25 -0.47 -0.80 -0.80 -0.80 -0.81 -0.81 -0.81 -0.82 
Private Firm          
IRR #DIV/0!         
NPV -$9.20         
Foreign Banks NPV $0.37         
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
            
-0.96 -0.96 -1.10 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.36 
            
            
-
$0.14 -$0.16           
-
$0.04 -$0.02           
-0.18 -0.18           
-1.14 -1.14 -1.10 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.36 
            
            
            
-0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04      
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
-0.01 -0.01           
  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
-0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
            
-1.06 -1.04 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -0.98 -0.98 -0.98 -0.98 -0.69 
0.32 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.21 
            
-0.82 -0.83 -0.80 -0.65 -0.65 -0.65 -0.65 -0.67 -0.67 -0.67 -0.67 -0.16 
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(c)Efficiency Analysis 
(Millions 2007 US$)          
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
          
Capital Costs          
Vessels -0.56         
Land&Improvements -0.07         
Buildings&Facilities -0.21         
Equipment -0.13         
Working Capital -0.30         
Total -1.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
          
Operating  Costs          
Labour  -0.21 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 
-
0.41 -0.41 
-
0.41 
Materials  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 
Maintenance  -0.04 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
-
0.08 -0.08 
-
0.08 
Fuel  -0.20 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 
-
0.40 -0.40 
-
0.40 
Electricity  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 
Insurance  -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 
Miscellaneous  -0.23 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 
-
0.45 -0.45 
-
0.45 
Total  -0.73 -1.44 -1.44 -1.44 -1.44 
-
1.44 -1.44 
-
1.44 
          
Opp. Cost of Catch  -0.04 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
-
0.08 -0.08 
-
0.08 
External Cost  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
          
Revenues          
Canned Tuna  0.56 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 
Fishmeal  0.07 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
          
Net Benefit -1.27 -0.14 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 
-
0.24 -0.24 
-
0.24 
NPV -$4.06         
IRR #DIV/0!         
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
            
            
  -0.11         0.11 
           0.06 
           0.10 
  -0.03         0.02 
           0.30 
0.00 0.00 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 
            
            
-0.41 -0.41 -0.41 
-
0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 
-
0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
-
0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
-
0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
-0.40 -0.40 -0.40 
-
0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 
-
0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-
0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-0.45 -0.45 -0.45 
-
0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 
-
0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 
-1.44 -1.44 -1.44 
-
1.44 -1.44 -1.44 -1.44 
-
1.44 -1.44 -1.44 -1.44 -1.44 
            
-0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
-
0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
-
0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
            
            
1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 
0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
            
-0.24 -0.24 -0.39 
-
0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 
-
0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 0.35 
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(d)Referent Group Analysis 
(Millions 2007 US$)          
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
          
Aggregate RG Net Benefits 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 
          
Disaggregated RG Net Benefits          
          
Direct Taxes          
Personal Income Tax (foreign)  0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Personal Income Tax (domestic)  0.05 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Company Income Tax  -0.20 -0.34 -0.34 -0.34 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.32 
Total  -0.13 -0.20 -0.20 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.18 -0.18 
Indirect Taxes          
VAT  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Import Duty 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Fuel  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Export Tax  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Access Fees  0.08 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Employment Benefits  0.08 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Opportunity Cost of Catch  -0.04 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
External Cost  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
          
Aggregate RG Net Benefits 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 
Check 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
          
Referent Group NPV $0.72         
Type of Net Benefit          
Direct Taxes -$2.10         
Indirect Taxes $0.00         
Access Fees $1.81         
Employment Benefits $1.93         
Opportunity Cost of Catch -$0.90         
External Cost -$0.00         
Total $0.72         
Stakeholder Group          
Government -$1.20         
Labour $1.93         
Community -$0.00         
Total $0.72         
          
Non-Referent Group Net Benefits         
WPTP -$9.20         
Foreign Bank $0.37         
European Union $4.04         
Total -$4.79         
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
            
0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.17 
            
            
            
            
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
-0.32 -0.31 -0.31 
-
0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.29 -0.21 
-0.17 -0.17 -0.16 
-
0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.06 
            
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
-0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
-
0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
            
0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.17 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Appendix 3 : Spreadsheet model for Option 5. 
(a)Project Analysis 
(Millions 2007 US$)          
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
          
Capital Costs          
Vessels -22.73         
Land&Improvements -2.27         
Buildings&Facilities -6.06         
Equipment -1.06         
Working Capital -0.50         
Total -32.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
          
Operating  Costs          
Labour  -0.88 -1.77 -1.77 -1.77 -1.77 -1.77 -1.77 -1.77 
Materials  -0.30 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 
Maintenance  -0.45 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 
Fuel  -1.36 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 
Electricity  -0.55 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 
Insurance  -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 
Miscellaneous  -0.23 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 
Total  -3.97 -7.76 -7.76 -7.76 -7.76 -7.76 -7.76 -7.76 
          
Access Fees  -2.44 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 
          
Revenues          
Canned Tuna  11.34 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 
Fishmeal  1.44 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 
Export Tax  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EU Duties  -3.40 -6.80 -6.80 -6.80 -6.80 -6.80 -6.80 -6.80 
Total  9.38 18.76 18.76 18.76 18.76 18.76 18.76 18.76 
          
Net Cash Flow -32.62 2.97 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 
          
IRR 16%         
NPV $41.56         
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
            
            
  -4.55         4.55 
           1.82 
           3.03 
  -0.27         0.16 
           0.50 
0.00 0.00 -4.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.05 
            
            
-1.77 -1.77 -1.77 -1.77 -1.77 -1.77 -1.77 -1.77 -1.77 -1.77 -1.77 -1.77 
-0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 
-0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 
-2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 
-1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 
-0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 
-0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 
-7.76 -7.76 -7.76 -7.76 -7.76 -7.76 -7.76 -7.76 -7.76 -7.76 -7.76 -7.76 
            
-4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 
            
            
22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 
2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
-6.80 -6.80 -6.80 -6.80 -6.80 -6.80 -6.80 -6.80 -6.80 -6.80 -6.80 -6.80 
18.76 18.76 18.76 18.76 18.76 18.76 18.76 18.76 18.76 18.76 18.76 18.76 
            
6.11 6.11 1.30 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 16.17 
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(b) Private Analysis 
(Millions 2007 US$)          
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
          
Project Net Cash Flow -32.62 2.97 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 
          
Interest and Repayments          
Loan 26.10 -$1.49 -$1.67 
-
$1.87 
-
$2.09 
-
$2.34 
-
$2.62 -$2.94 -$3.29 
Interest  -$3.13 -$2.95 
-
$2.75 
-
$2.53 
-
$2.28 
-
$2.00 -$1.68 -$1.33 
Total 26.10 -4.62 -4.62 -4.62 -4.62 -4.62 -4.62 -4.62 -4.62 
Equity NCF pre-tax -6.52 -1.65 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 
          
Company Tax          
Depreciation          
Vessels  -1.52 -1.52 -1.52 -1.52 -1.52 -1.52 -1.52 -1.52 
Buildings&Facilities  -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 
Equipment  -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 
Replacement Vessels          
Replacement Equipment          
Total Depreciation  -1.92 -1.92 -1.92 -1.92 -1.92 -1.92 -1.92 -1.92 
          
Taxable Income  -2.09 1.24 1.44 1.66 1.91 2.19 2.51 2.86 
Tax Payable  0.63 -0.37 -0.43 -0.50 -0.57 -0.66 -0.75 -0.86 
          
Equity NCF after Tax -6.52 -1.03 1.12 1.06 1.00 0.92 0.84 0.74 0.64 
Private Firm          
IRR 17.14%         
NPV $20.44         
Foreign Banks NPV $9.57         
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
            
6.11 6.11 1.30 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 16.17 
            
            
-$3.68 -$4.12           
-$0.94 -$0.49           
-4.62 -4.62           
1.50 1.50 1.30 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.11 16.17 
            
            
            
-1.52 -1.52 -1.52 -1.52 -1.52 -1.52 -1.52      
-0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 
-0.11 -0.11           
  -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30 
  -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
-1.92 -1.92 -2.15 -2.15 -2.15 -2.15 -2.15 -0.63 -0.63 -0.63 -0.63 -0.63 
            
3.25 3.70 3.97 3.97 3.97 3.97 3.97 5.48 5.48 5.48 5.48 15.04 
-0.98 -1.11 -1.19 -1.19 -1.19 -1.19 -1.19 -1.64 -1.64 -1.64 -1.64 -4.51 
            
0.52 0.39 0.11 4.92 4.92 4.92 4.92 4.47 4.47 4.47 4.47 11.66 
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(c) Efficiency Analysis 
(Millions 2007 US$)          
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
          
Capital Costs          
Vessels -22.73         
Land&Improvements -2.27         
Buildings&Facilities -6.06         
Equipment -1.06         
Working Capital -0.50         
Total -32.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
          
Operating  Costs          
Labour  -0.51 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 
Materials  -0.30 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 
Maintenance  -0.45 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 
Fuel  -1.36 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 
Electricity  -0.55 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 
Insurance  -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 
Miscellaneous  -0.23 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 
Total  -3.59 -7.00 -7.00 -7.00 -7.00 -7.00 -7.00 -7.00 
          
Opp. Cost of Catch  -2.44 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 
External Cost  -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
          
Revenues          
Canned Tuna  11.34 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 
Fishmeal  1.44 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 
          
Net Benefit -32.62 6.73 13.63 13.63 13.63 13.63 13.63 13.63 13.63 
NPV $131.69         
IRR 36%         
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
            
            
  -4.55         4.55 
           1.82 
           3.03 
  -0.27         0.16 
           0.50 
0.00 0.00 -4.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.05 
            
            
-1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 -1.02 
-0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 -0.61 
-0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 -0.91 
-2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 -2.73 
-1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 -1.11 
-0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 
-0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 
-7.00 -7.00 -7.00 -7.00 -7.00 -7.00 -7.00 -7.00 -7.00 -7.00 -7.00 -7.00 
            
-4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 
-0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
            
            
22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 22.68 
2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 2.88 
            
13.63 13.63 8.82 13.63 13.63 13.63 13.63 13.63 13.63 13.63 13.63 23.69 
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(d) Referent Group Analysis 
(Millions 2007 US$)          
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
          
Aggregate RG Net Benefits 0.00 -0.27 1.09 1.15 1.21 1.29 1.37 1.47 1.57 
          
Disaggregated RG Net Benefits          
          
Direct Taxes          
Personal Income Tax (foreign)  0.04 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Personal Income Tax (domestic)  0.13 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Company Income Tax  -0.63 0.37 0.43 0.50 0.57 0.66 0.75 0.86 
Total  -0.45 0.72 0.78 0.85 0.93 1.01 1.11 1.21 
Indirect Taxes          
VAT  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Import Duty 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Fuel  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Export Tax  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Access Fees  2.44 4.88 4.88 4.88 4.88 4.88 4.88 4.88 
Employment Benefits  0.20 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 
Opportunity Cost of Catch  -2.44 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 
External Cost  -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
          
Aggregate RG Net Benefits 0.00 -0.27 1.09 1.15 1.21 1.29 1.37 1.47 1.57 
Check 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
          
Referent Group NPV $20.13         
Type of Net Benefit          
Direct Taxes $15.80         
Indirect Taxes $0.00         
Access Fees $58.55         
Employment Benefits $4.77         
Opportunity Cost of Catch -$58.55         
External Cost -$0.43         
Total $20.13         
Stakeholder Group          
Government $15.80         
Labour $4.77         
Community -$0.43         
Total $20.13         
          
Non-Referent Group Net Benefits         
WPTP $20.44         
Foreign Bank $9.57         
European Union $81.55         
Total $111.56         
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9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
            
1.69 1.82 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91 2.36 2.36 2.36 2.36 5.23 
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0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 
0.98 1.11 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.64 4.51 
1.33 1.46 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 4.86 
            
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4.88 4.88 4.88 4.88 4.88 4.88 4.88 4.88 4.88 4.88 4.88 4.88 
0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 
-4.88 -4.88 
-
4.88 -4.88 
-
4.88 -4.88 
-
4.88 
-
4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 -4.88 
-0.04 -0.04 
-
0.04 -0.04 
-
0.04 -0.04 
-
0.04 
-
0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
            
1.69 1.82 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91 2.36 2.36 2.36 2.36 5.23 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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